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ABSTRACT
A concern with respect for local culture, practices and customs emerged in 
international humanitarian assistance in the 1990s. This concern is clearly 
necessary as humanitarian assistance operations have frequently suffered from an 
inadequate appreciation of the local context, which has negatively affected the 
effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid, as well as the security of aid 
workers. The emergence of respect for culture, however, also raises questions 
about the relationship of this norm to the traditional humanitarian principles, and 
in particular of the possibility that some cultural norms and practices may run into 
an irresolvable conflict with the normative framework underpinning international 
humanitarian assistance.
The issue of culture in the humanitarian context has thus far been under- 
researched. The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the conceptual and practical 
implications of the commitment to respect culture for international humanitarian 
assistance both at the level of principles and policy. First, the existing normative 
framework underpinning international humanitarian assistance is described 
through an examination of international legal documents, and aid organisations’ 
statements of principle and professional guidelines. Second, the emergence of the 
norm of respect for culture in international law, in the principles and guidelines of 
aid organisations, as well as in academic research is discussed. Third, the 
conceptual tools of normative political theory are applied in order to examine the 
interaction between the existing normative framework, on one hand, and the norm 
of respect for culture, on the other. In particular, types of potential conflict 
between the two, and possible ways of addressing such conflicts are discussed. 
Fourth, the implications of respect for culture for gender issues in the 
humanitarian context are also examined. Finally, the findings from the conceptual 
analysis are brought onto an operational level through a discussion of their 
implications for humanitarian policy and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Food packets presently dropping over Afghanistan inspire memories o f similar US 
generosity in other war zones. The Afghan parcels, bearing a message o f 
friendship written in English to a largely illiterate population, contain items like 
peanut butter and jam, and include moist towelettes, presumably for a touch o f 
dining etiquette. So it was in the 1992 intervention in Somalia, when the 
Americans attempted to win hearts and minds by distributing hot water bottles, 
teddy bears and tins o f baked beans with pork sausages.1
The above quote illustrates but one of the more recent examples of international 
humanitarian assistance that is inappropriate to the culture and customs of its 
recipients (which is not to say that this is the only axis along which the deliveries 
of assistance by the US Government in Afghanistan could conceivably be 
criticised2). It is precisely because of problems like these that (at least the non- 
and inter-govemmental) practitioners of international humanitarian assistance 
have recently become increasingly aware that understanding of, and respect for, 
local culture and customs is an intrinsic part of the successful provision of 
humanitarian assistance. A variety of examples of such increasing awareness can 
be cited: training courses for humanitarian aid workers now often include
1 ‘Towelettes for Afghans,’ Prospect (November 2001), p. 6.
2 For example, it has been pointed out that the American aid packages were at least initially the 
same colour -  yellow -  as the unexploded cluster bombs that the US-led forces also dropped from 
their planes, with the ensuing confusion endangering the lives of the people trying to collect aid 
packages.
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components entitled something like ‘cultural awareness’,3 and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) organised a seminar in 1998 for non­
governmental organisations on ‘Humanitarian Standards and Cultural 
Differences’.4 Perhaps most significantly, however, this concern with culture and 
customs was given explicit normative status in 1994, when the signatories to an 
interagency agreement on professional standards for humanitarian aid workers, 
the Code o f Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (hereafter Code 
o f Conduct), made an explicit commitment ‘...to respect the culture, structures and 
customs of the communities and countries we are working in’.5 The inclusion of 
this norm in the Code of Conduct is significant, as it is possibly the most 
important contemporary attempt to express what may be described as the present 
normative consensus underpinning international disaster relief, applicable both 
during peacetime disasters and in armed conflict.
The cultural and customary norms and practices of the recipients of humanitarian 
assistance are something that humanitarian practitioners must engage with in their 
day-to-day work. For this reason, it is important to understand both the
3 This was the title o f such a segment in the Finnish Red Cross’s Basic Training Course fo r  Future 
Delegates, which I attended in 1999.
4 See ICRC Seminar for Non-Govemmental Organizations on Humanitarian Standards and 
Cultural Differences, 14 December 1998 (a Summary Report of the seminar proceedings is 
available via http://www.icrc.org).
5 Code o f  Conduct fo r  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements and Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994) [hereafter Code o f  Conduct]. The 
full text of the Code o f  Conduct is available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct. For 
background of the Code o f  Conduct, see e.g. Nick Cater, ‘Setting Standards,’ Red Cross, Red 
Crescent: The Magazine o f  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (No. 1,
2002), pp. 12-13.
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possibilities and problems that ‘respect for culture and customs’ may create for 
international humanitarian assistance. On one hand, respect for culture and 
customs is clearly important for the successful provision of international 
humanitarian assistance. All too often, mistakes made in international 
humanitarian aid operations have been the result of an inadequate understanding 
of, and/or respect for, the local context, including culture and customs. Sometimes 
these mistakes may have been relatively trivial ones, while at other times they 
may have made the difference between life and death. One need only to consider 
the practical implications of providing pork as the only source of protein to a 
devout Muslim population to bring home the seriousness of the concern. 
Moreover, even if many such errors seem more like honest mistakes than anything 
else, it is important to consider what such mistakes tell us about the relationship 
between the donor and recipient communities.
On the other hand, respect for culture and customs, however necessary, may also 
create problems in international humanitarian assistance. It seems conceivable, 
indeed probable, that there may be cultural or customary norms and practices that 
conflict with the norms and principles on which international humanitarian 
assistance is based. What are the implications of ‘respect for culture and customs’ 
in such situations? The issue is further complicated by the fact that ‘culture and 
customs’ are anything but precise categories. This means that beliefs, norms and 
practices may be classified under the category of ‘culture and customs’ in a 
manner that render the norm of ‘respect for culture and customs’ vulnerable to 
abuses of power, as it can at times be very difficult to distinguish between
9
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genuinely shared cultural norms, on one hand, and oppressive practices serving 
the interests of the few, on the other.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and clarify some of the implications that 
respect for culture and customs may have for the principles and policies of 
international humanitarian assistance. This is an important topic to which very 
little systematic attention has been devoted thus far. I have chosen to use the 
concepts and methods of contemporary political theory to address this issue. Two 
main types of reasons can be identified for using political theory to address the 
issue of respect for culture in humanitarian assistance: on one hand, humanitarian 
assistance can contribute to normative political theory in the sense that it provides 
a fresh angle to a central issue area (i.e. the problem of culture) in contemporary 
political theory; on the other hand, the thesis seeks to utilise the methods of 
political theory to clarify some of the basic concepts and choices associated with 
international humanitarian assistance, both specifically in relation to the issue of 
culture as well as more generally. Let me now examine these two aspects in more 
detail:
On one hand, the project may be seen as a practical ‘case study* within the more 
general, and abstract, debate regarding universalism and particularism (or 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, as it is also known) in international 
political theory.6 I believe that international humanitarian assistance has
6 The major features and participants of this debate are by now well known. Thus, I will not enter 
into a discussion of them here. For an introduction to the general philosophical issues at stake, but 
with primary emphasis on the domestic context, see Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals
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characteristics that make it particularly suited for such a case study. For one, 
humanitarian assistance is a rare international activity in that it is based on 
explicitly stated universalistic ethical norms, in particular on humanity and 
impartiality.7 As the content of these norms is discussed at length in the following 
chapter of the thesis, it will suffice to say here that the principle of humanity 
refers to the call to save lives and prevent or alleviate human suffering, while the 
principle of impartiality is a distributive principle according to which every 
human being is equally entitled to humanitarian assistance, qualified only by the 
extent of his or her needs. The interaction between these universalistic principles 
and local cultural and customary norms is an intrinsic and unavoidable part of the 
practice of international humanitarian assistance, as humanitarian assistance is one 
of the few international activities that directly involves ‘ordinary’ citizens, as 
opposed to members of political or economic elites. Moreover, because it 
explicitly deals with matters of life and death, humanitarian assistance is also 
likely to bring the implications of the different ethical approaches under extreme 
circumstances into sharp relief, something that does not usually occur in non­
emergency contexts. The picture is further complicated by the fact that, in the 
context of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, during the past decade 
concepts such as culture, tradition, and ethnicity have gained an increasingly 
significant role (at least at the level of rhetoric) in the conflicts themselves.
and Communitarians, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992; for an introduction to this debate 
specifically in the international context, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New 
Normative Approaches, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
7 These norms appear, for example, in the Fundamental Principles o f  the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement (available, for example, at http://www.redcross.org.uk/index.asp?id=10), in 
the Code o f  Conduct (available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp), and in the 
interagency Sphere Project (available at http://www.sphereproject.org).
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On the other hand, the introduction of the concepts and methods of (international) 
political theory can also add clarity to contemporary debates within humanitarian 
assistance. In particular, they can be seen as providing a more general conceptual 
network with regard to elements of the contemporary international system, within 
which the principles and practice of humanitarian assistance can be located in 
relation to other related but distinct activities and actors, such as international 
distributive justice, as well as the state and the states system. It is, after all, 
primarily in relation to and by contrast with other activities and actors, both real 
and potential, that it is possible to define the nature of a particular activity or 
actor, in this case that of humanitarian assistance and the humanitarian aid 
community. Thus, locating humanitarian assistance within the ‘big picture’, as it 
were, in this manner can also go some way in helping humanitarians to address 
some of the central contemporary debates within humanitarian assistance, such as 
the ones about accountability and quality, which at bottom may be seen as being 
about what contemporary humanitarian assistance both descriptively is and 
normatively ought to be. In this context, one of the questions that may be raised is 
whether, or to what extent, this thesis helps practitioners to make correct, or at 
least better, decisions with regard to culture. Even though the argument is made 
with reference to concrete cases and decisions throughout the thesis and in 
particular in the final chapter, it should be emphasised that I have not set out to 
offer a code of conduct in respect for culture or even to improve those codes that 
already exist (and that are discussed at length in this thesis), and thus I do not 
expect to improve practitioners’ decisions in any direct way. Rather, my aim has
12
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been to clarify the general guiding principles of humanitarian assistance in light of 
their wider context, and thus to get practitioners to think more clearly about the 
problems of applying these principles giving due respect to culture.
CONTEXT
Despite the potential for bringing together two different academic literatures (i.e. 
political theory and humanitarian assistance) that this topic presents, as was 
described above, it is nonetheless important to emphasise that my primary interest 
in this issue is not academic but practical. In international humanitarian assistance, 
cultural and customary norms and practices pose concrete problems that aid 
workers must somehow resolve in their day-to-day work. One of the aims of this 
research is to use some of the conceptual tools of the existing academic discourse 
regarding universalism and particularism to make sense of phenomena 
confronting practitioners of international humanitarian assistance. Working as 
Desk Officer for Western and Southern Africa in the International Aid 
Department of the Finnish Red Cross, I was struck by the -  often tragicomic -  
stories recounted by experienced aid workers, where their efforts had in one way 
or another run into conflict with the culture and customs of the local population. 
While these examples are anecdotal, they can be seen as reflecting a more general 
phenomenon, namely the emergence of a norm of respect for culture and custom 
in international humanitarian assistance, as well as the sometimes problematic 
implications that this concern may have for the other norms governing 
humanitarian assistance:
13
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In one case, an aid agency had included spaghetti in the food aid it had sent to a 
certain part of Somalia. The consequence was that the recipients proceeded to 
laboriously turn the spaghetti into flour, as it, rather than pasta, was part of their 
normal diet. Another case involved an European aid worker ordering hundreds of 
mattresses for a group of Afghan nomads who had no use for them, simply 
because he had incorrectly interpreted their needs (presumably on the basis of 
what his own needs would have been in their situation). I think it bears 
emphasising that the ‘spaghetti-for-Somalia’ episode and others like it may appear 
trivial but have in fact very serious implications as they have been got wrong so 
often. These examples, far from isolated ones, illustrate failures on the part of aid 
workers and agencies in understanding local culture and customs. It is examples 
like this that have, quite justifiably, prompted the emerging concern with respect 
for culture and custom in international humanitarian assistance.
There are, however, other kinds of stories about the interaction between local 
culture and customs and the norms of humanitarian assistance as well. Probably 
the most striking one for me was that of an African woman, recounted by a highly 
experienced European aid worker. The aid worker had been involved in an aid 
operation where he was responsible for the distribution of food aid, where the 
method -  today increasingly common -  of giving aid to village elders to be 
distributed further had been used. Because the local distribution of food 
customarily went through male heads of the family, an old woman, a widow, had 
been left completely without and was starving to death. Even though there was no
14
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indication that this was a situation where anyone had to die (i.e. it was not a case 
of distribution of scarce resources in a situation where not everyone could be 
saved), this was accepted by her fellow villagers because they considered her, as a 
widow, to be effectively dead already. The aid worker who told the story said that 
his choice in this situation had been not to become involved, so as not to interfere 
with the local culture. In doing so, however, his decision appeared to fly in the 
face of the basic rationale for humanitarian aid, namely the saving of lives and 
alleviation of suffering of all persons. It was this example in particular that 
prompted me to think whether there were limits to how far the respect for culture 
and custom should go, or how the importance of this norm should be ‘ranked’ if 
and when irreconcilable conflicts between it and the other norms of international 
humanitarian assistance arose. This example also illustrates the problems that can 
arise when the practical implications of normative commitments such as the one 
to respect culture and customs are left to the intuition of individual aid workers 
rather than being systematically examined and clarified. Obviously, it is very 
difficult to give conclusive answers to many of these questions, as much depends 
on the specific circumstances encountered in the field. I believe, however, that 
simply raising questions and highlighting concerns is useful.
Having explained above some of the context and motivation from which this 
thesis arises, let me now go on to make some remarks about some of the central 
definitions related to the subject matter of the thesis. In doing so, my aim is also to 
locate this research in the broader context of some major contemporary debates 
surrounding international humanitarian assistance.
15
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DEFINITIONS AND DEBATES
It is customary to begin this kind of research exercise by defining the subject 
matter at hand. The purpose of offering such definitions is to clarify both the 
content as well as the boundaries of the research exercise in question; in other 
words, to identify the kinds of issues that the particular research project seeks to 
address as well as those left outside of its remit. In the context of the present 
exercise, the most important concepts that require definition are ‘international 
humanitarian assistance’, on one hand, and ‘culture’, on the other. I will therefore 
say something of each of them in turn.
International humanitarian assistance
As traditionally defined, international humanitarian assistance refers to the 
deployment o f relief by international aid organisations or agencies to alleviate
a
suffering and prevent deaths resulting from an emergency or a disaster. 
Arguably, this definition continues by and large to reflect the activities and self- 
image of most contemporary aid agencies and aid workers and therefore will be 
used as a starting-point for this thesis. At the same time, it should be noted that 
this definition has in recent years come under challenge from various directions; 
some of the major challenges will be discussed below. Let us first unpack the 
elements of this definition, however:
8 For an example of this ‘traditional’ definition, see for example Peter Macalister-Smith,
16
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(1) Relief refers to the provision of assistance in kind, by way of financial 
contributions, or through the services of trained personnel, aimed at compensating 
for the abnormal situation created by the disaster and helping to bring the affected 
people’s lives ‘back to normal*.
(2) International aid agencies refer to organisations that provide disaster relief in 
at least one country outside of their origin. Most international humanitarian aid 
agencies are based in Western Europe or North America, although many of them 
operate globally, either independently or in co-operation with locally-based 
agencies. Such agencies may be intergovernmental (for example, United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), and 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)) or non-governmental (for 
example, CARE, Caritas, Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), and the 
different parts of the Red Cross Movement).9 It is also possible, even if in practice 
rare, for a single government to directly engage in disaster relief in a country other 
than its own (for example, the US government’s recent assistance efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq could be seen as cases in point -  however, it should be noted 
in this context that many would argue that assistance can only be considered 
properly humanitarian if the disaster in question is not in any sense of one’s own
International Humanitarian Assistance, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, pp. 1-7.
9 For a detailed, even if  partly outdated, description of the different humanitarian aid organisations, 
see Yves Beigbeder, The Role and Status o f  International Humanitarian Volunteers and 
Organizations: The Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991.
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making10).
(3) Disasters are events or developments resulting in loss of life, great human 
suffering and distress, and large scale material damage. The definition of any 
particular situation as a disaster depends on a complex set of variables. This is 
because an objectively measurable event -  for example, an earthquake of a 
particular magnitude -  may or may not constitute a disaster depending on whether 
or not it occurs in a highly populated area, the time of day it occurs (e.g. whether 
people are mainly outside or inside buildings), whether or not the buildings 
affected have been constructed to withstand earthquakes, and so on. Moreover, a 
crucial dimension of a disaster is that the needs created by the disastrous event or 
development are such that they overwhelm the locally existing resources and 
capacities. The decision of when and how such capacities are overwhelmed is, 
however, to a large extent a political one, rather than dependent on the presence of 
some objectively measurable phenomena.
Disasters are usually classified etiologically, in other words according to their 
cause; the basic division is between natural and man-made disasters.11 Natural 
disasters are those resulting from the effects of natural phenomena (for example, 
floods, droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, mudslides,
10 For example, according to Henry Shue, ‘[i]f there is indeed a disaster, but one is the cause of it, 
or has deep complicity in it because one has inflicted harm in violation of a fundamental moral 
constraint, then any assistance one provides is more accurately thought of as compensation for the 
harm done than humanitarian assistance.’ Henry Shue, ‘Morality, Politics and Humanitarian 
Assistance,’ in Bruce Nichols and Gil Loescher (eds.), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and 
U.S. Foreign Policy Today, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, p. 22.
11 See e.g. Macalister-Smith, op. cit., in note 8, pp. 2-3.
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tsunamis, tornadoes, typhoons, cyclones, avalanches, or fire). Man-made disasters 
can be divided into those that arise accidentally or as the result of negligence (for 
example, chemical or nuclear accidents) and those that are the result deliberate 
actions (for example, armed conflict). Disasters may also be the result of a 
combination of natural and man-made factors (for example, many famines); it is 
with reference to disasters of this type that the term ‘complex emergencies’ has 
emerged in recent years. Indeed, disasters need not have a single cause; instead, 
there may be multiple independent causes or they may occur as the cumulative 
effects of a series of linked events. Disasters and the resulting need for assistance 
can appear suddenly (for example, earthquakes) or develop incrementally over 
long periods of time (for example, famine or armed conflict), and can be long or 
short term in duration. They can involve large or small numbers of people (though 
international humanitarian aid agencies usually only become involved when the 
numbers affected are relatively large).
As was already mentioned above, this understanding of what international 
humanitarian assistance involves, or ought to involve, has in recent years come 
under a number of challenges.12 Having offered a brief description of what I have 
described as the ‘traditional* definition of international humanitarian assistance 
above, let me now turn to examining some of the contemporary challenges to this 
definition. In part, these challenges can be seen as relating to the question of 
whether the above description accurately reflects the reality of what contemporary
12 For another discussion of such challenges, see for example Joanna Macrae, ‘The Origins of 
Unease: Setting the Context of Current Ethical Debates,’ paper presented at Ethics in 
Humanitarian Aid: Non-Governmental Organisations Forum, Dublin, 1-10 December 1996.
19
Introduction
humanitarian assistance is, while in part they are about what humanitarian 
assistance ought to be. Both aspects are relevant for the present exercise: 
questions of the first type (i.e. about what humanitarian assistance is) relate to the 
issue of whether it makes sense to discuss international humanitarian assistance as 
a distinctive practice -  as is assumed to be the case in this thesis; whereas 
questions of the second type (i.e. about what humanitarian assistance ought to be) 
raise the more fundamental question of whether humanitarian assistance in its 
traditional form is even in fact something desirable -  after all, if it is not, it would 
make more sense to seek to develop alternatives to it rather than waste one’s time 
discussing it in its present form.
Humanitarian assistance vs. global redistribution o f resources
Let me begin with what presents perhaps one of the most fundamental challenges 
-  in the sense of questioning its entire raison d ’etre -  to humanitarian assistance 
today. This challenge arises from the conviction that vulnerability to disasters, as 
well as the capacity to respond to them, reflects at bottom an unjust international 
distribution of resources. There is something obviously persuasive about this idea, 
as it is certainly possible to see much of the suffering and death in the world, 
whatever its proximate causes, as ultimately the outcome of poverty. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how else could it be explained that humanitarian assistance 
relatively consistently flows from the rich countries of the North to the poor ones 
in the South, and hardly ever in the opposing direction. If poverty is indeed the 
key variable behind the need to engage in humanitarian assistance, at face value at
2 0
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least it would seem to make sense to seek to prevent the suffering and deaths in 
the first place by concentrating on dealing with the underlying problem of 
poverty, understood in the sense of inequalities in the international distribution of 
resources, instead of applying the admittedly temporary and inadequate ‘band-aid* 
of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, humanitarian assistance can even be accused 
of helping to uphold the existing inequalities, in the sense that it serves as a means 
of simultaneously staving off the guilt of the rich as well as pacifying the poor by 
dealing with the worst excesses resulting from an unequal international 
distribution of resources, while leaving the basic institutional structures 
untouched. Along these lines, for example, B. S. Chimni has argued that 
‘[h]umanitarianism is the ideology of hegemonic states in the era of globalisation 
marked by the end of the Cold War and a growing North-South divide. ...[T]he 
ideology of humanitarianism mobilises a range of meanings and practices to 
establish and sustain global relations of domination*.13
Thus, the nature of this challenge is that it is argued that, rather than giving 
humanitarian assistance at their discretion as they currently do, the rich states 
actually have an obligation to transfer resources to the poorer ones as a matter of 
justice. An obligation to transfer resources internationally could be defended in a 
variety of ways: for example, as compensation for past wrongs, as an equal right 
to ownership of natural resources, as a human right, or as a mutual obligation
13 B. S. Chimni, Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion o f  Refugee Protection; RSC 
Working paper No. 3, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, February 2000, p. 2.
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deriving from alliance.14 Moreover, at least in the more extreme versions of this 
argument, the corollary of this assertion is taken to be that humanitarian assistance 
should be abolished, either right away (because it serves to uphold the inequalities 
by making them more tolerable) or at the very least by the time a just international 
redistribution of resources has been achieved.
The distinction that is usually drawn to illustrate the difference between 
humanitarian aid and such resource transfers is that between charity and justice. 
Charity is something that is freely given, laudable but not necessarily required, 
and where the extent of the giving is dependent on the discretion of the giver. This 
implies that those doing the giving as a matter of charity can exercise control over 
the resources handed over, and impose conditions on their use; by contrast, 
whatever is owed as a matter of justice is obligatory rather than voluntary, its 
extent is not discretionary, nor can it be made conditional. For example, one of the 
practical implications of being able to show that something would be owed 
internationally as a matter of justice would be that it could then be made the 
subject of coercive taxation irrespective of the will of the individual taxpayers, 
whereas charitable donations ought by definition to be voluntary.
14 Various arguments along these lines have been described in what is known as the ‘global justice’ 
literature. The term ‘global justice’ is probably most predominantly associated with Ian Shapiro 
and Lea Brilmeyer (eds.), Global Justice, New York: New York University Press, 1999. There are 
also other works that could be seen as falling under this heading, however. See, for example, 
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979; Charles Beitz, ‘Justice and International Relations,’ in Charles R. Beitz et al., International 
Ethics: A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, 
pp. 282-311; Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999; Onora O’Neill, Faces o f  Hunger, London: Allen & Unwin, 1986; and 
Henry Shue, Basic Rights; Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996.
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In this context, it should be noted that the idea of humanitarianism as charity is 
sometimes rejected on the grounds that when something is charitably given, on the 
discretion of the giver, that means that ‘anything goes’. This usage of the term 
‘charity’ is reflected, for example, on the International Federation of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) website: ‘[t]here is still an assumption 
in many countries that disaster relief is essentially “charitable” work and therefore 
anything that is done in the name of helping disaster victims is acceptable.’15 It is 
not clear to me, however, why this should necessarily be the case; after all, if we 
are giving humanitarian assistance at all, we ought to set out to do the task as well 
as we can. Thus, humanitarianism and professionalism for the purposes of the 
present context should not be seen as opposites. Moreover, the distinction between 
humanitarianism and global justice drawn here should not be taken to imply that 
governments have no moral and/or legal obligations to provide at least a minimum 
level of protection and welfare for the populations under their control, or that -  
where a state for one reason or another fails to provide such protection or welfare
-  there are no international obligations to provide humanitarian assistance. Indeed, 
such obligations, in particular as derived from international law, will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 1 of the thesis.
For the purposes of this thesis, at least the more extreme versions of this argument
-  i.e. the ones that suggest that humanitarian assistance should be abolished 
entirely either now or later -  are rejected for a number of reasons. Let me begin 
with the argument which seems to be implied at least by Chimni’s position,
15 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Introduction,’ Code o f
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namely the idea that, were it not for the ‘softening* effects of humanitarian 
assistance on the worst excesses of the existing international economic order, the 
unbearableness of the circumstances would somehow push people to overhaul the 
existing structures and replace them with better ones. Therefore, the argument 
goes, it would in the long-term at least be better (even if considerable suffering 
might be the short-term outcome) if humanitarian assistance were to be abolished. 
The problem with this argument, however, is that -  unless we hold some sort of 
crude Marxist determinist views about the necessary course of historical progress 
-  there are simply no guarantees that withdrawing humanitarian assistance 
entirely would necessarily mean that the structures would be changed, let alone 
that they would be changed for the better, all that would be guaranteed is that 
suffering and death would go on unabated.
Having said this, there does not seem to be anything about humanitarian 
assistance that would preclude combining it with measures aimed at alleviating 
poverty. Indeed, as a way of dealing with concerns regarding human welfare, 
international humanitarian assistance is clearly inadequate on its own: it would be 
a very thin conception of human welfare indeed that would be limited to ensuring 
survival and alleviating (physical) suffering, which are after all the activities 
humanitarian assistance tends to focus on. In this context, it may be helpful to 
employ the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory introduced by John 
Rawls. Simply put, ideal theory seeks to answer the question of what a perfectly 
just society (or, in this case, international system) would be like, whereas non­
Conduct (http ://www .ifrc.org/publ icat/conduct/index. asp).
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ideal theory is adjusted to ‘natural limitations and historical contingencies’.16 
Now, on one hand, both humanitarianism and the idea about the obligation to 
redistribute resources globally can be seen as alternative ideal theories. In this 
case, humanitarianism may rightly be accused of being intrinsically conservative 
of the existing international order by comparison to the global transfers of 
resources. On the other hand -  and this is the argument adopted in this thesis -  
rather than as an alternative ‘ideal theory’, humanitarian assistance can also be 
seen as an auxiliary or complement to measures aimed at dealing with long-term 
structural problems, such as poverty, with humanitarian assistance concentrating 
on addressing unexpected crises or disasters. In addition, in the present situation 
where the international community is nowhere near to agreeing what, if anything, 
ought to be done regarding poverty, let alone taking effective measures towards 
that goal, humanitarian assistance would seem to defend its place as a means of 
alleviating suffering and preventing deaths. Indeed, humanitarian assistance seems 
in principle compatible with a wide variety of conceptions of appropriate social 
order; what it is concerned with is simply keeping people alive in an emergency 
situation, in the hopes that they will eventually be able to return to some form of 
normalcy, where more comprehensive social arrangements -  however conceived -  
will again become possible.
In addition, it should be noted that it is not clear that the need for international 
humanitarian assistance would be completely eliminated in a world even with a 
perfectly equitable international distribution of resources. As Brian Barry -  an
16 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 245-246.
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advocate of international redistribution himself -  has pointed out, while
[t]he need for humanitarian aid would be reduced in a world that had a basically 
just international distribution[J [i]t would still be required to meet special 
problems caused by crop failure owing to drought, destruction owing to floods 
and earthquakes, and similar losses resulting from other natural disasters. It 
would also, unhappily, continue to be required to cope with the massive refugee
17problems that periodically arise from political upheavals.
In other words, while a more equitable international distribution of resources 
would probably improve the capacity of many states to prevent disasters and 
respond to them, it could not eliminate the need for humanitarian assistance 
completely. This is due to a number of factors: natural disasters are not always 
predictable, nor can they necessarily be prevented even where they can be 
predicted. Moreover, it seems overly reductionist to assume that even a perfectly 
equitable international distribution of resources could completely eliminate all 
political conflicts. Indeed, recent studies about Angola and Sierra Leone, two 
countries where large segments of the population have had to rely on international 
humanitarian assistance for their basic survival needs for years -  or, in the case of 
Angola, decades -  have demonstrated that it may in fact have been their resource 
wealth (in oil and diamonds, respectively) rather than resource poverty that has
17 Brian Barry, ‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,’ in his Democracy, Power and 
Justice: Essays in Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 461.
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fuelled the conflict in these countries.18 Indeed, the term ‘complex emergencies’ 
was coined precisely because it was acknowledged that conflict-generated 
emergencies by their very nature have complex, multiple causes. And, even with 
the improvement in disaster response capacities that a more equitable international 
distribution of resources could bring, sometimes the scale of the emergency can 
simply be overwhelming. Finally, there is of course also the unhappy possibility 
that governments may simply not concern themselves with the survival of all or 
some segment of their population. For all these reasons, humanitarian assistance 
as currently understood would seem to defend its place even in a world with a 
(more) equitable international distribution of resources.
In conclusion, to summarise the argument that has been presented above, the 
position taken as the starting point of this thesis is that, rather than being an 
(inferior) alternative to efforts aimed at alleviating global poverty, as has been 
suggested by some advocates of global redistribution of resources, international 
humanitarian assistance serves a purpose distinctive of, even if often 
complementary to, such efforts.
18 On Sierra Leone, see Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: 
Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security,’ Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000 
(available at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org/docs/diamond_doc.doc); on Angola, see ‘A 
Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the 
Plunder of State Assets,’ London: Global Witness, December 1999 (available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/oil/reports.php); on the economics of civil conflict more 
generally, see also, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil 
War,’ 21 October 2001 (available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm).
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Humanitarian assistance and the ‘consequentialist ’ challenge
In addition to the challenge that the raison d ’etre of international humanitarian 
assistance has faced from at least some advocates of the global justice perspective, 
there is also another challenge that potentially puts in question the desirability of 
humanitarian assistance. In the contemporary literature, this challenge is usually 
referred to as ‘consequentialism’, which is contrasted with a view of 
humanitarianism described as ‘deontological’.19
Deontology and consequentialism are of course terminology not limited to the 
humanitarian context but rather used in moral philosophy and ethics more 
generally. Briefly described, those approaches to moral philosophy and ethics that 
hold that certain acts are morally right or wrong in themselves, independent of 
their consequences, are said to be deontological. As a result, deontologists tend to 
emphasise the role of duty and intention in moral behaviour. Immanuel Kant and 
Kantian theories, e.g. theories of human rights, are examples of deontology. 
Deontology is usually contrasted with consequentialism: for consequentialists, the 
rightness or wrongness of any act depends on its consequences, i.e. whether it in 
fact does any identifiable good or harm. Thus, a consequentialist -  in particular an 
act-consequentialist -  would argue that one should act in whatever way would
19 The deontology-consequentialism distinction has been employed in the humanitarian context by 
Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, London: Zed Books, 2001, Ch. 4; Des 
Gasper, ‘Drawing a Line: Ethical and Political Strategies in Complex Emergency Assistance/ 
European Journal o f  Development Research (Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999), pp. 87-114; Hugo Slim,
‘Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political 
Emergencies and War,’ Disasters (Vol. 21, No. 3, 1997), pp. 244-257; and Hugo Slim, ‘Claiming 
a Humanitarian Imperative: NGOs and the Cultivation of Humanitarian Duty,’ paper presented at 
the 7* Annual Conference of Webster University, entitled Humanitarian Values for the Twenty-
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bring about the best overall state of affairs. Probably the best-known 
consequentialist moral theory is utilitarianism. It should be noted that deontology 
is not the same as absolutism, according to which certain acts are right or wrong, 
whatever the consequences. Deontologists do not entirely disregard consequences, 
and can allow that in exceptional circumstances it may not be wrong to break a 
rule. For example, in cases where two rules conflict, the weightier principle 
trumps the lesser, e.g. that you ought to break a promise to meet a friend for a 
drink in order to save a life. This should, however, not be interpreted so much as 
overruling the principle for the sake of the consequences but rather as treating the 
saving of life as the more important principle than the particular promise. Thus, 
faced with having to choose between the two, deontologists will tend to give 
priority to rules, principles and intentions over consequences. In a similar manner, 
consequentialists do not necessarily reject the moral significance of rules and 
principles, but tend to interpret them as guidelines based on previous 
consequences.
The main problem with deontological approaches is that it is not clear what 
ultimately is the source of the moral authority of the rules that deontological 
theories posit we ought to follow. Earlier deontological theories drew of course on 
the will of God, or that of some other metaphysical being, as the source for 
determining what was morally right or wrong. In the contemporary, secular era, 
this is no longer seen as an option by many people. Some have suggested that a 
more appropriate source for moral rules is what people can agree upon. The
first Century, 21-22 February 2002, Geneva.
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problem here is, of course, that people do not as a matter of fact agree upon that 
much. This is true both within a domestic context, and certainly even more so 
when dealing with issues of an international or global scope, such as international 
humanitarian assistance. At the same time, as committed deontologists often point 
out, the counter-argument to this could be that moral argument should not be 
confused with anthropology; the role of the moral argument is to persuade people, 
not to document their agreements.
The consequentialist position is attractive because it bases its judgement of 
whether an action is right or wrong on its real effects on human welfare. There 
are, however, also a number of problems with it. For one, it is not clear how the 
different consequences are to be measured and evaluated against one another. 
Thus, its usefulness as an actual guide for action is questionable. This is the 
problem, for example, with Peter Singer’s well-known attempt to justify the 
obligation to provide international famine relief on the basis of a consequentialist 
(utilitarian) argument.20 Briefly, Singer argues in favour of the obligation to 
provide famine relief on the basis of two assumptions: first, that ‘suffering and 
death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad’, and second, that ‘if is 
in our power to prevent something veiy bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.’21 He then 
offers the following example to illustrate his argument:
20 See Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality,’ in Charles R. Beitz et al. (eds.), 
International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1985, pp. 247-261.
21 Ibid., p. 249.
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I f  I  am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I  ought to 
wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this 
is insignificant, while the death o f the child would presumably be a very bad 
thing}2
Adding that the second assumption is unaffected by proximity/distance and that ‘it 
makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could 
possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same 
position’, Singer concludes that the acceptance of these assumptions commits us 
to the position that rich countries have a moral obligation to help the people in 
poor ones.23 However, as Brian Barry has pointed out, it is not clear why, on the 
basis of the utilitarian calculus, the scales would necessarily tip in favour of an 
obligation to provide famine relief: ‘for a Benthamite utilitarian, for example, 
even getting one’s trousers muddy would be in itself an evil -  not one comparable 
to the death of the child, but an evil none the less. Even Singer’s chosen case 
would be eliminated on this criterion, let alone any more strenuous sacrifices.’24
In addition, a further problem with consequentialism is that it fails to take the 
individual person’s well-being seriously: it thinks nothing of sacrificing the 
welfare of an individual, including his or her life, if that contributes to maximising
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pp. 249-250.
24 Barry, op. cit. in note 17, p. 439.
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the overall welfare. This latter feature of the consequentialist position is a 
particularly serious problem when we are dealing with matters of life and death as 
humanitarian assistance does. Having said this, it is not clear to what extent the 
humanitarian ‘consequentialists’ are in fact committed to a consistent 
consequentialist position. Rather, it seems to me that, while they may be 
disappointed that saving lives here and now has turned out to be much more 
complicated than the thoroughly positive exercise it appears at first sight to be, 
they are still basically committed to the humanitarian principles. This is a different 
position from one that explicitly seeks to maximise overall welfare even at the 
expense of individual lives.
A deontological take on the ethics of international humanitarian assistance would 
be that saving lives and alleviating suffering is a good thing in itself, irrespective 
of its consequences. For a long time, humanitarianism was what could probably 
best be described as ‘unselfconsciously deontological’; however, since the 1990s, 
increasing attention has been paid to the fact that emergency relief may also have 
negative unintended consequences.25 ‘Consequentialism’ in the humanitarian 
context therefore refers to a cluster of concerns, raised primarily from a political 
economy perspective, as a result of the realisation that ‘[t]ime after time, aid that 
was meant as simple, neutral, and pure ‘act of mercy’ becomes tainted by 
subsequent negative ramifications’ 26 In particular, the consequentialist concern
25 See, for example, Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  Or War, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
26 Mary B. Anderson, ‘”You Save My Life Today, But for What Tomorrow?”: Some Moral 
Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid,’ in Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in 
Humanitarian Intervention, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 137.
32
Introduction
has focused on two issues: first, that emergency relief may in fact fuel, and 
therefore exacerbate and/or prolong, armed conflict, and second, that it may create 
dependency in its recipients. Let me briefly discuss what each of these concerns 
involves:
There are a multitude of ways in which relief may fuel or exacerbate conflict. 
During an armed conflict, combatants may steal or extort relief goods for many 
reasons: in order to trade them for other assets (such as weapons), to provide the 
basic necessities for combatants, to prevent emergency relief from reaching a 
specific non-combatant population, to attract displaced people to a particular area 
in order to kill them, to attract new conscripts, or to trade in for sexual favours. 
Combatants may also receive money for providing protection for aid workers and 
their warehouses, or for allowing access to certain roads, airfields or ports.28 And, 
even where emergency relief assistance actually goes to the civilian population 
rather than falling into the hands of combatants, it may indirectly contribute to the 
war effort Relief supplies can free resources, otherwise needed for civilian 
welfare, for military purposes. This reduces the need for the combatants to be 
accountable to the population they claim to represent, a phenomenon that can also 
be described as undermining the social contract.29
27 Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000, pp. 133-134.
™ Ibid., p. 134.
29 See, for example, Alexander de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry 
in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 1997, pp. 137-138 (de Waal uses the term ‘political contract’).
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The second problem regarding the consequences of humanitarian aid is its 
potential to create dependency in its recipients. In this context, aid may be 
provided either too soon or for too long. In the first case, it may displace existing 
coping mechanisms, and in the second case it may encourage people to give up 
productive activities in order to acquire relief goods and services.
To the extent that the consequentialist position is understood as suggesting a 
complete rejection of humanitarian assistance in the face of the potential negative 
consequences, it is clearly flawed. Indeed, as Mary B. Anderson -  a leading 
exponent of consequentialism in humanitarian aid herself -  has pointed out, 
‘[demonstrating that aid does harm is not the same as demonstrating that no aid 
would do no harm. Nor does the conclusion that aid does harm justify the 
conclusion that providing no aid would result in good’.30 In other words, the 
argument made above against Chimni’s position applies equally here: the 
withdrawal of humanitarian assistance is no guarantee that things will change for 
the better; all that can be guaranteed is that suffering and death will go on 
unabated. Therefore, while completely eliminating humanitarian assistance cannot 
be the answer to the consequentialists’ concerns, what humanitarians can and 
ought to do is to remain aware of the potential dangers outlined by the 
consequentialists, and attempt to minimise them to the best of their ability. At the 
same time, it should be noted that it is not clear whether the problems identified 
by the consequentialists can ever be wholly eliminated in international 
humanitarian assistance; in particular, as will be argued at a greater length in
30 Anderson, op. cit., in note 26, p. 138
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Chapter 1, the ‘undermining of the social contract* may reflect something of an 
inherent tension in humanitarian assistance, and as such may to some extent be 
unavoidable. As far as the potential for humanitarian aid to create dependency is 
concerned, however, the idea of relief-development continuum, to be discussed 
below, has been proposed in part as a response to this problem.
Relief vs. development
In recent years, many people have increasingly started to question the usefulness 
of sharply distinguishing between emergency relief, on one hand, and long-term 
rehabilitation and development assistance, on the other.31 In part, this has been the 
result of the concern with the potential of humanitarian aid to create dependency, 
discussed in the previous section. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that the 
depiction of emergencies as short-term, transitory phenomena often does not 
accurately reflect reality. Indeed, there are many countries -  such as Angola until 
recently or Colombia -  where the emergency situation has continued for several 
decades, and in fact in many ways become the norm, rather than being the 
exception that it has traditionally been assumed to be. In such situations, 
international humanitarian assistance may effectively become the only form of 
public welfare that a generation of people has ever experienced.32 Thus, it is
31 For the dimensions of these debates, see for example Jonathan Moore, ‘The Humanitarian- 
Development Gap,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 833,31 March 1999), pp. 103- 
107, or Hugo Slim, ‘Dissolving the Difference between Humanitarianism and Development: The 
Mixing of a Rights-Based Solution,’ Development in Practice (Vol. 10, No. 3 & 4, August 2000), 
pp. 491-494.
32 Mark Duffield has called this phenomenon the ‘internationalisation of public welfare’. See Mark 
Duffield, ‘The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and
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questioned whether humanitarian assistance in its traditional form, focusing on 
saving lives and alleviating physical suffering as it does, is really adequate in 
situations like these, or whether a more full-fledged, ‘developmentalist’ approach 
to human welfare might be a more appropriate response to the needs of the people 
affected. In addition, there is also the problem that, since emergency relief tends 
to be far more dramatic than development assistance and, as such, provides a 
better chance for scoring political points, many donor governments appear to 
prefer it to the lower-profile development assistance. In this context, it has been 
pointed out that the need to resort to relief activities may often be a direct result of 
a failure to develop local capacities and resources to either prevent disaster 
altogether, or to respond to it adequately.
As a remedy to problems like these, the idea of the relief-development continuum, 
or linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been proposed. The 
idea of LRRD is that relief, rehabilitation and development should be seen as 
being intrinsically related activities that support one another, rather than being 
treated as entirely separate tasks, as has often been done in the past. Thus, the aim 
is to design relief interventions in a way that supports -  or at least does not 
undermine -  longer term rehabilitation and development goals and, vice versa, 
includes disaster prevention and preparedness measures in development 
programmes in order to prevent, or at least diminish, the effects of disasters. On 
the face of it, this seems like a perfectly reasonable expectation. It should also be 
noted, however, that LRRD may be more difficult to achieve in practice than it
International Aid,’ in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger: Rethinking 
International Approaches to Complex Emergencies, London: Zed Books, 1994, p. 57-63.
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would seem at first sight. For one, humanitarians may sometimes be faced with 
genuine trade-offs between saving lives, on one hand, and figuring out how such 
an activity fits into the development agenda, on the other, in terms of both time 
and resources. In such a situation, as the survival of the population would appear 
to be a basic precondition for the success of any development programme, it 
would seem that a choice in favour of the humanitarian goals over the 
development agenda would be justified. Moreover, the issue is further 
complicated by the fact that, even if there are sufficient time and resources 
available, it is not clear that there is ‘a’ development agenda with which 
humanitarians could straightforwardly align their activities: instead, there seem to 
be many competing and contested ideas regarding both what constitutes 
development as well as how that could be achieved.
Having said this, it should be emphasised that there is nothing in this thesis that 
requires the wholesale rejection of the relief-development continuum. 
Nonetheless, even if the categories of relief and development activity cannot be 
kept rigidly separate, the position taken in this thesis is that relief and 
development are currently -  for better or for worse -  distinct practices, involving 
a distinctive set of actors. For one, due to the mandates of aid organisations as 
well as donor preferences, emergency and development funding is usually not 
fungible: in other words, funds earmarked for emergency assistance cannot be 
used for development or reconstruction, and vice versa P  More importantly, the 
activities that are undertaken under one or the other heading tend to be
33 See Weiss and Collins, op. cit., in note 27, p. 143.
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substantially different. Humanitarian assistance is first and foremost about the 
delivery of essential resources to ensure survival, while development assistance 
incorporates a wide array of measures intended to promote socio-economic 
development broadly conceived. Often there is also a difference in duration: 
humanitarian assistance tends to be short-term while development assistance tends 
to be of longer time-scale. It should be emphasised, however, that duration is only 
one factor in the emergency-development distinction. Even where a political 
emergency goes on for decades, it still remains in important respects an 
emergency: the immediate survival of the population is still constantly under 
threat and the overall situation is usually too volatile for development programmes 
proper to have any real chance of long-term success. Finally, both the separate 
sources of funding and the differences in the activities undertaken (and the 
different skills and training therefore required) mean that aid organisations tend 
either to focus on one or the other side, or -  in those organisations that engage in 
both -  different people tend to be assigned responsibility for emergency relief and 
development assistance, respectively. Therefore, it should be emphasised that 
what I am interested in are the norms and principles that govern the practice of 
relief assistance, as understood by the organisations and individuals that work 
within that practice. For this reason, issues related to development assistance will 
not be addressed in detail in this thesis.
In sum, what all the challenges discussed above share is the concern that 
humanitarian assistance has failed to resolve -  and may at times even have 
reinforced -  the long-term structural problems that arguably contribute to the
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emergence and/or prolongation of many disasters and/or the ability of local 
authorities to respond to them. What I have argued above is that -  while these 
challenges raise important questions for humanitarian assistance that should be 
taken seriously -  insofar as their claim is that what I have called the ‘traditional’ 
understanding of humanitarian assistance is either descriptively inaccurate or 
normatively fundamentally undesirable, they are less than persuasive. While the 
capabilities of humanitarian assistance may be limited, the basic assumption from 
which this thesis proceeds is that it is nonetheless a both distinctive and necessary 
practice.
Indeed, much of the criticism discussed above may at least in part be seen as 
reflecting inflated expectations of what contemporary humanitarian assistance is 
capable of delivering, based on a misunderstanding of the aims and role of 
humanitarian assistance, on one hand, and what should be expected from other 
actors and institutions, on the other. As Hugo Slim has expressed this point,
...in recent years ... perhaps more ink has been spilt by or about humanitarians 
and their responsibility for death and violence than about the responsibility o f 
warlords, violent politicians and international negligence or collusion in the 
violence o f today’s wars or genocides. ...A t times, this has created the absurd 
impression that it is humanitarians rather than politicians, war criminals and 
other powerful forces who should be in the dock for today’s war and 
inhumanity.34
34 Hugo Slim, ‘Sharing a Universal Ethic: The Principle of Humanity in War,’ The International
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These inflated expectations are not necessarily limited to the critics of 
humanitarian assistance but may be held by some of its proponents as well: as 
Mark Duffield has pointed out, ‘[tjhere is a certain narcissism of aid at work in 
which relatively small inputs are credited with powers and effects beyond 
reasonable expectation’.35 Indeed, to refer back to the earlier discussion on 
humanitarian assistance and global justice, there is a sense in which many people 
seek to measure the success or failure of humanitarian assistance on the basis of 
criteria more appropriately used to evaluate a comprehensive attempt to bring 
about international or global justice. Indeed, it sometimes seems that (at least 
some of) the critics of humanitarianism may sometimes expect things from 
humanitarian assistance that even justice, or justice and humanitarianism in 
conjunction, simply cannot deliver. Neither justice nor humanity, nor the two 
together, are a panacea that can solve all the ills of the world; it is simply 
impossible to help all of the people in all ways all of the time, not least because 
finite resources mean that there are trade-offs to be made and priorities to be set.
Humanitarian assistance vs. humanitarian intervention
In addition to the challenges described above, all of which have been made 
primarily from a political economy perspective, another issue that anyone 
discussing humanitarian assistance today needs to take a stance on is the question
Journal o f  Human Rights (Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1998), p. 30.
35 Duffield, op. cit., in note 19, p. 98.
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of what is, or ought to be, the relationship between humanitarian assistance and 
military intervention. In recent years, the essentially contestable nature, 
ambiguity, or plasticity of the term ‘humanitarian’ has been frequently remarked 
on.36 As is the case with terms like ‘democracy’, the positive associations with the 
term ‘humanitarian’ invite its use in the context of a broad array of practices. 
Some of these uses may be deliberately manipulative, whilst others are more 
sincere. In particular, in recent years, concern has been expressed about the way in 
which military interventions -  for example the one in Afghanistan and, perhaps to 
a somewhat lesser extent, the more recent one in Iraq -  have been justified at least 
in part with reference to humanitarian intentions. Moreover, a related but distinct 
question that has sometimes been raised when I have presented my research has 
been why humanitarian assistance in the context of an armed conflict could not 
conceivably include providing arms to the belligerents, to allow them to reach a 
solution to their dispute, ‘once and for all*. Although such a question may seem 
almost blasphemous to many humanitarians, it should at least be given serious 
consideration.
The relationship between humanitarianism and military action is clearly complex. 
While many contemporary humanitarians see themselves as pacifists, it is difficult 
to see how humanitarians could categorically reject the use of military means for 
humanitarian purposes, not least because the history of humanitarian ideas is 
firmly located within the just war tradition. Just war theory takes the middle 
position between pacifism (‘war is always wrong’) and militarism (‘morality has
36 See, for example, Hugo Slim, ‘Violence and Humanitarianism: Moral Paradox and the
41
Introduction
no place in war; it is legitimate to use all means necessary when engaged in war’): 
its stance is that there may be both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for 
engaging in a war (jus ad bellum), on one hand, and means of fighting a war (jus 
in bello), on the other. Indeed, the latter is the central assumption of the Geneva 
Conventions, the major normative document on which contemporary 
humanitarian assistance during armed conflict is based. Thus, humanitarianism is 
not intrinsically an anti-war or pacifist doctrine, even if individual humanitarians 
may hold these beliefs.
Having said this, it seems clear that it is possible to distinguish between 
humanitarian assistance and humanitarian (military) intervention as currently 
separate practices.37 This is because, even if the lines in recent years have 
occasionally become partially blurred, humanitarian aid agencies and military 
organisations remain for most practical purposes distinct actors, with distinctive 
mandates, command structures, funding sources, and activities. Thus, this thesis 
will strictly focus on humanitarian assistance as traditionally understood and leave 
the issues of military intervention, however important, aside. In this context, it 
should also be said that, although encompassing relief efforts both during armed 
conflict and peace, the scope of this research in relation to armed conflict is 
limited to humanitarian assistance to civilians, rather than including the broader 
category of non-combatants (which includes, in addition to civilians, wounded,
Protection of Civilians,’ Security Dialogue (Vol. 32, No. 3,2001), p. 331.
37 On humanitarian intervention, see for example Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War: Military 
Intervention and Human Rights,’ International Affairs (Vol. 69, No. 3,1993), pp. 429-449; or 
Michael J. Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues,’ Ethics & 
International Affairs (Vol. 12, 1998), pp. 63-79.
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sick and shipwrecked soldiers, as well as prisoners of war), who are also objects 
of assistance. This is for reasons of both space and clarity; the provisions of 
international humanitarian law in relation to the non-civilian categories of non- 
combatants are both complex and somewhat distinct from those relating to 
civilians. At the same time, it is important to remain cognisant of the fact that in 
contemporaiy armed conflicts it is increasingly difficult to distinguish civilians 
from the other categories. It is also not possible to enter here into a discussion of 
the special protection mandates of the UNHCR or the ICRC. Thus, only those 
aspects of the UNHCR’s or the ICRC’s work in which they resemble other relief 
organisations will be addressed here.
Culture
In addition to offering a definition of what is meant by ‘international humanitarian 
assistance’, as has been done above, it is equally important to make some remarks 
about what is understood by the term ‘culture’ in this thesis.
Culture is a term that is used frequently in eveiy-day language as well as in 
academic writing; yet, it is extremely difficult to define precisely. For the 
purposes of this thesis, culture is understood broadly to encompass the way of life 
and worldview of a particular group of people. This reflects a common 
contemporary understanding of what constitutes a culture in disciplines such as 
anthropology and sociology. Under this definition, culture incorporates both the 
values and beliefs of people, as well as their behaviours and artefacts. Culture is
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always a property of groups, not individuals; these groups may be large or small, 
however. Culture is also something learned rather than natural. This distinction 
may be illustrated with the help of the following example: the fact that people eat 
is not cultural, whereas the types of food a group of people eat, as well as the 
methods used to obtain, prepare and consume that food are cultural. Moreover, 
culture is not static, but rather changes over time, both as a result of factors 
internal to the culture as well as through its contact with other cultures. In the 
social sciences, culture has traditionally been understood as the entire way of life 
of a people, covering their material, intellectual and spiritual beliefs and values, 
supposed to be forming a complex whole. In this way, the term culture has been 
used to refer collectively to all the factors that come together as the ‘shaping of 
the human mind* in a particular society. More recently, this idea of cultures as 
unified complex wholes has come under question, however. This is because of the 
realisation that the elements making up a culture may be internally poorly 
harmonised and that some aspects of a culture may be followed by some members 
without strong identification, or with ambiguity. Having said this, it seems clear 
that there will be obvious cases of what a particular group’s practice is supposed 
to be in regard to food, or some other aspect of their lives, and the humanitarian 
practitioner has to decide how to deal with these cultural claims if a conflict with 
the humanitarian principles arises.
Notwithstanding the above remarks, which are intended to help the reader by 
providing some very basic ‘goal posts’ about what culture is and is not generally 
thought to encompass, it should nonetheless be emphasised that the term culture is
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primarily defined in this thesis through the way that it has been used in the 
humanitarian discourse. In other words, the definition of culture utilised here is an 
immanent one (i.e. internal to a particular discourse, as well as subjective) rather 
than an objective or pre-existing one. This is because the thesis examines the 
implications of two potentially contradictory commitments within the 
humanitarian discourse, i.e. the commitment to humanitarian principles, on one 
hand, and the commitment to respect for culture, on the other, for the constantly 
evolving practice of humanitarian assistance, rather than the meeting of 
humanitarian assistance and culture as somehow objective and immutable 
phenomena. Therefore, the definition of culture emerges as the argument evolves, 
rather than being fixed on the outset. In this context, it should also be said that 
part of the problem with the commitment to respect for culture, as it is expressed 
in contemporary humanitarian texts, is that the meaning of culture does not tend to 
be clearly defined within these texts. One of the aims of this thesis is therefore to 
illustrate that this lack of definition poses certain problems in the humanitarian 
context, and show that there are in fact a number of different types of phenomena 
that can fit under the general heading of ‘culture’, which may in fact have 
radically different implications for humanitarian assistance. In addition, the issue 
of culture is also further complicated by the fact that there is not necessarily a 
singular ‘local culture’ that humanitarian aid workers can relate their approach to, 
but that in most societies there are several, contested ‘cultures’. In many armed 
conflict situations, the internal cultural tension may in fact be a factor in the 
conflict itself. More generally, social breakdown, whatever its cause, often 
changes the conditions of ‘cultural coexistence’ in a particular society. In addition,
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it is important to note that humanitarian assistance also has its own ‘cultural 
baggage’. This baggage is made up of two related but distinct elements: on one 
hand, in a general sense, humanitarian assistance can in many ways be seen as a 
part of the tradition of Western universalism. On the other hand, humanitarian 
assistance is in practice always administered through a particular cultural lens, 
which may be a local one, just as well as being a Western one. Thus, humanitarian 
assistance is not simply a matter of foreign aid vs. local culture (in the singular) 
and the relations and impacts between the different cultural elements are likely to 
be complex.
CHAPTER STRUCTURE
The purpose of this introductory chapter has been to describe the context of, and 
reasons for, choosing this topic of research, to offer definitions of some of the 
central terms used in this thesis, and to locate the present approach in the context 
of some of the major debates in the existing literature on international 
humanitarian assistance. In doing so, its aim has been to set the stage for, as well 
as sketching the boundaries of, this project. Finally, before embarking on the 
thesis itself, let me present a brief overview of the structure of the thesis:
Chapter 1 describes the normative framework underpinning contemporary 
humanitarian assistance through an examination of international legal documents 
and statements of principle by aid agencies. The purpose of the chapter is to 
present the first half of the background to the discussion that follows in Chapters 3
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and 4.
Chapter 2 provides the second half of that background by describing the 
emergence of the concern with ‘respect for culture and customs’ in international 
humanitarian assistance as it can be traced in international legal documents, 
statements of principle and operational guidelines of aid organisations, as well as 
academic literature. In doing so, it also presents a review of the existing literature 
-  both practitioner-oriented and academic -  on this topic.
Chapter 3 brings together on a conceptual level the two elements -  namely the 
normative framework underpinning international humanitarian assistance and the 
emergent norm of respect for culture -  examined in the previous two chapters. A 
typology of the different kinds of relationships that may exist between the 
principles of humanitarian assistance, on one hand, and cultural norms and 
practices, on the other, is presented. Different approaches to conflicts between the 
humanitarian principles and cultural norms and practices are also examined.
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between humanitarian assistance, gender and 
culture. Following a brief overview of the contemporary literature on gender and 
humanitarian assistance, the relationship between gender concerns and respect for 
culture and customs in humanitarian assistance is examined. In particular, the 
chapter discusses different approaches to potential conflicts between gender 
equality/equity and respect for culture in humanitarian assistance. Finally, the 
debates surrounding gender are utilised as an entry-point to the more general
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question of what the justifiable scope of social intervention by international 
humanitarian assistance is.
Finally, Chapter 5 draws conclusions for humanitarian policy and practice from 
the discussion that has taken place so far. First, ways in which humanitarians can 
inform themselves about cultural norms and practices in the environments where 
they operate are discussed. Second, the chapter addresses the issue of ways in 
which it is possible to support, or at least not undermine, cultural norms and 
practices in humanitarian aid operations. Third, specific operational 
considerations raised by situations where cultural norms and practices conflict 
with humanitarian principles and practice are examined. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the role of stakeholder participation and cultural 
considerations in hiring and training of humanitarian aid workers.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter within the context of the thesis as a whole is to 
describe some of the central elements of the overall normative landscape of 
international humanitarian assistance. As a result, the approach of the chapter is 
more descriptive than argumentative. Such a description is, however, necessary in 
order to provide the context for the examination of the implications of the 
principle of respect for culture that follows.
At the same time, I believe that an examination of some of the central values of 
humanitarian assistance may in itself also be a valuable exercise. The normative 
framework underlying international humanitarian assistance is not only of interest 
to academics but also has very real implications for practitioners. This is not least 
because, in recent decades, the business of international humanitarian assistance 
has grown exponentially in terms of the numbers of recipients involved. 
Humanitarian assistance is given in two primary contexts, namely armed conflicts
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and natural disasters.1 In 2001, on average 520,000 people (including Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) and residents) affected by armed conflict received food 
and other assistance every month from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) -  which has been mandated under international law to provide 
protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict -  alone. And, at the start of 
2002, the number of people ‘of concern’ (including refugees, returnees, asylum 
seekers and IDPs) to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) -  the organisation with the mandate to protect and assist people falling 
under the definition of refugee under international law - was 19.8 million.3 To 
these figures can be added natural disasters, which affect approximately 250 to 
300 million people annually, and this figure is growing at a rate of about 10 
million per year.4 There has also been a corresponding proliferation of 
organisations engaging in international humanitarian assistance. For example, in 
the autumn of 1994, there were over 140 humanitarian agencies registered in 
Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.5 It has also been reported that at least 180 agencies 
were involved in the initial aid effort in 1999 in Kosovo.6 Yet, until recently, 
many of these agencies have operated in a virtual regulatory vacuum. As one
1 The term ‘humanitarian assistance’ is sometimes limited to assistance in armed conflicts, 
whereas aid given to victims of natural disasters is described as ‘relief. I refer to both in the 
context of this thesis as humanitarian assistance.
2 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Annual Report, Geneva: ICRC, 2002, p. 7.
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees by Numbers: 2002 
Edition, Geneva: UNHCR, 2002 (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
4 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Introduction’, 
Publications: Code o f  Conduct (available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp).
5 Ibid.
6 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Humanitarian Resources: Training the Kosovo Aid Workers,’ People
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[t]he proliferation o f NGOs in particular (which has been an inevitable 
consequence o f Western donor policy in recent years) has led to wide differences 
in the ethical maturity and political sophistication o f various organisations which 
are all competing to work in the same emergency. Anyone surveying the swarm o f  
NGOs delivering primarily governmental humanitarian assistance in many o f 
today’s emergencies would be unwise to accept them all as equally principled and 
professional?
Of course, there are those aid agencies that have a strong mandate derived from 
international law, namely the above-mentioned ICRC and UNHCR, as well as 
long-standing agencies with established internal philosophies and regulatory 
devices, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent and 
its members, the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, and so on. But there are also a large number of agencies that do not fall 
under either of these categories. Only within the last decade have some efforts at 
regulating all humanitarian aid agencies begun to emerge, most notably the 1994 
Code o f Conduct, the 1997 interagency Sphere Project, as well as the 
Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP -  formerly the Humanitarian 
Ombudsman Project).
Management (15 July 1999), p. 34.
7 Hugo Slim, ‘Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, 
Impartiality and Solidarity,’ Development in Practice (Vol. 7, No. 4, November 1997), p. 344.
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This combination of, at best, emergent formal regulation in the field of 
humanitarian action as a whole with the enormous impact of humanitarian 
assistance on the lives of millions of people, has raised serious questions 
regarding issues such as quality and accountability. An examination of the 
normative justification underlying international humanitarian assistance, as well 
as discussion of how these norms can best be translated into action, is necessary if 
these questions are to be addressed at all. It is impossible to speak about ‘quality’ 
without addressing the question what humanitarian assistance fundamentally is or 
aims to be; moreover, if international humanitarian assistance is to be held 
accountable to both of its two main constituencies, namely those that it seeks to 
assist and those that donate its resources, a discussion of the purposes of 
humanitarian assistance and a corresponding evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the means employed to reach those aims is called for.
In this context, it should be mentioned that these attempts at self-regulation by 
humanitarian aid agencies have also received a fair share of criticism from within 
the humanitarian aid community. These criticisms focus on three main issues: (1) 
that the universal scope of these regulatory efforts overlooks the complexity and 
variety of operational contexts in which humanitarian aid organisations operate; 
(2) that the idea of a ‘humanitarian imperative’, combined with a narrow focus on 
technical standards, fails to take into account the broader consequences of 
humanitarian assistance, and in particular the potential of humanitarian assistance 
to do harm (e.g. by prolonging the emergency it aims to alleviate); and (3) that the 
emphasis on the duties of aid organisations evident in these documents may
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undermine international law, in particular by re-allocating responsibilities that 
properly belong to states to non-governmental actors.81 will address the first two 
criticisms below, while the third will be dealt with later on in the chapter.
Some humanitarian practitioners have voiced the concern that regulation threatens 
the operational flexibility that aid agencies need in order to be able to carry out 
their work effectively in the widely varying contexts in the field. In this vein, for 
example, the Quality Platform, perhaps the best-known group of critics of the 
current regulatory efforts, writes: ‘[u]niversal benchmarks ignore the fact that 
each humanitarian emergency is unique, and each calls for different, perhaps 
original, responses.’9 There is clearly something to this concern, and it should be 
kept in mind whenever issues of regulation are discussed. This criticism, however, 
does not seem to be wholly justified if we take a closer look at the current 
regulatory efforts. For example, the authors of the Sphere Handbook seem only 
too aware of the need to take into account contextual considerations:
Agencies ’ ability to achieve the Minimum Standards will depend on a range o f 
factors, some o f which are within their control, while others such as political and 
security factors, lie outside their control O f particular importance will be the
8 For other discussions of these criticisms, see for example Hugo Slim, ‘Claiming A Humanitarian 
Imperative: NGOs and the Cultivation of Humanitarian Duty,’ paper presented at the Seventh 
Annual Conference of Webster University, entitled Humanitarian Values for the Twenty-First 
Century, Geneva, 21-22 February 2002 (available at
http://www.hapgeneva.org/pdf/H%20slim%20on%20Duties.pdf), as well as Koenraad van 
Brabant, ‘Regaining Perspective: The Debate over Quality Assurance and Accountability,’ 
Humanitarian Exchange (No. 17, October 2000), pp. 22-25 (available via http://www.odihpn.org).
9 Fran$ois Griinewald, Claire Pirotte and Veronique de Geoffroy, ‘Debating Accountability,’ 
Humanitarian Exchange (No. 19, September 2001), pp. 35-36 (available via
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extent to which agencies have access to the affected population, whether they 
have the consent and cooperation o f the authorities in charge, and whether they 
can operate in conditions o f reasonable security. Availability o f sufficient 
financial, human and material resources is also essential. This document alone 
cannot constitute a complete evaluation guide or set o f criteria for humanitarian 
action.10
The problem with shying away from attempts to regulate humanitarian assistance 
completely for the fear of losing ‘operational flexibility’ is that it may simply 
serve to reinforce the still widely-shared notion that humanitarian assistance is 
essentially an act of ‘charity’, understood in this context to mean that any effort to 
help the victims of disasters is as good as any other. Indeed, the criticism about 
lack of attention to broader consequences of assistance can be rejected at least in 
part on these grounds: the motivation for the regulatory efforts lies precisely in the 
experience that well-intentioned but unprofessional would-be helpers can in fact 
make matters worse for those that they seek to assist. Moreover, the drafters of 
these documents seem in fact quite aware of the potential of humanitarian aid to 
do harm as well as good. This is testified by the inclusion of what has been 
described as a ‘Do No Harm’ clause -  reflecting the influence of Mary B. 
Anderson and other ‘consequentialists’, who have challenged traditional forms of 
humanitarian assistance on the basis of a political economy analysis (see
http://www.odihpn.org).
10 ‘Introduction,’ The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards, Geneva: 
The Sphere Project, 2000, p. 2 (available at http://www.sphereproject.org).
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Introduction to this thesis) -  in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter:11 ‘...the attempt 
to provide assistance in situations of conflict may potentially render civilians 
more vulnerable to attack, or may on occasion bring unintended advantage to one 
or more of the warring parties. We are committed to minimising any such adverse 
effects of our interventions... *12
In this context, it is also important to point out that the most vocal opposition to 
the current regulatory efforts is primarily limited to the Francophone humanitarian 
community, thus reflecting important differences in the traditions of humanitarian 
action in the Francophone and Anglophone (and Nordic) contexts. It has been 
observed that
[i]n France, the NGO community is much more sceptical o f governmental action 
[than in the Anglophone or Nordic countries], fiercely guarding its independence 
from the state. One facet o f this is an interpretation o f the process o f 
‘professionalisation' o f aid, including humanitarian aid. While in Anglophone 
countries the term is used positively to denote competence and experience, in 
France it has become associated with the risk o f institutionalising civil action and 
so losing the authenticity o f international solidarity. Thus voluntarism remains a 
grounding principle in many French NGOs, particularly humanitarian NGOs.13
11 See Slim, op. cit., in note 8, p. 9.
12 ‘Humanitarian Charter,’ The Sphere Project, op. cit., in note 10, p. 8.
13 Joanna Macrae, ‘Foreword,’ in Claire Pirotte, Bernard Husson and Fran$ois Grunewald (eds.), 
Responding to Emergencies & Fostering Development: The Dilemmas o f  Humanitarian Aid, 
London: Zed Books, 1999, p. xix.
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In sum, while it is important to acknowledge the existence of these critical voices, 
the validity of their criticisms in relation to the current regulatory efforts is at best 
debatable. Moreover, the weight of these views within the humanitarian 
community as a whole should not be exaggerated. Thus, it seems possible to 
examine the commonalties between international legal principles and those of 
humanitarian agencies, in particular as expressed in the Fundamental Principles of 
the Red Cross and in the most significant recent interagency statements of 
principle, namely the above-mentioned Code o f Conduct and the Sphere Project, 
in order to describe what represents a relatively broad normative consensus within 
the field of international humanitarian assistance.
In the first section of this chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the 
documents that make up the normative framework underpinning international 
humanitarian assistance, while in the second section, I will discuss die major 
principles arising out of these documents.
REVIEW OF EXISTING DOCUMENTS
This section presents a brief introduction to the documents that can be seen as 
expressing the broad normative framework underpinning contemporary 
international humanitarian assistance. I will begin with international legal 
documents, go on to interagency agreements between humanitarian organisations, 
and conclude with the principles of the Red Cross.
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In principle, there are three major bodies of international law that are relevant to 
international humanitarian assistance:
(1) international humanitarian law (IHL),
(2) international human rights instruments, and
(3) international law on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).14
I will briefly comment on the background, as well as the relevance for 
humanitarian assistance, of each of these bodies of law in turn:
IHL consists of two ‘streams’, namely the ‘Hague’ and ‘Geneva’ law. Hague law, 
codified in a series of treaties and declarations following the first Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899, deals with the conduct of hostilities (e.g. prohibiting the use 
of certain types of weapons) and thus has at most indirect relevance to 
international humanitarian assistance, which focuses on the treatment of the 
victims of war. Therefore, the legal instruments discussed here under the heading 
of IHL fall under Geneva law, which deals with the treatment of the victims of 
war. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (on the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field, on the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed
14 Recently, the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) have also initiated efforts to develop an international law on 
disaster response. See Chapter 8: ‘Towards an International Disaster Response Law,’ in the World 
Disaster Report 2000, Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
2000, pp. 145-157. It should also be noted that many countries also have national legal 
instruments applicable to humanitarian assistance. See Directory o f  National Emergency Response 
Offices, Disaster Emergency Plans and Legislation, and Regional- and Sub-Regional Agreements
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forces at sea, on prisoners of war, and on civilian persons) and the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977 (on international and non-international armed conflicts) 
constitute the primary instruments of Geneva law. In particular, the provisions of 
IHL applicable to international humanitarian assistance to civilians are expressed 
in the Fourth Geneva Convention (on the protection of civilians) and the two 
Additional Protocols. Moreover, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide contains provisions that may also be 
relevant to humanitarian assistance.
The major international human rights instruments with bearing on international 
humanitarian assistance include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both 
of 1966. Conceptually, humanitarian assistance is particularly closely connected 
to the economic and social rights, as what is at issue is the claim for a right to the 
positive provision of goods and services, rather than the primarily negative 
freedoms from interference of civil and political rights. The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 also contain provisions that may be 
relevant to humanitarian assistance, as does the Convention Against Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. The relevant 
regional human rights treaties include the European Convention on Human Rights 
of 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, and the African
fo r  Disaster Assistance, UNDRO, 1992. The directory lists the legislation of 64 countries.
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Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1986.
Finally, the smallest body of international law -  at least in terms of the number of 
existing documents -  with relevance to humanitarian assistance is the 
international law applicable to refugees and IDPs, which consists of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. The Refugee Convention was created both to consolidate 
international refugee law as well as to deal with the hundreds of thousands of 
European refugees created by the Second World War, and its scope of application 
was initially limited to those who had become refugees prior to 1951. The 
Refugee Convention constitutes the key legal document in defining who is a 
refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of states. The Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1967, removed the 
earlier 1951 deadline and the geographical restrictions while retaining other main 
provisions of the instrument. Finally, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, while not a formal interstate agreement like the Refugee 
Convention, represents an attempt by the United Nations to afford IDPs -  who do 
not fit within the definition of a refugee because they have not crossed an 
international border, and whose protection therefore remains legally the 
responsibility of their governments -  similar rights as the Refugee Convention has 
granted to refugees proper.
Each of these bodies of law has a different scope of applicability. Most provisions
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of IHL come into force only during armed conflict, while human rights law 
applies primarily during conditions of peace.15 In this context, it should also be 
noted that there is something of a legislative vacuum in situations, now 
increasingly common, of widespread violence that fails to fulfil the relatively 
narrow legal criteria for armed conflict, but which nonetheless induces the state in 
question to declare a state of emergency and suspend most of the human rights it 
has otherwise committed itself to respect.16 And, although international law on 
refugees and IDPs applies both during peace and armed conflict, it only does so 
with regard to the protection and assistance of people that fit within the -  again 
fairly narrow -  legal definition of a refugee or an IDP.
Moreover, it should be emphasised that, despite the apparent relevance of the 
subject matter of each of these three bodies of international law to humanitarian 
assistance, the provisions directly related to the relief activities of aid agencies are 
at best limited in all of them. This is because the main subjects of international 
law are states (and, to a more limited degree, intergovernmental organisations), 
meaning that the bulk of the rights and obligations of international law are 
addressed to them, rather than to the mostly non-governmental humanitarian 
agencies. Thus, the main task of IHL is to regulate the conduct of the (primarily
15 The legal definition, and thus the scope of applicability of the Geneva Conventions, of armed 
conflict encompasses ‘declared war o r ... any other armed conflict which may arise between two of 
the [state parties to the Geneva Conventions], even if a state of war is not recognised by one of 
them’ as well as ‘all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory [of a state party] even if the 
said occupation meets no armed resistance’. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions.
16 See Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vite, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law’, in the International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 293,30 April 1993), p. 94-119.
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state) parties to an armed conflict toward victims of that conflict.17 Similarly, 
international human rights instruments apply to the relations of states to their 
citizens at peacetime, and the international legal instruments on refugees and IDPs 
define the obligations that states have towards these two groups of people. This 
does not mean that these legal instruments have no bearing at all on the activities 
of humanitarian aid agencies. For instance, they may help them in their advocacy 
work and provide arguments in support of the right of access to beneficiaries. 
Nonetheless, the primary concern in this chapter is with the norms that govern 
actual relief activity. In the next section, I will highlight those elements of 
international law -  however few -  that apply directly to this aspect of the work of 
international humanitarian agencies.
As was already mentioned above, in the relative absence of a legal framework to 
offer substantive guidance to many of their activities, international humanitarian 
aid agencies have during the past decade undertaken a number of efforts toward 
self-regulation. The discussion here will focus on two of these efforts, arguably 
representing the broadest consensus, namely the Code o f Conduct and the Sphere 
Project. Indeed, the Code o f Conduct and the Sphere Project’s Humanitarian
17 In so far as IHL reflects customary law, it is binding on all states and non-state parties to the 
conflict, whether or not they have ratified the Geneva Conventions or the Additional Protocols. 
Moreover, when a state has ratified a Convention or Protocol, the provisions relating to non- 
intemational armed conflict are automatically binding on the non-state parties to conflicts 
occurring on its territory. The four Geneva Conventions themselves are generally accepted as 
international customary law and, in any case, have been virtually universally ratified. With the 
exception of Common Article 3 (which applies to non-international armed conflict), however, they 
apply only to international armed conflict. The Additional Protocol II, which applies to non- 
intemational armed conflict, is not considered to be part of international customary law. See Kate 
Mackintosh, The Principles o f  Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, 
Humanitarian Policy Group Report, London: Overseas Development Institute, March 2000, pp. 4- 
5.
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Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response have in a relatively short 
time become so important for the humanitarian community that they have been 
described as almost having reached the status of ‘soft law’.18 In addition to these 
two, the better-known recent normative documents involving interagency input 
also include the Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies (Mohonk Criteria), produced by the Task Force on Ethical and Legal 
Issues in Humanitarian Assistance of the World Conference on Religion and 
Peace of 1994.19 The Mohonk Criteria have not, however, in effect received the 
endorsement of the majority of humanitarian agencies. The primary reason for this 
is probably that the Mohonk Criteria include military intervention as a possible 
means for providing humanitarian assistance, while most humanitarian agencies 
categorically reject this option. In any case, the general principles of the 
Mohonk Criteria essentially replicate the core elements of the Fundamental 
Principles of the Red Cross (discussed below). Thus, they do not contribute much 
that is new to the understanding of the basic principles of humanitarian assistance.
The Code o f Conduct is perhaps the most significant attempt to date to express the 
normative framework underpinning international disaster relief. It consists of a set 
of ten principles that establish professional standards of behaviour for non­
governmental humanitarian agencies, as well as of three sets of recommendations
18 Slim, op. cit., in note 8, p. 2.
19 The full text of the Mohonk Criteria is available at 
http://www.wcrp.org/whatsnew/Humanitarian.html.
20 Personal communication with Dr. Heike Spieker, Head of Division for International 
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Ethics, German Red Cross, April 2001.
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(to governments of disaster affected countries, donor governments, and 
intergovernmental organisations) on the kind of working environment that non­
governmental humanitarian agencies would like to see created in order to facilitate 
their work.21 The Code o f Conduct was prepared in 1994 by the EFRC and the 
ICRC, in consultation with the members of the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response (SCHR), which incorporates eight of the world’s largest 
non-governmental disaster response agencies, and has thus far been signed by 
over 140 agencies.22 It is a voluntary code that any NGO working in disaster relief 
can commit itself to and, as such, it is self-enforcing; in other words, no sanctions 
can be applied to those who fail to abide by it. The Code o f Conduct applies both 
during peacetime and in armed conflict, although in armed conflict the provisions 
of IHL take precedence.
The Sphere Project, launched in July 1997, is even more broad-based than the 
Code o f Conduct in that it is the result of the collaboration of humanitarian NGOs, 
donor governments and UN agencies 23 Whereas the Code o f Conduct aims to set
21 The full text of The Code o f  Conduct fo r  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief is available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/.
22 The original eight agencies include Caritas Intemationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children 
Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross has observer status.
23 The Sphere Project was led by two non-governmental networks, the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and Inter Action, with VOICE (a consortium of European 
Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies), ICVA (International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies) and the ICRC holding observer status on the Project Management 
Committee. UN agencies, including UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, also participated 
in the project. In addition to the initial funding from the Management Committee NGOs 
themselves, donor organisations from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, UK and USA, and the European Union have also provided funding for the project.
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general standards of professional conduct for humanitarian aid agencies, the 
Sphere Project seeks to articulate a concrete set of operational minimum standards 
for the provision of goods and services in disaster relief. The purpose of the 
Sphere Project is to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the 
accountability of humanitarian agencies by developing minimum standards for 
five core areas of humanitarian operations, including water and sanitation, 
nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health. Its scope covers both 
armed conflict and peacetime. The Sphere Project does not aim to create new 
standards; rather, it seeks to consolidate and present a consensus of existing ideas 
by drawing on the experiences of over 228 organisations and over 700 individual 
aid-workers in over sixty countries. Thus far, the main product of the Sphere 
Project has been the Sphere Handbook.
The Sphere Handbook consists of two parts: a humanitarian charter and minimum 
standards in disaster response. The humanitarian charter, drawing from 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, 
singles out three core principles, one from each body of law: (1) the right to life 
with dignity (2) the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (i.e. that 
non-combatants should be immune from attack), and (3) the principle of non­
refoulement (i.e. that refugees cannot be sent (back) to a country where their life is 
threatened because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinion, or where there are substantial grounds to believe 
that they would be subject to torture). Like the Code o f Conduct, the Sphere 
humanitarian charter is voluntary and self-enforcing. The goal of the Sphere
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Project is that, by signing the humanitarian charter, aid organisations publicly 
commit themselves to the basic principles as well as the minimum standards. For 
their part, the minimum standards seek to outline the material conditions that the 
realisation of the right to life with dignity would at minimum involve. Thus, for 
example, with regard to water supply and sanitation, the Sphere Handbook 
establishes minimum standards for quantity and quality of water supply, excreta 
disposal, vector control, waste disposal and hygiene. Similarly, in relation to 
nutrition and food aid, the Sphere Handbook establishes standards for nutritional 
support for the general population as well as specifically targeted needs, for 
analysis of the conditions creating food insecurity, and for methods for fair and 
equitable distribution. There are similar minimum standards for shelter and site 
planning, as well as for health services.
Finally, the seven Fundamental Principles o f the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement have been included in the examination here as they constitute 
probably the best-known statement of principles by any single humanitarian aid 
organisation.24 Indeed, the Red Cross principles have probably been the greatest 
single influence on the normative framework underpinning humanitarian 
assistance to date.25 Although reference to the Fundamental Principles appears in
24 The Red Cross Movement is made up of three distinct although interrelated parts: (1) the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the founding element of the movement, which is 
primarily responsible for protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict, (2) the National 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies which have the primary responsibility for disaster relief 
both during peacetime and armed conflict in their respective countries, and (3) the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which serves to coordinate international Red 
Cross response to natural disasters.
25 The full text of the Fundamental Principles is available on the Internet, for example, at the 
following British Red Cross website: http://www.redcross.org.uk/index.asp?id=10 .
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the Statutes of the International Red Cross as early as 1921 and in oral tradition 
even earlier, the principles were formally established by the International 
Conference of the Red Cross in 1965 and were modified to their present form in 
1986. Unlike the operating principles of any other humanitarian agency, they are 
also recognised in international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions refer 
to the manner in which the activities of the Red Cross are governed by its 
principles, even using them as a standard with which the legitimacy of the 
activities of other humanitarian agencies can be evaluated.27 The Fundamental 
Principles apply to Red Cross Movement activities during both peacetime and 
armed conflict.
An additional Red Cross document with relevance in the context of disaster relief 
is the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief. The 
Principles and Rules were first approved by the International Conference of the 
Red Cross in 1969 and, with the subsequent revisions and additions (the latest of 
which were approved by the International Conference of the Red Cross in 1995), 
govern all Red Cross and Red Crescent relief operations. The Principles and Rules 
are binding on the IFRC and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
26 For the history of the principles, see Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles o f  the Red Cross: 
Commentary, Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1979, pp. 7-10.
27 Article 63 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that, except in exceptional situations 
involving the security of the occupying power, ‘[r]ecognised National Red Cross (Red Crescent, 
Red Lion and Sun) Societies shall be able to pursue their activities in accordance with Red Cross 
principles, as defined by the International Red Cross Conferences. Other relief societies shall be 
permitted to continue their humanitarian activities under similar conditions’.
28 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Principles and Rules 
fo r  Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief as endorsed by the XXVI International 
Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1995. The full text of the Principles and Rules is available 
at http://www.ifrc.org/what/response/rulesdr.asp.
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As both the Fundamental Principles and the Principles and Rules were adopted by 
the International Conferences of the Red Cross, at which governments participate 
and vote, they also have some validity in negotiations with governments.
In the preceding section, I have sought to provide a brief overview of the most 
significant documents that, taken together, arguably constitute the main elements 
of contemporary normative framework underpinning international humanitarian 
assistance. In the following section, I will discuss some of the central substantive 
elements of the ethical framework articulated in these documents.
PRINCIPLES
In this part of the chapter, I will describe the content of the fundamental principles 
constituting the normative framework that underpins contemporary international 
humanitarian assistance. In essence, the aim of humanitarian assistance is to save 
lives and alleviate human suffering, whatever its cause. The argument here is that 
the normative framework on which this activity is based can be expressed through 
two fundamental principles, namely humanity and impartiality.
The ideas expressed through the principles of humanity and impartiality are by no 
means unique to humanitarian assistance; rather, they express general ethical 
principles that also appear, for example, in medical ethics. For the purposes of 
humanitarian assistance, these principles were originally articulated in the 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, and the different parts of the Red Cross
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Movement have probably contributed most to the definition and analysis of their 
content. At the same time, the commitment to these principles is by no means 
limited to the Red Cross Movement. Indeed, I would argue that humanity and 
impartiality are the only principles on which there appears to be a consensus 
among the majority of the significant humanitarian actors today. While most 
people involved in humanitarian assistance would probably accept humanity and 
impartiality as fundamental principles of humanitarian assistance, however, some 
might argue that other principles, perhaps most importantly independence and 
neutrality, should also be added to this list. I do not share this conviction, 
however. Before embarking on a discussion of the central elements of the 
principles of humanity and impartiality, I will briefly explain why I do not see 
independence and neutrality as being part of the normative consensus 
underpinning contemporary international humanitarian assistance.
The principle of independence refers to the idea that humanitarian agencies should 
not become instruments of foreign policy (unless that policy happens to coincide 
with the independently defined aims of the agency). The problem with 
independence, however, is that it appears somewhat superfluous as long as the 
principles of humanity and impartiality are rigorously applied as the primary 
principles governing humanitarian assistance. In other words, if the argument 
about the fundamental nature of die principles of humanity and impartiality is 
accepted, any "humanitarian’ action that is based on something other than these 
two principles, whether that be as a result of serving the self-interested foreign 
policy goals of a state or for any other reason, would by definition not be
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defensible within the nonnative framework of humanitarian assistance. Thus, the 
articulation of independence as a separate principle can perhaps best be seen as 
giving added emphasis to the implications of humanity and impartiality in a 
particular context that has proven especially problematic in practice. Moreover, I 
would argue that, in practice, the principle of independence cannot even be said to 
represent a consensus between the majority of humanitarian agencies. 
Independence is by definition primarily a concern of the non-governmental actors 
in international humanitarian assistance, whereas the relationship of 
intergovernmental humanitarian agencies (such as the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the United Nations* World Food Programme 
(WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)) to 
the principle of independence is necessarily somewhat more ambiguous. In 
particular, UN-based bodies may have difficulty with the principle of 
independence in the context of armed conflict because ‘... not only the UN 
Security Council may be sanctioning one party or supporting another, but also 
because within the UN there are pressures for humanitarian activities to fall more 
firmly under political direction’.29 Indeed, the actual relationships of 
intergovernmental agencies to the foreign policies of their member states are 
complex enough to warrant a separate study, and thus could not be done justice in 
the space available here.
The principle of neutrality refers to ‘not tak[ing] sides in hostilities or engaging]
29 Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s,’ in Humanitarian 
Studies Unit (eds.), Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions, 
London: Pluto Press, 2001, p. 42.
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•  •  •  t Aat any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature*.
Thus, neutrality is a principle that has more resonance in the context of armed
conflict than in peacetime disasters. There is a clearly consensual element to
neutrality in the sense that virtually all humanitarian agencies would see
knowingly supplying resources that could contribute to the war effort of any party
to an armed conflict as fundamentally inimical to the purposes of humanitarian
assistance. At the same time, there is also substantial disagreement within the
humanitarian community regarding the principle of neutrality. This disagreement
centres mainly on the controversial practice of some humanitarian agencies of
publicly assigning blame for the suffering that they witness, usually through the
use of the media. Thus, as with independence, the relationship of different
agencies to neutrality varies, with some agencies favouring relatively outspoken
advocacy, others insisting on maintaining their neutrality even in cases where the
blame can with relative certainty be attributed to one party or another, and some
1agencies falling somewhere in between. The most important pro-advocacy 
humanitarian aid agency has traditionally been Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) -  
which was in fact founded by a group of doctors who, on the basis of their 
experience in Biafra, were dissatisfied with the ICRC policy of neutrality -  while 
the ICRC is usually seen to be the archetypal proponent of neutrality. While this 
categorisation may in some respects be overly simplistic (even the ICRC
30 ‘Neutrality’ as defined in the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement.
31 See e.g. Larry Minear, ‘The Theory and Practice of Neutrality: Some Thoughts on the 
Tensions,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 833,31 March 1999), pp. 63-71, as well as 
Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action,’ Ethics & International Affairs 
(Vol. 13, 1999), pp. 1-22.
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sometimes makes public condemnations, even if only as a last resort32; moreover, 
the MSF stated in 1997 that its approach in Biafra had been a ‘salutary mistake’ 
and had in fact served to prolong the crisis and increase starvation33) there is 
enough truth to it to support the claim that the principle of neutrality cannot be 
said to represent a consensus among humanitarian agencies today. Another, 
perhaps even more important reason for excluding neutrality from what I have 
described as the normative consensus underpinning humanitarian assistance is that 
there are grounds for doubting whether even the ICRC sees neutrality, in the sense 
of categorically refraining from public condemnation, as having intrinsic value. 
Indeed, I would argue that, even for its strict adherents, neutrality is primarily a 
pragmatic means towards realising die more fundamental principles of humanity 
and impartiality. In a world where, rightly or wrongly, sovereignty and non­
interference in the internal affairs of states still have considerable currency, 
neutrality is more often than not a practical condition that humanitarian agencies 
must accept in order to gain and maintain the consent of the local authorities for 
their activities.
32 For examples of such cases, see Yves Beigbeder, The Role and Status o f  International 
Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: The Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, pp. 167-175. On the ICRC position on neutrality 
more generally, see also Denise Plattner, ‘ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian 
Assistance,’ International Review o f the Red Cross (No. 311,30 April 1996), pp. 161-179, as well 
as Comelio Sommaruga, ‘Humanity: Our Priority Now and Always,’ Ethics & International 
Affairs (Vol. 13,1999), pp. 24-25.
33 Medecins Sans Frontieres (ed.), World in Crisis: The Politics o f  Survival at the End o f  the 2(fh 
Century, London: Routledge, 1997, p. xxi. For a more detailed discussion of MSF’s position on 
the humanitarian principles, see also Joelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry, ‘Humanitarian Responsibility 
and Committed Action,’ Ethics & International Affairs (Vol. 13, 1999), pp. 29-34; and on the 
evolution of MSF’s approach over time, see also Tim Allen and David Styan, ‘A Right to 
Interfere?: Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism,’ Journal o f  International 
Development (Vol. 12, No. 6, August 2000), pp. 825-842.
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Having offered some reasons for the exclusion of independence and neutrality 
from the description of the normative consensus regarding international 
humanitarian assistance, I will now turn to discuss the principles of humanity and 
impartiality, which I believe do represent such a consensus.
Humanity
I f  the Red Cross were to have only one principle, it would be this one.34
The above statement by Jean Pictet can be extended from the Red Cross 
Movement to apply to virtually all actors engaging in international humanitarian 
assistance; the principle of humanity is the fundamental principle of humanitarian 
assistance. In this section, I will first discuss the definition of the principle of 
humanity, then go on to address some issues regarding its justification, and finally 
comment on the kinds of claims for rights and duties that the principle of 
humanity creates in international humanitarian assistance.
Let me begin by addressing the issue of definition. Following Red Cross usage, I 
have chosen to use the term ‘humanity’ to describe this principle. By comparison 
to the related term ‘humanitarianism’, ‘humanity’ has the advantage of conveying 
the dual idea of an attitude and behaviour (humaneness or benevolence), on one 
hand, and the object of that behaviour (humankind as a whole, simply by virtue of
34 Pictet, op. cit., in note 26, p. 22.
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its human attributes) on the other. In essence, the principle of humanity can be 
defined as the call to save lives and prevent or alleviate suffering. Thus, the 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross define humanity as ‘preventing] and 
alleviating] human suffering wherever it may be found’ and ‘protecting] life and 
health and ensuring] respect for the human being’.35 In a similar manner, the 
Code o f Conduct states that ‘the prime motivation of our response to disaster is to 
alleviate human suffering’.36 Likewise, the Sphere Project’s Humanitarian Charter 
describes what it calls the ‘humanitarian imperative’ as ‘the belief that all possible 
steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising out of 
conflict or calamity*.37
In this context, it should be noted that the principle of humanity is not explicitly 
stated in the documents pertaining to refugees and IDPs. This is probably not least 
because die relevant body of international law focuses on a specific, narrowly 
defined group of people, refugees and IDPs, and not even in principle on 
humanity as a whole. Having said this, however, the underlying normative idea 
behind this body of law is arguably not that far removed from the principle of 
humanity. It simply seeks to include a particularly disadvantaged group of people, 
refugees and IDPs -  who by definition are excluded from the protection that 
people under most circumstances can expect to receive from their state -  within 
the scope of a very basic form of protection and assistance.
35 ‘Humanity’ as defined in the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement.
36 Code o f  Conduct, op. cit., in note 21, p. 5.
37 The Sphere Project, op. cit., in note 10, p. 6.
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The basic definition of the principle of humanity -  as a call to save lives and 
prevent or alleviate suffering, no matter what its cause -  is straight-forward and 
represented in a relatively uniform manner throughout the documents examined 
here. Its justification, or the answer to the question ‘why ought we to save lives 
and alleviate suffering?’ is, however, a more complicated matter.
In the existing literature, three main approaches to the question of justification can 
be identified. First, many humanitarian aid agencies (for example, the Catholic 
Relief Services, Caritas, and the Lutheran World Federation) justify the principle 
of humanity with reference to Christian beliefs. For example, Catholic Relief 
Services explicitly states that ‘[its] work is founded on the belief that each person 
possesses a basic dignity that comes directly from God’.38 By contrast, other 
organisations -  for example the Red Cross Movement -  effectively refuse to 
commit themselves to any one justification, arguing instead that the principle of 
humanity may be arrived at via a number of different religious or philosophical 
routes. Thus, according to Jean Pictet,
[t]he wellspring o f the principle o f humanity is in the essence o f social morality 
which can be summed up in a single sentence, Whatsoever ye would that men 
should do to you, do ye even so to them. This fundamental precept can be found, 
in almost identical form, in all the great religions, Brahminism, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism and Taoism. It is also the golden rule
38 Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services Guiding Principles (available at
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o f the positivists, who do not commit themselves to any religion but only to the 
data o f experience, in the name o f reason alone. It is indeed not at all necessary to 
resort to affective or transcendental concepts to recognize the advantage for men 
to work together to improve their lot.39
Similarly, in the words of a more contemporary ICRC ‘ideologue’:
It has rightly been said that the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement does not stand for any specific philosophy or moral doctrine. .... [tjhe 
Movement adheres to no particular ideology or political system. On the contrary, 
its universality enables it, with varying degrees o f success, to adapt to or even 
influence various political regimes or tendencies in order to promote 
humanitarian aims.40
In other words, the Red Cross deliberately refuses to anchor its principles to any 
particular justification, in order to keep the Movement open to people subscribing 
to as wide a variety of religious and philosophical doctrines as possible.
http://www.catholicrelief.org/believe/index.cfm).
39 Pictet, op. cit., in note 26, p. 33; for a case study of humanitarian principles in a non-Westem 
context, see for example Ly Djibril, ‘The Bases of Humanitarian Thought in the Pulaar Society of 
Mauritania and Senegal,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 325, 31 December 1998), pp. 
643-653.
40 Jean-Luc Blondel, ‘The Meaning of the Word “Humanitarian in Relation to the Fundamental 
Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (November- 
December 1989), p. 507. See also Marion Harroff-Tavel, ‘The Doctrine of the Red Cross and, in 
particular, of the ICRC,’ Dissemination (No. 2, August 1985). Both Blondel and Harroff-Tavel 
were at the time of their writing working in the ICRC Division for Principles and Relations with 
the Movement.
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Some humanitarian practitioners go even further than this and reject talk about 
principles, let alone their justification, altogether. This ‘non-justification’ 
represents the third frequently occurring approach to justifying the humanitarian 
principles. In this context, the argument is usually that humanitarianism is 
primarily a practical rather than philosophical undertaking, in other words, that it 
is first and foremost about humanitarian action rather than about humanitarian 
principles.41
Each of these approaches to justification carries some problems with it. The 
traditional justification of the principle of humanity on the basis of the teachings 
of Christianity appears problematic as it seems necessary that the ethical 
justification of humanitarian assistance as a global activity be grounded on 
something with a significantly broader appeal than Christianity. After all, while 
most of the donor and aid agencies are based in the predominantly Christian 
countries of Europe and North America, many of their beneficiaries are not 
Christian, nor are many of the governments that control access to these 
beneficiaries. Thus, humanitarian aid agencies must -  on both philosophical and 
pragmatic grounds -  be able to justify their action in a way that does not require 
Christian faith.
As a way of circumventing this problem, many humanitarians resort to the 
argument that similar principles appear in all the major world religions and 
philosophical doctrines. This approach is also not without problems: the fact that
41 See e.g. Blondel, op cit., in note 40, p. 508.
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the argument needs to be made at all, coupled with the historical record of the 
problems of access that humanitarian assistance has faced (discussed in more 
detail below), would seem to suggest that the presence of the principle of 
humanity in all the major religions or philosophies, or at least its order of priority 
in relation to other considerations, is not anywhere near as self-evident as the 
proponents of this argument would like to claim. Moreover, any actual attempts to 
identify the principle of humanity in each of these religions will run into the 
problem that there is unlikely to be a single authoritative version of the teachings 
of any given religion, but rather a variety of different interpretations. Some of 
these interpretations may well include something resembling the principle of 
humanity as formulated here, while others may not. As religious belief is a matter 
of accepting an other-worldly truth as an article of faith rather than a question of 
human agreement, there seems to be no way of choosing between the different 
interpretations that would be acceptable to everyone. Nonetheless, if the 
expectation that a universal consensus can be found is dropped and more modest 
targets are set instead -  for finding partial common grounds on the basis of 
contingently shared beliefs -  this approach to justifying the humanitarian 
principles may be the best humanitarians can in actual practice do.
In the face of uncertainty about the foundations of humanitarian beliefs, it is not 
unnatural to want to drop the discussion about abstract principles altogether, and 
focus instead on concrete action, as those taking the third view to justification 
identified above would like to do. It seems difficult to draw a line between action 
and principles in this manner, however. This is because principles provide a way
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of distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate forms of action within a 
particular practice. Even the advocates of the ‘action-over-principles’ argument 
would probably not concede that any action is just as good as any other in the 
context of humanitarian assistance. At one extreme, killing people or inflicting 
pain on them are undeniably forms of action; yet, if the definition of the principle 
of humanity as a call to save lives and prevent or alleviate suffering is accepted, 
we would not include these actions within the definition of humanitarian action. 
It is not even necessary to go this far to see that there are many forms of action 
that would be either detrimental or irrelevant to the business of saving of lives and 
preventing or alleviating suffering. Moreover, not only principles for action but 
also the underlying arguments offered in their justification have very concrete 
implications. For one, people can take the same course of action for veiy different 
reasons. At the same time, these different reasons can result in different courses of 
action in different contexts. For example, both a humanitarian agency which sees 
itself as bound by a universal duty to alleviate human suffering wherever it may 
be found (let’s say, for the sake of argument, that this duty is derived from some 
interpretation of Christianity), and another agency, of the kind that is usually 
described as ‘solidaristic’ because it sees its duty to be to assist those who share 
its religious or political beliefs,42 may provide assistance to the victims of a 
particular disaster in a virtually identical manner, provided that the victims belong 
to the same religious or political group as the latter organisation. Yet, the 
solidaristic organisation will not turn up to provide assistance to victims of an
42 Most people who have been involved with humanitarian assistance can probably think of several 
concrete examples of solidaristic agencies; I will not identify this approach with any particular 
group because of the risk of incorrectly representing their beliefs.
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identical disaster elsewhere if those affected by that disaster are of a different faith 
or political conviction. This is by no means the only kind of effect that different 
justifications can have, but rather simply an illustration of the point that principles 
and their justification can have very concrete consequences and are therefore 
important to academics and practitioners alike. For these reasons, the ‘we are 
doers rather than thinkers’ dichotomy advocated by some humanitarian 
practitioners must be seen as ultimately incoherent. Humanitarians can and should 
talk about the values and principles that guide their action, even if the best that 
they can do is to try to understand their own -  at bottom contingent -  beliefs 
better.
Having addressed some questions regarding the justification of the principle of 
humanity above, I will now turn to discussing the implications of this principle for 
different actors, i.e. the kinds of claims of obligations and entitlements that the 
principle of humanity is seen to create in international humanitarian assistance.
From the legal point of view, the primary obligation to save lives and prevent and 
alleviate suffering falls first and foremost on the state. During peacetime disasters, 
this can be grounded on, for example, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which obliges the state parties to the Covenant to work 
towards the realisation of the right of everyone to ‘adequate food, clothing and 
housing’, to ‘be free from hunger’ and to ‘the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’.43 And, even if many human rights commitments may
43ICESCR, Articles 11 and 12.
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be suspended during armed conflict, international humanitarian law imposes 
obligations regarding the welfare of the populations under their control on (mainly 
state) parties to the conflict, although these obligations are limited by various 
conditions.44 Even non-governmental humanitarian aid agencies have been keen 
to emphasise that the primary responsibility to save lives and prevent or alleviate 
suffering rests with the state. Thus, for instance, the Sphere Project 
‘acknowledge[s] the primary role of the state to provide assistance when people’s 
capacity to cope has been exceeded’ 45 This can be interpreted both as an 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, in the sense of freedom from interference, 
of state authorities within their jurisdiction, as well as a reminder of the duties that 
must be fulfilled in order for that sovereignty to remain legitimate. At the same 
time, many humanitarian agencies also see themselves as being bound by a duty 
to provide humanitarian assistance. The Code o f Conduct provides perhaps the 
broadest argument along these lines, stating that ‘as members of the international 
community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance 
wherever it is needed’.46 Similarly, according to the Principles and Rules for Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief, the Red Cross and Red Crescent ‘has a
44 The Fourth Geneva Convention obliges states only with regard to the welfare of enemy civilians 
under its control during international armed conflict, thus excluding the state’s own citizens as 
well as non-international armed conflicts from its scope. In relation to non-intemational armed 
conflict, Article 18 of Additional Protocol II provides some basis for an obligation on the parties to 
the conflict to alleviate the hardship suffered by the civilian population as a result o f the conflict. 
Similarly, during international armed conflict, Additional Protocol I creates some obligations on 
the party to the conflict in relation to all civilians in need in territory under its control (including its 
own citizens).
45 The Sphere Project, op. cit., in note 10, p. 8.
46 Code o f  Conduct, op. cit., in note 21, p. 5.
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Indeed, as was already mentioned earlier, there is an ongoing debate among 
humanitarians on whether making such commitments does not serve to undermine 
international law and in fact help states to abdicate the responsibility for the 
wellbeing of their populations. In this vein, for example, the Quality Platform 
alleges that the Sphere Project’s humanitarian charter ‘...endangers existing texts 
and laws, and allocates to NGOs responsibilities that are not theirs’ 48 Similarly, it 
has been argued that ‘[f]rom Sphere, through the Codes of Conduct and finally to 
the Ombudsman, the onus of responsibility for assisting vulnerable people shifts 
from states to humanitarian organisations, and finally to the victims themselves.’49 
Arguably, however, the critics are once again barking up the wrong tree, for at 
least two reasons. First, insofar as they accuse aid agencies that see themselves as 
bound by a humanitarian duty as undermining international law -  which is 
understood to place the duty to provide humanitarian assistance squarely with 
each state within its jurisdiction -  this is not entirely factually correct, at least not 
for peacetime disasters. This is because, while the duty to promote social and 
economic rights falls in the first instance on each state within their jurisdiction, 
the UN Covenant in fact also lays a duty on all states parties to it to co-operate in 
promoting respect for such rights world-wide; this is also a duty of signatories to
47IFRC, op. cit., in note 28.
48 Grunewald et a l, op. cit., in note 9.
49 Fiona Terry, ‘The Limits and Risks of Regulation Mechanisms for Humanitarian Action,’ 
Humanitarian Exchange (No. 17, October 2000), p. 21.
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the 1948 declaration and the United Nations Charter.50 More fundamentally, 
however, the 1948 declaration and the later covenants lay the duty on each 
individual to promote respect for human rights world-wide.51 The obvious 
interpretation of this duty is that it is best fulfilled by individuals co-operating 
through the medium of their state to promote this respect for their fellow citizens 
in the first instance, and then by their state co-operating with other states and 
international institutions to promote such respect world-wide.52 Thus, for example 
the Code o f Conduct's formulation, ‘as members of the international community, 
we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is 
needed,’ in fact represents a more accurate interpretation of the requirements of 
international law than that of its critics.
Second, the tension between helping victims and excusing states from their 
responsibilities to their populations should also be seen as something inherent to 
the practice of international humanitarian assistance in itself, rather than the result 
of any efforts to regulate it. After all, at bottom, humanitarian assistance as an
50 The preamble of the ICSECR refers to ‘the obligation of States under the Charter of the United 
Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,’ and 
under Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, the purposes of the United Nations 
include the achievement o f ‘international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion’.
51 The preamble of the ICSECR points out that ‘the individual, having duties to other individuals 
and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’, and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that ‘...every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.’
521 would like to thank John Charvet for emphasising this point to me.
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ethical practice is based on the conviction that there is some minimum level of 
welfare (usually understood to be somewhere just above mere survival) below 
which people should not sink just because their government is unable or unwilling 
-  or both -  to provide them with even the most basic form of protection and 
assistance. This provision of relief to the population, however, also has the 
inevitable consequence of excusing the authorities of the state in question from 
having to face the consequences of their failure to look after the needs and 
interests of the population. The only thing that the current regulatory efforts add to 
what is already an inherent tension within humanitarian aid is simply a layer of 
professionalism: the idea that, if we engage in international assistance at all, we 
might just as well do it well, i.e. in an effective and efficient manner. The only 
real alternative would be to make the population bear the brunt of the 
consequences of what is essentially a fundamental failure of their state and not to 
engage in humanitarian assistance at all. Indeed, it seems to me that it would be 
this alternative, rather than the current efforts aimed at regulating humanitarian 
assistance, that would in fact be the most certain way of shifting the responsibility 
for assisting vulnerable people to the victims themselves.
Nonetheless, in practice, the question of whose duty it is to provide assistance has 
not turned out to be as problematic for the humanitarian community as the 
question of the right to give and receive it. As the numbers of aid agencies in 
Somalia and Kosovo quoted at the beginning of this chapter demonstrate, at 
present there appears to be an abundance of agencies both willing and able to 
provide humanitarian assistance in some form, at least in what may be described
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as ‘high profile’ emergencies. A major problem they face, however, is the 
limitation or denial of access by state authorities, who argue that such assistance is 
an infringement on their sovereignty, while at the same time being unable or 
unwilling, or both, to supply the goods and services to the affected population 
themselves. For example, in the context of internal armed conflict, governments 
are often particularly reluctant to allow the passage of humanitarian assistance to 
rebel-held territories. Moreover, from a legal point of view, the problem of access 
is particularly pressing in natural disasters, where there is at present no treaty 
obligation for states to allow such assistance. Examples of natural disasters where 
there has been resistance from the part of authorities to allow international 
humanitarian organisations access to victims include the recent famines in North 
Korea, the 1990 earthquake in Iran, and the February 1998 earthquake in 
Afghanistan.53 By contrast, during armed conflict (and especially international 
armed conflict), the Geneva Conventions oblige parties to the conflict to allow 
access to relief agencies (although this obligation has also in practice been 
flouted, for example, during the war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988)54).
The problem of access has led humanitarian agencies to argue for the ‘right to 
give and receive humanitarian assistance’. At first sight, this seems a peculiar 
construct, as it appears to set two rights up against one another, where both the 
recipient and the giver have the ‘right’ to receive and to give humanitarian
53 See Rohan J. Hardcastle and Adrian T. L. Chua, ‘Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of 
Access to Victims of Natural Disasters,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 325,31 
December 1998), pp. 589-609.
54 Hans Haug, Humanity fo r  All: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Berne: 
Paul Haupt Publishers, 1993, p. 460.
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assistance, but no corresponding obligations are imposed on either party. Both of 
these rights, however, are of course asserted against the state in relation to the 
problem of access. During international aimed conflict, ‘the right to give and 
receive assistance’ derives from the international legal obligation of the 
belligerent state to provide assistance to enemy nationals in its power and to allow 
access to relief organisations (asserted, for example, in Article 142 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention). The Additional Protocols extend this right to both the states’ 
own citizens and to non-intemational armed conflict (Article 70 of Additional 
Protocol I and Article 18 of Additional Protocol II). The legal situation under 
conditions other than armed conflict is less well-defined. While the Code o f 
Conduct asserts that *[t]he right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, 
is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of 
all countries’, it is clear that such a right has not yet reached the status of 
customary international law, or otherwise been widely recognised by the 
international community.
In this section, I have provided a definition of the principle of humanity, discussed 
some of the issues related to its justification, as well as to the obligations and 
entitlements that flow from this principle. I will now turn to look at the principle 
of impartiality.
Impartiality
If humanity is the fundamental principle of humanitarian assistance, then
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impartiality is its distributive principle. Impartiality describes how the goods and 
services of humanitarian assistance ought to be allocated. As such, it may be seen 
as a second-order principle to the primary principle of humanity. Indeed, the term 
‘humanity* -  in the sense of ‘humankind as a whole, simply by virtue of its human 
attributes’ -  already contains a suggestion about how the goods and services of 
humanitarian assistance ought to be distributed.
In the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, impartiality is defined as 
‘mak[ing] no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or 
political opinions’ and ‘endeavouring] to relieve the suffering of individuals, 
being guided solely by their needs, and ... giv[ing] priority to the most urgent 
cases of distress’.55 Similarly, the second principle of the Code o f Conduct reads: 
‘Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and 
without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis 
of need alone’.56 A similar view of the distribution of humanitarian assistance was 
also affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua vs. 
United States:
An essential feature o f truly humanitarian aid is that it is given 'without 
discrimination ’ o f any kind.... [I]t must be limited to the purposes hallowed in the 
practice o f the Red Cross, namely ‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering ’, and 
'to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being'; it must also,
55 ‘Impartiality’ as defined in the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
56 Code o f Conduct, op. cit., in note 21, p. 5.
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and above all, be given without discrimination to all in need.
The idea of non-discrimination is also apparent in the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
where Article 3 (on non-discrimination) states that ‘[t]he Contracting States shall 
apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to 
race, religion or country of origin’. Similarly, in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, Principle 4, Paragraph 1 reads: ‘[t]hese Principles shall be 
applied without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, legal 
or social status, age, disability, property, birth, or on any other similar criteria’, 
and Paragraph 2 continues: ‘[c]ertain internally displaced persons, such as 
children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with 
young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly 
persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition 
and to treatment which takes into account their special needs’.
Conceptually, the principle of impartiality can be broken down to two related but 
distinct components, namely non-discrimination and proportionality.58 Non­
discrimination refers to the absence of adverse distinction on the basis of
57 In this case, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua accused the United States of violating 
international law through its support of the Contras. The United States defended itself by arguing 
that its support took the form of humanitarian assistance. The Court agreed that humanitarian 
assistance could not constitute a violation of international law, but concluded that the assistance 
offered by the United States was not truly humanitarian in character because it was directed 
exclusively to the Contras and their families. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States o f  America) (Merits), ICJ 
Reports 1986, Paragraph 243.
581 draw here on the 1979 commentary of the famous ICRC lawyer, Jean Pictet, on impartiality as
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membership in a social group, whereas proportionality refers to the idea that 
assistance should be given according to degree of need. Let me now examine each 
of these elements in turn:
Non-discrimination means that one’s race, religion, nationality, class, political 
opinions or sex should not negatively affect the amount or quality of aid that one 
receives. The specific references to race, religion, nationality, class and political 
opinions in the Fundamental Principles and the Code o f Conduct, referred to 
above, can be seen as drawing from the particular experiences of the Second 
World War, which have arguably fundamentally shaped most contemporary 
humanitarian and human rights thought. At the same time, it is clear that these 
categories must be seen as illustrative rather than exhaustive examples of the 
kinds of adverse distinction that is forbidden. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions 
make this explicit through the addition of ‘any other similar criteria* to the list of 
group memberships on the basis of which discrimination is forbidden.59 Thus, 
non-discrimination expresses the idea of equality of human beings, as human 
beings, as well as a duty of equal treatment derived from it. In other words, the 
scope of humanitarian assistance is in principle universal: every human being is 
entitled to receive the goods and services of humanitarian assistance, solely by 
virtue of being human.
one of the fundamental principles of the Red Cross. See Pictet, op. cit., in note 26.
59 The common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions reads: ‘Persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse discrimination 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.’ 
Article 3, Paragraph 1 (emphasis added).
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As was pointed out above, non-discrimination means that the allocation of goods 
and services should never be negatively affected by consideration of a person’s 
membership in a social group. This, however, places no limits on positive 
discrimination, in other words that members of particular social groups, for 
example women, children and the elderly, should receive more, or qualitatively 
different assistance. This brings us to the second element of impartiality, namely 
proportionality.
As was already mentioned above, proportionality refers to the idea that assistance 
should be given according to degree of need. In this way, proportionality qualifies 
non-discrimination in singling need out as the one acceptable basis for differential 
treatment. In the context of humanitarian assistance, needs and their relative 
priority are usually defined in terms of the minimum physiological requirements 
for survival. For example, the minimum standards outlined by the Sphere Project 
can be seen as expressing something of a current consensus on both the kinds of 
needs that humanitarian agencies ought to attend to, as well as giving some 
indication of the order of priority in which they should be responded to.
Conceptually, proportionality encompasses three elements: that more urgent needs 
should be treated first, that greater needs ought to be given quantitatively greater 
treatment, and that qualitatively different needs should be attended to in an 
equitable, though not necessarily the same, manner. In other words, people who 
are likely to die or receive permanent injury in the absence of medical treatment 
or distribution of food and medicine should be attended to first, while those with
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greater needs should receive additional assistance. Finally, assistance should be 
appropriate to needs, rather than meted out in identical form to everyone.
In conclusion, the elements of non-discrimination and proportionality serve to 
flesh out the two dimensions of the principle of impartiality. By forbidding 
negative distinction on the basis membership in a social group, non-discrimination 
serves to affirm the universalism implied by the principle of humanity; in other 
words, that each human being is equally entitled to receive humanitarian 
assistance, solely by virtue of being human. At the same time, proportionality 
means that everyone should receive equitable treatment in proportion to their 
needs.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, my aim has been to describe some of the central elements of the 
basic normative framework underpinning the contemporary practice of 
international humanitarian assistance. I started by reviewing existing documents, 
including both formal legal texts, as well as the less formal -  but equally, if not 
more significant -  commitments by international aid agencies, some of which can 
be said to have reached the status of ‘soft law’. On the basis of these documents, 
two core elements of the normative framework can be identified: the principle of 
humanity, which is the fundamental principle of humanitarian assistance, and the 
principle of impartiality, which is its distributive principle. Briefly described, the 
principle of humanity can be described as a call to save lives and alleviate
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suffering, whereas the principle of impartiality refers to the idea that every human 
being is in principle entitled to humanitarian assistance, qualified only by his or 
her needs.
The purpose of this chapter has been to establish the groundwork for what 
follows. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the emergence of the norm of respect for 
culture and customs in international humanitarian assistance. The puipose of 
Chapter 3 is then to bring together the ideas expressed in the previous two 
chapters, and examine the conceptual implications of the norm of respect for 
culture and customs for the basic normative framework underpinning international 
humanitarian assistance.
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C u s to m s  in In te rnational H u m an ita rian  
A ssis tan ce
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, I offered a description of the sources and content of the 
basic normative framework underpinning international humanitarian assistance, 
and argued that the principles of humanity and impartiality play a particularly 
central role within this normative framework. The principle of humanity can be 
said to be the fundamental principle of international humanitarian assistance, 
while the principle of impartiality serves as its distributive principle. Briefly 
described, humanity refers to the call to save lives and prevent or alleviate human 
suffering, whilst according to the principle of impartiality every human being is 
equally entitled to humanitarian assistance, qualified only by the extent and nature 
of his or her needs.
The aim of the present chapter is to describe the emergence of the norm of 
‘respect for culture and customs’ in international humanitarian assistance. As 
such, the role of the chapter is something of a ‘literature review’ on the way that 
the issue of culture has been dealt with in the context of international 
humanitarian assistance. However, it is a somewhat unconventional one in the
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sense that, rather than concentrating on strictly academic sources -  of which there 
are in any case very few thus far on this topic -  it looks more broadly at 
documents that have addressed the issue of culture in the context of humanitarian 
assistance, be they formal legal texts, principles of aid agencies, operational 
guidelines for practitioners, or academic research. The advantage of presenting the 
issue in this way is that it focuses on how the international humanitarian aid 
community itself sees this normative commitment to respecting culture and 
customs, rather than on some external interpretation. Thus, within the thesis as a 
whole, the overall purpose of this chapter is to present the ‘second half of the 
background (the first half having been provided by the preceding chapter) against 
which the analysis of the implications of respect for culture and customs for the 
existing normative framework underpinning international humanitarian assistance 
can proceed in the chapters that follow.
The present chapter is structured as follows: in the first section, I will describe the 
way in which some of the major documents -  including formal legal texts as well 
as more informal principles and operational guidelines -  that apply to the work of 
contemporary humanitarian practitioners address the issue of respect for culture 
and customs. In the second section, the existing academic literature that deals with 
the issue of culture in humanitarian assistance will be examined.
RESPECT FOR CULTURE AND CUSTOMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN EXISTING DOCUMENTS
This section is divided into two parts. First, I will examine how the issue of
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culture is addressed in legal texts pertaining to humanitarian assistance. Second, I 
will look at the way in which more informal documents, such as those articulating 
the principles of humanitarian aid agencies (some of which, as was already 
pointed out in the previous chapter, have arguably reached the status of ‘soft 
law’1) or professional guidelines deal with this issue. Addressing the documents in 
this order also makes sense in terms of chronology -  and thus for the purposes of 
illustrating how these ideas have developed over time -  as the legal documents 
predate the documents on principles and operational guidelines in most cases by 
several decades. As the background of the legal documents addressed below was 
already described in the previous chapter, I will launch directly into a discussion 
of their content.
Respect for culture in international legal documents
Although the norm of respect for culture and customs has arguably only in recent 
years received heightened attention from those engaged in humanitarian 
assistance, some evidence of this concern can be traced back already to the 
provisions of 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thus, for example, Article 27 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (on civilians) states that: ‘Protected persons are 
entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their 
family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and 
customs’. Moreover, with regard to the culturally appropriate upbringing of child
1 See Hugo Slim, ‘Claiming a Humanitarian Imperative: NGOs and the Cultivation of 
Humanitarian Duty,’ paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Webster 
University, entitled Humanitarian Values for the Twenty-First Century, Geneva, 21-22 February
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victims of armed conflict, article 24 of the Fourth Convention states that:
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separatedfrom their families as a 
result o f the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, 
the exercise o f their religion and their education are facilitated in all 
circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons 
o f a similar cultural tradition.
Similarly, with regard to religious practices in occupied territories, article 58 of 
the Fourth Convention states that ‘[t]he occupying power shall permit ministers of 
religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities. 
The Occupying Power shall also accept consignments of books and articles 
required for religious needs and shall facilitate their distribution in occupied 
territory.’ Also, with reference to internees, article 82 provides that ‘[t]he 
Detaining Power shall, as far as possible, accommodate the internees according to 
their nationality, language and customs’. And, specifically addressing the 
provision of food for internees, article 89 states that ‘[a]ccount shall also be taken 
of the customary diet of the internees’. On religion, article 93 states that 
‘[ijntemees shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, 
including attendance at the services of their faith, on condition that they comply 
with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the detaining authorities’. It should 
also be mentioned that similar provisions can be found in the other Geneva
2002, p. 2.
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Conventions, although -  as the focus of the present exercise is in the treatment of 
and assistance to civilians -  they will not be examined in detail here.
International legal documents that deal with refugees and IDPs also make 
reference to cultural issues, albeit more briefly than the relatively detailed Geneva 
Conventions. Thus, the 1951 Refugee Convention states in article 4, on religion, 
that ‘[t]he Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories 
treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to 
freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education 
of their children*. In addition, there are two similar references in the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement: Principle 22 of the Guiding Principles states 
that ‘ [ijntemally displaced persons, whether or not they are living in camps, shall 
not be discriminated against as a result of their displacement in the enjoyment of 
the following rights: (a) The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief, opinion and expression...’, while Principle 23 asserts every human being’s 
right to education, stating that, ‘[t]o give effect to this right for internally 
displaced persons, the authorities concerned shall ensure that such persons, in 
particular displaced children, receive education which shall be free and 
compulsory at the primary level. Education should respect their cultural identity, 
language and religion’.
It is worth noting that in all of the legal texts referred to above, the question of 
culture is primarily seen as a matter limited to freedom of religion and the right to
2 See, for example, Article 17 in the first Convention, and Articles 26,34,72 and 120 of the third 
Convention.
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culturally appropriate education. Thus, the possibility that cultural and customary 
norms and practices might also play a role within the context of satisfying basic or 
physiological needs (i.e. food, water, sanitation, shelter and medical care), which 
after all have traditionally been the main focus of humanitarian assistance proper, 
is largely overlooked. The only exception to this appears to be the above- 
mentioned reference to the ‘customary diet’ of the internees in the fourth Geneva 
Convention.
As was already pointed out in the previous chapter, when looking at international 
legal documents in the context of international humanitarian assistance, it should 
be remembered that the significance of the legal texts to the practice of 
international humanitarian assistance is limited by the fact that the international 
legal instruments are primarily addressed to states, thus leaving outside a wide 
range of non-state actors involved in international humanitarian assistance. Thus, 
to obtain a more complete picture of the normative status of the issue of respect 
for culture and customs in international humanitarian assistance, it is necessary 
also to look at more informal documents, such as statements of principle and 
operational guidelines issued by the humanitarian aid organisations themselves. It 
is to these documents that I will turn next.
Respect for culture in aid organisations’ principles and operational 
guidelines
The document that has expressed the norm of respect for culture perhaps most 
authoritatively in the context of humanitarian assistance to date is the 1994 Code
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o f Conduct. The Code o f Conduct states, as the fifth of its ten principles: ‘We [the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and NGOs engaging in disaster relief] 
shall respect culture and custom: we will endeavour to respect the culture, 
structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in’.3 The 
Code o f Conduct is significant both because it was prepared jointly by all the 
major non-governmental humanitarian aid organisations and has been signed by 
what probably amounts to the overwhelming majority of aid organisations in the 
world (see Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the background of the Code o f 
Conduct), and because its provisions have, in a relatively short time, become 
central criteria for the planning and evaluation of NGO programming both in the 
context of peacetime disasters and in armed conflict.
While the Code o f Conduct expresses respect for culture and customs as a general 
principle, it nonetheless does not give any indication of what the observance of 
this principle would look like in practice. It is possible to identify two major 
documents that give concrete expression to the significance of culture and 
customs for humanitarian assistance in practice, namely the People-Oriented 
Planning approach, primarily used by UNHCR and its partners, and the Sphere 
Project which has been contributed to, and is being used by, a broad spectrum of 
humanitarian aid organisations. This is not to say that these are the only 
operational documents that mention cultural issues in the context of humanitarian
3 The Code o f  Conduct fo r  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief, p. 6 (available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/). NB: despite a title that would seem to limit its applicability 
to peacetime disasters, the Code o f  Conduct applies in fact both during peacetime and in armed 
conflict, although in armed conflict the provisions of International Humanitarian Law take 
precedence.
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assistance;4 for the purposes of this thesis, however, I have chosen to focus on the 
People-Oriented Planning approach and the Sphere Handbook, as they provide a 
particularly comprehensive view of cultural issues across the different 
functionally specific areas of humanitarian action. In addition, the Sphere 
Handbook can be seen as representing an unprecedentedly broad consensus on 
humanitarian assistance in that thousands of individual aid workers from hundreds 
of aid organisations -  both inter- and non-governmental -  and scores of countries 
were consulted for it. I will now examine each of them in turn.
Respect for culture and customs in UNHCR’s People-Oriented Planning
As the People-Oriented Planning approach has not been discussed earlier, it 
deserves a brief introduction. In 1990, the Executive Committee of the United 
Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees’ programme approved a Policy on 
Refugee Women, which called for the improvement of participation and access of 
refugee women in all programmes. One outcome of this policy was the 
development of A Framework for People-Oriented Planning in Refugee Situations 
Taking Account o f Women, Men and Children: A Practical Planning Tool for 
Refugee Workers (hereafter People-Oriented Planning) by Mary B. Anderson, 
Ann M. Howarth and Catherine Overhault for UNHCR in 1992.5 The operational
4 For example, the IFRC’s policy on emergency food aid and nutrition states as its first principle 
that ‘[t]he International Federation and each individual National Society shall: Seek to provide 
food aid which is culturally acceptable, nutritionally wholesome and free from undesirable long­
term adverse consequences’ (available at http://www.ifrc.org/who/policy/foodaid.asp (emphasis 
added)).
5 Mary B. Anderson, Ann M. Howarth (Brazeau) and Catherine Overholt, A Framework fo r  
People-Oriented Planning in Refugee Situations Taking Account o f  Women, Men and Children: A
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implications of the People-Oriented Planning approach were fleshed out in greater 
detail in a 1994 publication by Mary B. Anderson, called People-Oriented 
Planning at Work: Using POP to Improve UNHCR Programming.6 The influence 
of the People-Oriented Planning approach can also be seen in the updated version 
of UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies, which raises many of the same issues.7
According to its authors, the People-Oriented Planning approach is a tool intended 
to help refugee workers to improve the participation and access of, in particular, 
refugee women in all programmes, by providing them with ‘a framework for 
analysing socio-cultural and economic factors in a refugee society which can 
influence the success of the planned activities’.8 Despite having been originally 
envisaged primarily as relating to gender, People-Oriented Planning deals with a 
variety of forms of diversity -  including cultural diversity -  that may exist both 
between and within refugee groups: ‘[rjefugee groups are not the same. Nor is any 
refugee group homogeneous’.9 As a result of this diversity, it is necessary to find 
out specific information about each particular group in order to provide ‘efficient, 
cost-effective and humane protection and services’ to them.10
Practical Planning Toolfor Refugee Workers, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1992 (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
6 Mary B. Anderson, People-Oriented Planning at Work: Using POP to Improve UNHCR 
Programming, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 1994 (available via 
http://www.unhcr.ch).
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook fo r  Emergencies (second 
edition), Geneva, 2002 (available via www.unhcr.ch).
8 Anderson et al., op. cit., in note 5.
9 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 2.
10 Ibid.
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The three basic components of the ‘People-Oriented Analytical Framework’ are: 
(1) refugee population profile and context analysis, (2) activities analysis, and (3) 
use and control of resources analysis. Briefly described, the refugee profile refers 
to the demographic composition of the refugee group before they became 
refugees, as well as changes in that composition while being refugees, or 
becoming returnees, whereas the context refers to factors that affect a particular 
refugee situation. The main contextual factors identified include the reasons why 
these particular people became refugees (for example, as a result of armed conflict 
or famine) as well as the cultural mores that influence how the refugees act. The 
activities analysis consists of identifying the division of labour among the 
refugees as well as when and where particular activities are undertaken. Finally, 
resources analysis includes finding out what resources the people in question 
have, who has which resources, and what resources still need to be provided to the 
refugees. Together, these three steps are seen to contribute to more efficient and 
equitable planning:
When you know who is in the refugee population (refugee profile), which roles 
different groups perform (activities analysis and culture), and which resources 
they already possess that can be used (resources analysis), you will be able to 
identify which resources and services need to be provided, who needs them, and 
where, how and when to provide them in order to reach the right people. This will 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness o f UNHCR’s programming.n
"Ibid., p. 3.
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In a similar manner, the UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies states on 
identifying needs that ‘[a]n appropriate response in the provision of protection and 
material assistance requires an assessment of the needs of refugees that takes into 
account not only their material state and the resources available, but also their 
culture, age, gender and background... ’12
The issue of the culture and customs of the refugee population, and the need to 
respect it, appears in a number of contexts within the People-Oriented Planning 
approach. On a general level, it is pointed out that ‘[i]f refugees are mostly men, 
the jobs that women normally did cannot be done in the usual way, or if refugees 
are mostly women, then die jobs done by men cannot be done as they previously 
were. This is especially true if cultural mores strongly dictate who can do what’.13 
Moreover, under the title of ‘socio-cultural background of the people*, refugee 
workers are urged to ask:
What factors in the traditions and practices o f these people will directly affect 
programming? ... Are there any deeply held, traditional and/or religious beliefs 
that will affect:
1. How UNHCR or its implementing partners gain access to certain groups o f 
refugees (e.g. women)?
2. What food is suitable?
12 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 7, p. 6.
13 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 3.
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3. What medical/health care is suitable?
4. What shelter is appropriate or how water and sanitation should be arranged?14
Thus, the People-Oriented Planning approach raises the issue of culture in the 
context of each of the above-mentioned functionally specific areas -  food, shelter, 
water, sanitation and health. Let us now look at the issue of culture in each of 
these areas in turn:
In relation to culture and food, the People-Oriented Planning approach raises the 
issues of food taboos, culturally specific division of labour in food preparation 
(for example, along gender lines), as well as culturally specific distributive 
structures. In relation to food delivery, the People-Oriented Planning approach 
states that ‘[i]f there are clear or prevalent food taboos, either for the general 
population or for particular groups within it, you must know them so that you do 
not waste food and/or fail to meet the nutritional requirements of certain 
groups’.15 The examples cited include pork for Muslim populations, as well as 
foods that are forbidden for young children or for pregnant or lactating women. 
Likewise, a similar concern with the cultural dimensions of food aid is expressed 
in the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies: ‘[assistance must be appropriate to 
the nutritional needs of the refugees and be culturally acceptable. Foods prepared 
locally with local ingredients are preferable to imported foods. Infant feeding
14 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
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policies require particular attention.’16 In relation to food preparation, the People- 
Oriented Planning approach points out that ‘[i]f people normally responsible for 
preparing food (or gathering fuel and water for its preparation) are not part of the 
population of refugees, and others do not know how to do these activities or are 
proscribed by tradition and culture from doing these things, then providing raw
17 •rations to people will not ensure that they can eat them’. The example that is 
cited in this context is that of groups of young male refugees who have no 
experience of cooking for themselves, and who as a consequence have often 
suffered high rates of nutrition-related illness and death until programmes were 
redesigned to address this refugee group’s lack of food preparation knowledge. 
Finally, in the context of culturally specific distributive structures and their impact 
on food delivery to the population, the example of ‘second and third wives (and 
their children) who did not receive adequate provisions because food distributors 
assumed that the male head and the first wife would organize a fair intra-family 
distribution’ is given.18
Regarding the issue of shelter and culture, the UNHCR Handbook for 
Emergencies states that ‘[t]he social and cultural background of the refugees must 
be a primary consideration and will be an important determinant of the most 
appropriate type of site and shelter,’19and continues: ‘[r]efugee housing should be
16 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 7, p. 189.
17 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 6.
18 Ibid., p. 7.
19 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 7, p. 148.
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culturally and socially appropriate and familiar. Suitable local materials are best, 
if available.’20 For its part, the People-Oriented Planning approach focuses in the 
context of shelter on the issue of ‘unaccompanied’ women (humanitarian jargon 
for women not in the company of a male relative), pointing out that:
I f  tradition dictates (culture) that women should be secluded within household 
compounds, housing styles and latrine locations must be designed to respect these 
traditions. In addition, the locations o f wells andfood or other service distribution 
points must take account o f women ’s mobility i f  women are to be ensured access 
to them. Shelter arrangements for women without husbands in situations where 
women are usually secluded must also take into account the tradition o f 
seclusion.
As a way of dealing with such problems, the approach suggests two possible lines 
of action: first, providing shelter in a manner that “pairs” single women with 
families where there are men present or, second, reserving special areas for groups 
of single women and their dependents. The People-Oriented Planning approach 
also points out that the decision which of these ways of addressing the problem is 
appropriate in a given context should be based both on the local culture, as well as 
on the risk that the women will be exploited in the household with whom they are 
paired. For these reasons, it continues, ‘it is essential to gather information on 
refugee culture, and the cultural environment where the refugees are now located,
20 Ibid., p. 155.
21 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 9.
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The issue of culturally specific (and gendered) division of labour is raised again in 
relation to water programming:
[ajctivities analysis and culture are important for understanding whose task it 
will be (usually based on traditional activities) to collect water and the conditions 
under which water should be provided. I f  most water related tasks belong to 
women, then the location o f water points, the time o f day at which these are 
operational, and the utensils provided for carrying water will need to be arranged 
in ways that are appropriate for women.
Furthermore, ‘[i]n some societies, women’s social seclusion must be respected in 
the location and availability of water points’.24
On culture and sanitation, the People-Oriented Planning approach gives the 
cautionary example of a case where ‘[Refugees would not use latrines that had 
been built for them because these latrines faced Mecca’.25 The possibility that 
refugees will not use latrines provided for them because men’s and women’s
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 10.
24 Ibid., p. 11.
25 Ibid., p. 13.
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latrines are built side-by-side, thus violating privacy norms, is also raised.26 
Similarly, addressing the cultural issues in the context of sanitation in more 
general terms, the Handbook for Emergencies states that ‘[t]he essential starting 
point is to find out the traditional sanitation practices of the refugees and how 
these can be modified to reduce health risks in a refugee emergency’.27 The 
Handbook also provides a detailed check-list of the types of information that 
needs to be gathered in this context, including issues such as the previous 
sanitation system and practices of the people in question; the need for privacy; the 
segregation of sexes and other groups or individuals with whom it is culturally 
unacceptable to share a latrine; cultural practices for children; cultural taboos (for 
example, against contact with anything that may have touched excreta of others); 
social factors, including likelihood of community action to ensure proper use of 
proposed system; and the need for special orientation of latrines in some 
cultures.28
Finally, in relation to the provision of health services to refugees, the People- 
Oriented Planning approach emphasises the gendered nature of access to health 
care in many cultural contexts: ‘[i]n refugee populations in which culture 
proscribes who can treat women and women’s illnesses, health services will not 
be appropriate or utilised unless these cultural factors are recognised in where and
26 Ibid.
27 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 7, p. 233.
28 Ibid.
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how health services are provided and in who provides them’.29 One example that 
is given in this context involves a camp where women traditionally wore veils: 
‘...a campaign to ensure that refugees took vitamin A involved giving the tablets 
to refugees and insisting that they be swallowed immediately. After a few days, 
women stopped coming for the capsules, because they did not want to lift their 
veils in public (which the staff were insisting upon so that they could be sure the 
pills were being taken).’30 Moreover, ‘[i]f tradition dictates that men must 
represent their families in the public arena (culture), but there are many 
households in the refugee population who are headed by women or where women 
are secluded (refugee profile/culture), special arrangements must be made to 
provide health services in places and under circumstances that provide access to 
women without male support’.31 In a similar vein, the Handbook for Emergencies 
also points out that ‘[rjeproductive health care should be available in all situations 
and be based on refugee, particularly women's, needs and expressed demands. The 
various religious, ethical values and cultural backgrounds of the refugees should 
be respected, in conformity with universally recognized international human 
rights.’32 Finally, the People-Oriented Planning approach also points out that 
‘[s]pecial encouragement and protection may be needed to enable women to 
report sexual abuse when cultural taboos (e.g., ostracism) surround the victims of
29 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 13-14.
30 Ibid., p. 15.
31 Ibid., p. 14.
32 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 7, p. 177.
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such attacks’.33
As should be evident from the description above, both the People-Oriented 
Planning approach and the Handbook for Emergencies incorporate a broad range 
of cultural issues within their scope. In particular, in contrast to the legal 
documents examined above, they explicitly focus on the ways in which cultural 
and customary issues may affect the satisfaction of basic physiological needs. 
They also overtly take into account the manner in which gender-considerations 
and culture are often intertwined. Their main weakness is that both the People- 
Oriented Planning and the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies seem to implicitly 
assume that humanitarian aid organisations and aid workers are themselves 
somehow ‘culturally neutral’ -  as the implications of their possible cultural biases 
are not touched upon -  and that it is only the refugees whose cultural norms and 
practices may require attention or adjustment While the desire to keep things as 
straight-forward as possible in an essentially practice-oriented document such as 
the People-Oriented Planning approach is understandable, this oversimplifies the 
issues at stake. Moreover, it might also contribute to added sensitivity towards the 
beliefs and practices of the recipients if aid workers were also encouraged to 
examine their own cultural assumptions. A further problem -  which does not only 
apply to the issue of culture but rather reflects a more general problem with these 
documents -  is that they focus exclusively on assistance in a camp context, 
something that fails to capture the different types of situations humanitarian 
organisations may come up against in the field (even in many refugee situations,
33 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 14.
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the people who are forced to flee find shelter with relatives or members of the 
same ethnic group, and thus do not end up in camps).
Respect for culture and customs in the Sphere Project
Although the Sphere Project was already introduced in the previous chapter, a 
brief recapping is probably in order for the present context: the Sphere Project, 
launched in July 1997, is an interagency effort that seeks to articulate a set of 
operational minimum standards for the provision of goods and services in disaster 
relief. It is the result of the collaboration of humanitarian NGOs, donor 
governments and UN agencies. Its scope includes both armed conflict and 
peacetime disasters. The Sphere Project seeks to present a consensus on existing 
ideas by drawing on the experiences of over 228 organisations and over 700 
individual aid-workers in over sixty countries. Thus far, the main product of the 
Sphere Project has been the Sphere Handbook, which comprises a humanitarian 
charter and minimum standards in disaster relief.
The Sphere Handbook fleshes out some elements of the concrete implications of 
respect for culture for humanitarian aid operations. For example, the Handbook’s 
‘Guidance Notes’ on assessments and monitoring of disaster situations state that 
‘people who are able to collect information from all groups in the affected 
population in a culturally acceptable manner should be included, especially 
regarding gender analysis and language skills’.34 Continuing in a similar vein, the
34 See, for example, The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
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Handbook points out that ‘[g]roup discussions with members of the affected 
community can yield useful information on cultural beliefs and practices’. In 
addition to these general points, the Handbook makes a number of references to 
cultural factors in functionally specific contexts. Thus, with regard to water 
supply, the Handbook states that ‘the exact quantities of water needed for 
domestic use may vary according to the climate, the sanitation facilities available, 
people’s normal habits, their religious and cultural practices, the food they cook, 
the clothes they wear, etc.’.36 In other words, the need for water cannot be 
understood in purely physiological terms; rather, cultural (and other) factors must 
also be considered. Regarding gender and nutrition, the Handbook states that 
‘[women] can provide valuable information about feeding hierarchies, and how 
food is acquired by the affected population; they can also contribute to an 
understanding of gender roles and the cultural practices that affect how different 
members of the population access nutrition programmes. It is therefore important 
to encourage women’s participation in the design and implementation of nutrition 
programmes wherever possible.’37 Moreover, the Handbook goes on to point out 
that ‘[gjender roles within the social system also need to be taken into account, 
including cultural practices that contribute to women’s nutritional vulnerability. 
For example, in certain cultures, women eat after everyone else’. On food 
acceptability, the Handbook emphasises that ‘[f]oods distributed [should] not
Disaster Response (hereafter Sphere Handbook), Geneva: Sphere Project, 2000, p. 23.
35 See, for example, p. 29 of the Sphere Handbook (Ibid.).
36 Ibid., p. 32.
37 Ibid., p. 72.
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conflict with the religious or cultural traditions of the recipient or host populations 
(this includes any food taboos for pregnant or breastfeeding women)’ and that 
people should have ‘access to culturally important condiments (such as sugar or 
chilli)’.39 Regarding clothing standards, the Sphere Handbook specifies that each 
individual should have at least one full set of clothing ‘appropriate to the culture, 
season and climate’ and that ‘[culturally appropriate burial cloth [should be 
made] available as required*.40 Finally, the Handbook suggests that culture may 
play a role in the use of medical facilities, and therefore in the reduction of 
morbidity and mortality from communicable diseases: ‘consideration should be 
given to factors affecting the use of, and attendance at, medical facilities. These 
may include cultural factors...’41
Although the People-Oriented Planning approach goes into much greater detail on 
cultural issues than the Sphere Handbook -  probably reflecting the status of the 
former as a specialised tool designed to address issues related to diversity, while 
the latter is a general handbook dealing with a broad range of issues -  it is 
possible to see the similarities in their approaches to cultural issues in the context 
of humanitarian assistance even from the brief overview presented above. In sum, 
the approach taken by the People-Oriented Planning approach, the UNHCR 
Handbook for Emergencies, and the Sphere Handbook demonstrates the serious
3* Ibid., p. 80.
39 Ibid., p. 100.
40 Ibid., p. 193.
41 Ibid., p. 253.
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consideration that most humanitarian aid agencies today give to the role of culture 
and customs in humanitarian assistance. On the basis of the examples given in 
these documents, the primary rationale for this appears to be the role that cultural 
appropriateness is seen to play in the success of humanitarian aid. Clearly, a major 
impetus for the emergence of respect for culture and customs was provided by the 
recognition, as a result of mistakes made during earlier humanitarian operations, 
that the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance, and even safety of 
humanitarian aid workers, could be at risk if culture and customs were not 
adequately taken into account. That such considerations did play a role in the 
emergence of the norm of respect for culture and customs is attested, for example, 
by the way in which Paul Grossrieder, the Director General of the ICRC, has 
described the reasons why the ICRC had become concerned with the impact of 
cultural differences on its work:
Cultural differences are one o f the constraints insufficiently taken into account in 
our way o f working. When the ICRC tried to understand why it had so many 
problems in obtaining access to the victims and ensuring its delegates' security, it 
came to the conclusion that i f  it had a better understanding o f cultural differences 
and a greater awareness o f what it was when it intervened in other societies, its 
work would be better understood and in the long run better accepted*1
When compared to the earlier legal documents, the way in which to the issue of
42 From a speech, entitled ‘Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences’, given by 
Grossrieder at the ICRC Seminar for Non-Govemmental Organizations on Humanitarian 
Standards and Cultural Differences, 14 December 1998 (a Summary Report of the seminar is
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culture is dealt with in both the People-Oriented Planning approach and the 
Sphere Handbook is clearly much broader: the concern with culture and customs 
is no longer just related to freedom of religion and right to culturally appropriate 
education, but instead is seen to permeate virtually all aspects of basic needs 
provision. In part, this divergence may simply reflect the different purposes of the 
legal documents and the operational tools. Nonetheless, I would argue that it also 
represents a more fundamental change in attitude that has taken place over time 
among humanitarian practitioners. Unlike in the relatively recent past, basic needs 
provision is today no longer seen as an ‘exact science’, where what matters is 
getting things like calorific and nutrient requirements or litres of available 
drinking water per person right, but rather a much more complex exercise within 
which it is necessary to balance such objective, universal, and material 
considerations with subjective, contextual and non-material factors, including 
culture and customs, if humanitarian assistance is to reach its aims of saving lives 
and alleviating suffering in an effective and efficient manner. The approach taken 
by the People-Oriented Planning approach and the Sphere Project may be 
contrasted with the way in which, in the relatively recent past, (at least some) aid 
workers appear to have felt that respect for culture was a luxury those engaged in 
the serious business of saving of lives simply could not afford. For example, 
illustrating this tendency of disdain toward cultural and other ‘soft’ concerns, an 
American aid official commented on the humanitarian operation intended to 
alleviate mass starvation in Somalia: ‘We’re rightly indifferent to people’s
available via http://www.icrc.org).
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cultural needs and to appropriateness issues’.43 By contrast, far from being a ‘soft’ 
or peripheral concern, cultural issues are today seen to be at the centre of the 
successful delivery of aid. As one humanitarian practitioner writes: ‘complex 
emergencies require specialists who understand the history, culture and fast- 
moving politics of a country and region. It is impossible to programme effective 
relief programmes unless you also understand the local political context in which 
you wish to operate’.44 In other words, awareness of the local culture and customs, 
as well as other contextual factors, have come to be seen as intrinsic components 
in achieving the ends of humanitarian assistance, the alleviation of suffering and 
the saving of lives.
As I hope the above discussion clearly demonstrates, I believe that the Code o f 
Conduct, the People-Oriented Planning Approach, UNHCR’s Handbook for 
Emergencies, and the Sphere Handbook are addressing an important concern 
when they encourage aid workers to become informed about and respect the 
culture and customs of the recipients. There is, however, also another side to the 
question of culture in international humanitarian assistance: what about situations 
when culture and customs run into conflict with the basic principles underlying 
humanitarian assistance, namely humanity and/or impartiality? This is an issue 
that does not appear to be systematically dealt with in the existing documents. The 
Sphere Handbook’s reference to the need to take into account ‘cultural practices
43 Quoted in Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges & Intervention 
(second edition), Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, p. 136.
44 Christopher Cushing, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Role of NGOs,’ Institutional 
Development (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995), p. 13.
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that contribute to women’s nutritional vulnerability’ hints at the possibility of 
such problems, but does not go on explore them further.45 Likewise, the People- 
Oriented Planning approach refers to the fact that morbidity and mortality rates 
for girls are often higher than those for boys, pointing out that this tends to be the 
case because ‘parents place higher value on the health of their sons and, thus, 
when it is difficult to gain access to health care, they will postpone taking a 
daughter for care (during which time she may become quite ill) but they will 
ensure that a boy gets the care he needs before he becomes too ill to recover’.46 In 
other words, both the Sphere Project and the People-Oriented Planning approach 
seem to be at least tacitly aware that the principle of impartiality -  i.e. the idea 
that every human being is equally entitled to humanitarian assistance, conditioned 
only by his or her needs -  is not necessarily shared in all cultural contexts. 
However, neither of them attempts to address the implications of this phenomenon 
in a systematic manner. In part, this is perhaps the outcome of the tendency, 
referred to earlier, of these documents to see cultural particularity as the exclusive 
property of the recipients of aid, while presenting aid workers and organisations 
as culturally neutral universalists. Thus, potential cultural challenges to the 
humanitarian principles may not be taken seriously. As I see it, this position is 
somewhat problematic; I will return to examine it in more detail in Chapter 3, 
however. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the ways in which the issue of 
culture in the context of humanitarian assistance has been discussed in the existing 
academic literature.
45 Sphere Handbook, op. cit., in note 34, p. 80.
46 Anderson, op. cit., in note 6, p. 15.
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Academic literature on culture and humanitarian assistance
To begin with, it should be said that the existing academic literature on culture 
and humanitarian assistance is sparse to say the least. Only a handful of authors 
have dealt with this issue at all, whether from the point of view of a specific case 
study or a more conceptual analysis. I can only guess at reasons for why this is the 
case: perhaps other problems are thought to be more significant; perhaps the 
concern with culture and customs in the field of humanitarian assistance is simply 
too new; or perhaps there is a feeling that focusing on the diversity of cultural 
traditions and the implications that they might have for humanitarian aid might 
undermine the universalistic claims of the humanitarian agenda -  and thus run 
counter to the way in which many humanitarian organisations would like to justify 
their actions; it is difficult to say with certainty. Nonetheless, in this section, I will 
examine the literature that does exist
To my knowledge, the only attempt so far to systematically examine the 
conceptual implications of cultural issues for international humanitarian assistance 
so far has been made by the academic and former aid worker Hugo Slim; it is 
therefore worth discussing at some length. The occasion at which Slim spoke, the 
ICRC’s annual seminar for humanitarian NGOs in 1998, which had as its theme 
‘humanitarian standards and cultural differences’, in itself demonstrated the 
emerging interest from the part of the humanitarian community on the issue of
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culture and its potential impact on their work.47 In his presentation, Slim described 
the different dimensions of the issue of culture in the context of humanitarian 
assistance thus:
[Modem, organized humanitarianism] springs from a culture, one o f the sources 
o f which is here in Geneva. It engages around the world with many cultures. It 
prizes culture itself, in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 
religion, people’s way o f life, their cultural objects are prized by 
humanitarianism. So we can say that humanitarianism prizes cultural difference. 
Humanitarian aid also aims to spread a culture. A culture o f restraint in war and 
increasingly, particularly in the NGO community, a culture o f peace as well. 
Finally, o f course, organized, modem, Western humanitarianism has an 
organizational culture o f its own. And within its wider, global culture, it has
JQ
different national cultures o f humanitarianism.
What is important about Slim’s comments is that they illustrate the multiple 
dimensions that cultural issues can have in international humanitarian assistance; 
it is not only the diversity of cultural values, norms and practices among the 
recipients of humanitarian assistance that need to be taken into account when 
considering this issue, but also those of humanitarian aid workers and their
47 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Seminar for Non-Governmental Organizations 
on Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences, Summary Report, 14 December 1998 
(available via http://www.icrc.org).
48 Hugo Slim, ‘Relief Agencies: Cultural Challenges and Cultural Responsibility,’ presentation 
given at the ICRC Seminar for Non-Governmental Organizations on Humanitarian Standards and 
Cultural Differences, 14 December 1998 (available via http://www.icrc.org).
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organisations. Thus, the picture that Slim appears to present is not so much one of 
humanitarians as culturally neutral universalists who need to find ways of 
accommodating the particularistic cultures of the recipients -  a view that, as was 
pointed out above, comes across from many practitioner documents dealing with 
this issue -  than a much more complex one of various cultural elements from both 
sides coming together and having an impact on one another.
In addition to outlining the multiplicity of cultural traditions that meet in the 
practice of international humanitarian assistance, Slim comments on the ways in 
which Western humanitarianism should engage with other cultures. His argument 
is that this engagement should occur on three levels: ideological, social and 
practical.49 At the ideological level, it is necessary to understand how the people 
in question understand the principle of humanity, how they see human nature. It is 
also necessary to enquire into their philosophy and morality of war (in the context 
of humanitarian assistance in armed conflict), as well as that of charity, 
hospitality, and help. At the social level, we need to know whether the people in 
question understand social life in individualistic or communal terms. And finally, 
at the practical level, questions concerning diet and conceptions of health and 
illness should be asked (in addition, although Slim does not actually mention 
them, it also seems consistent with his overall approach that conceptions of shelter 
and practices of water use and sanitation would also be important at the practical 
level).
49 Ibid.
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Slim goes on to state that, as a result of asking these questions, we are likely to 
encounter one of four scenarios: first, what appear at first sight as cultural 
differences may be more apparent than real, in fact similar values that are 
presented somewhat differently. Second, we may have differences of emphasis on 
what are essentially shared values; these Slim sees as being open to negotiation. 
Third, real, i.e. irreconcilable differences may be revealed. Fourth, we may find 
out that culture is being used as an ‘alibi for excessive violence*. Slim concludes 
with what appears to represent a strong universalist position, stating that ‘from 
this cultural negotiation, humanitarianism can find out what is held in common 
and stand firm against what is a real difference. ... We have to find out what can 
be adapted and negotiated, and what real differences we have to take a strong line 
on’.50 It is worth noting that there may be some difficulty reconciling Slim’s 
initial approach, which appears to present humanitarianism as one culturally 
specific practice among others, with this concluding comment: after all, if 
humanitarianism is only one cultural practice among others, what justifies its 
assertion over differing practices? I will return to this question in the chapter that 
follows; in any case, Slim’s argument provides a useful tentative typology to 
structure our thinking about the kinds of issues respect for culture and customs 
might raise in general terms for humanitarian assistance.
While Slim addresses the issue of culture and humanitarian assistance from a 
conceptual perspective, Jok Madut Jok has written one of the few studies so far 
that examines the impact of cultural norms and practices on a specific
50 Ibid.
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humanitarian assistance operation. Specifically, Jok focuses on the way in which 
the interaction between humanitarian aid workers and recipients in South Sudan 
has been affected by the lack of awareness of the local norms and practices on the 
part of the aid workers. Jok’s basic argument is that ‘existing strategies of needs 
assessment are often based on misunderstandings about the cultural, social and 
economic conditions of war-affected communities’.51 This, according to Jok, has a 
number of consequences for aid operations. For example, he points out that if the 
questions asked by aid workers during needs assessments are seen as being 
irrelevant or stupid by the recipients, this may lead the local people to question the 
seriousness of the relief workers’ intentions and even their capacity to help on a 
more general level. One example Jok cites in this context involves questions 
regarding cattle numbers and sharing cattle:
It is a pointless and frustrating process to ask a Dinka person the number o f cattle 
he owns. Not only because o f the possible bad luck to say the number o f one's 
cattle, but most Dinka people do not know the exact number o f their herd. It is 
also rude. It is like doing a socio-economic status study in an urban area where 
the researcher asks people how much money they have in their bank accounts and 
building societies.52
Similarly, Jok cites an example where an aid worker asked a crowd of women
51 Jok Madut Jok, ‘Information Exchange in the Disaster Zone: Interaction between Aid Workers
and Recipients in South Sudan,’ Disasters (Vol. 20, No. 3, 1996), p. 206.
121
Chapter 2
...why, i f  the war had been going on for so many years, was the Dinka population 
so large? The 'population being so large’ is an expression that is virtually a taboo 
in Dinka ideology, because it implies wishing ill. This particular aid worker 
became the topic o f conversation in the village for the next few days. He was 
eventually deemed an ‘enemy o f the people \52
Jok points out that such ill-judged questions, whether intentionally malicious or 
not, may lead to scepticism on the part of the recipients regarding the intentions of 
the aid workers, which may in turn contribute to the provision of misleading 
information and which therefore may negatively affect the aid programmes.
Jok also identifies an additional dimension in the relationship between culture and 
humanitarian assistance, namely that relief agencies themselves may become 
vehicles of cultural change, something which may not only have positive 
consequences for the recipients. The example Jok cites in this context relates to 
the way in which community representatives may try to portray their particular 
communities as poorer and needier than others in order to gain access to aid.54 
While on one hand this seems like a rational response to the situation at hand, 
according to Jok, it is also behaviour that traditionally would have been unheard 
of amongst the Dinka of South Sudan:
52 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
*  Ibid., p. 211.
54 Ibid., p. 212.
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[ujnder normal circumstances when family prestige prompted kin to help one 
another, a Dinka person would try not to appear helpless. But as people become 
poorer and poorer, while the external assistance is in operation, they resort to 
stigmatised behaviour such as begging, doing odd jobs or lying about their actual 
conditions.55
Jok’s concern is that these externally influenced modes of behaviour will make 
their way into the general culture and not necessarily disappear even when the 
relief agencies withdraw; if this is indeed the case, the result may be a loss of 
cultural patterns and strategies that have in the past helped the population to cope 
with crises. Thus, in addition to providing concrete examples about how the issue 
of culture may arise in the context of a specific humanitarian assistance operation, 
Jok adds a further reason to those listed by Slim for why we should pay attention 
to the issue of culture in international humanitarian assistance: not only may there 
be elements of recipient culture that may negatively affect humanitarian 
assistance, as Slim points out -  it is also conceivable that humanitarian assistance 
may sometimes threaten certain apparently beneficial cultural practices.
In addition to the concerns about the impact of cultural appropriateness on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of aid, the concern with culture and customs in 
humanitarian assistance can also be seen as related to the broader debates that 
have emerged in various contexts over the recent decades regarding the validity of 
universal values in general -  and human rights in particular -  in the face of
55 Ibid.
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cultural and religious diversity. Indeed, many humanitarian practitioners 
themselves seem aware of this connection; for example, one practitioner 
interviewed for this study pointed out:
...before we talk about cultural, religious, and local customs as aspects o f  
humanitarian work, ...nowadays you should view it from a larger perspective, and 
that is, first andforemost, the whole human rights debate which has for the last 50 
years been ... shaped and configured on the basis o f the antagonism ... between 
what you could call cultural and religious forms o f relativism, on one hand, and 
universality, interdependence, I  would even say o f human rights in general.56
Of course, the primaiy target of this ‘cultural challenge* has been the doctrine of 
universal human rights. Nonetheless, since the norms and practices of 
international humanitarian assistance are closely connected to those of human 
rights -  as I sought to demonstrate in the previous chapter -  it seems only natural 
that this phenomenon would leave its mark on humanitarian assistance as well. As 
one recent overview of these debates points out, voices critical of universal values 
and human rights can be located both within the West itself, in East Asia, as well 
as in the Muslim world.57 Among Western political and social thought, it is 
possible to identify several currents that express scepticism regarding either the 
possibility of universal values altogether, or at least question the universality of
56 Henk van Goethem, ReachOut Project, IFRC/Geneva, personal communication, 23 September 
2002.
57 See Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Attack on Human Rights,’ Foreign Affairs (November-December
2001), pp. 102-116.
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those values that are presented by the current human rights discourse as being 
universal. These currents can be located within approaches and disciplines as 
diverse as Marxism, anthropology, and postmodernism, as well as within 
communitarian political theory. In the Muslim world, the debate has largely 
concentrated around the position and rights of women, while in East Asia, the 
political leaders of countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have argued that 
there is something that may be described as the ‘Asian value system’, within 
which community and family take precedence over individual rights. Although 
these debates have arisen independently, they have also served to reinforce one 
another.
Despite their acknowledged influence on humanitarian practice, only the last one 
of these three sets of external factors, namely the Asian values debate, has thus far 
been examined specifically from the point of view of its implications for 
humanitarianism, and then only in relation to international humanitarian law 
(IHL). In a 2001 article in the International Review o f the Red Cross, Alfred M. 
Boll, a lawyer and an ICRC delegate, examined the relevance of the Asian values 
debate to IHL.58 Boll points out that the Asian values debate may not affect IHL 
to the same extent as it does international human rights instruments, as -  in 
focusing on the prohibition of murder, torture, cruel and inhuman punishment and 
treatment, the right to judicial guarantees, a fair trial and humane treatment -  IHL 
can be seen to express something of a ‘lowest common denominator’ with regard
S8 Alfred M. Boll, ‘The Asian Values Debate and Its Relevance to International Humanitarian 
Law,’ International Review o f  the Red Cross (No. 841, February 2001), pp. 45-58 (available via 
http://www.icrc.org).
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to the obligations of states toward individuals, on which there may be broader 
agreement than on the more far-reaching provisions of human rights. He argues 
that the existence of such basic agreement is demonstrated by the fact that all 
Asian states have ratified the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (even if their 
ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols has been slower than in other parts of 
the world). By contrast, for example, very few Asian states have ratified the 
Refugee Convention: only Cambodia, China, the Philippines, South Korea, and 
Japan.59 Boll also cites examples of academic research that has sought to 
demonstrate that similarities exist between traditional Asian customary rules 
relating to warfare and present-day international humanitarian law, concluding 
that, even if these practices stem from diverse moral bases, all that matters at the 
end of the day is the "underlying practical consensus on humanitarian law in 
actual application’.60 As such, Boll’s argument is fairly typical of the way in 
which many proponents of the universality of humanitarian values tend to 
structure their argument, and is not surprising coming from an active ICRC 
delegate. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, there are some reasons to 
believe that such a practical consensus may not be quite as universal as Boll 
would like to suggest. Nonetheless, Boll’s article does represent an important 
contribution to discussions regarding the way in which the broader debates about 
culture intersect with the values and practices of humanitarianism.
59 See the document on States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol, which lists the signatories to the Refugee Convention and the Protocol as 
of 30 September 2002 (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
60 Alfred M. Boll, op. cit., in note 58, p. 6 (in the version available on the internet).
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In addition to Boll’s, there is also another study that examines the potential 
clashes between the universalistic humanitarian values and local cultural and 
customary norms, this time in the context of a specific aid operation. As was 
argued in the previous chapter, international relief organisations generally 
subscribe to the principle of impartiality as the distributive principle for 
humanitarian assistance -  in other words, the idea that all human beings are 
equally entitled to such assistance, simply by virtue of being human, and that aid 
should be distributed in proportion to (primarily physiological) needs alone. 
Alexander de Waal’s description in his book Famine That Kills of the different 
relief ‘ideologies’ in Darfur, Sudan provides evidence that not all cultural and 
religious traditions view entitlement to relief in this way. De Waal discusses three 
different sets of distributive principles adhered to by various groups in the 
Sudanese society during the famine in Darfur 1984-85, as well as the ideology of 
the international aid agencies based in Sudan.61
The first of the indigenous ideologies, which de Waal terms ‘Sudanic’, restricts 
entitlement to relief to members of the same kinship group and those who have 
become ‘Active kin’ by having assimilated to the community.62 In practice, this 
means that newly arrived or transient people, such as artisans or internally 
displaced people, will by definition be excluded as potential recipients of relief, 
even if they are in material terms poorer than those who do receive aid (normally 
those who cannot even in normal times support themselves, including the old, the
61 Alexander de Waal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989, Ch. 8.
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disabled and orphans) within the community. These outsiders, whatever their 
material status, are according to de Waal either deemed to be ‘non-deserving 
poor* or not viewed as poor at all.
By contrast, what de Waal terms as the ‘Islamic ideology’ bases the entitlement to 
relief on Muslim faith rather than kinship.63 As a result, all Muslims, including 
strangers, are entitled to relief. De Waal attributes this to the virtue that Islam 
makes of migration, the predominant place of the duty of hospitality and giving 
sanctuary in the religion, and the fact that one eighth of the Islamic tax, zaka, is to 
be given to travellers and pilgrims. Another factor that distinguishes the ‘Islamic’ 
from the ‘Sudanic’ approach to the distribution of relief is that the Islamic 
approach contains a material definition of poverty, which according to de Waal 
means that ‘it has a wider constituency than those included under the ‘Sudanic 
ideology’.64 According to the Koran, one eighth of the zaka tax is to be given to 
the fagiir (defined as the poor and indigent without a means of subsistence, in 
practice usually those who do not have enough to subsist one day) and one eighth 
to the miskin (those who do not have enough for one year). As de Waal points out, 
this implies that, within the ‘Islamic’ approach, unlike in the ‘Sudanic* one, 
material factors do play a role in deciding who are the deserving poor and who are 
not.
62 Ibid., p. 197.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 198.
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The third indigenous relief ideology described by de Waal is that of the Sudanese 
government. According to de Waal, the government’s relief ideology was 
characterised by the belief that they had a ‘special obligation’ to certain groups, 
primarily urban dwellers and government employees.65 This meant that, whenever 
possible, the government provided relief in towns by selling grain at subsidised 
prices, while villagers and herders received less or nothing.
Finally, de Waal contrasts the three above-mentioned indigenous aid ideologies 
with that of USAID and other international aid agencies present in Darfur at the 
time. This fourth aid ideology can essentially be seen as reflecting the principle of 
impartiality, i.e. the idea that all human beings are in principle entitled to 
humanitarian aid, in proportion to their needs. One way in which USAID sought 
to meet the proportionality requirement was through its guidelines, according to 
which government employees and anyone earning the equivalent or more than a 
set amount (100 Sudanese pounds) a month would not be entitled to relief 
assistance.66 Moreover, relief aid supplied by USAID could not be sold and the 
priority was to reach the people in the greatest need, seen to be fanners and 
herders.
In this context, it is also important to note that de Waal also describes some local 
charitable institutions that did not conform to the ‘Sudanic’, ‘Islamic’, or the 
Sudanese government’s model. For example, the local Red Crescent supplied
65 Ibid., p. 205.
66 Ibid., p. 206.
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relief aid to the migrants in a camp on the grounds of their material poverty, while 
what de Waal describes as the ‘Charitable Committee’ of the local town refused to 
do so.67 Overall, the evidence presented by de Waal seems to point out that the 
Red Crescent societies in Darfur demonstrated universalistic principles by 
focusing precisely on those people neglected by other forms of charity, 
irrespective of their membership in any particular societal group. Thus, it is worth 
emphasising that, even in this context, a universalistic approach to relief was not 
the sole prerogative of expatriate aid-workers.
Briefly, what ended up happening in Darfur in practice was that the government’s 
‘special obligation’ approach prevailed at first, with one third of the USAID first 
batch of food aid being sold in the towns. Viewing this as evidence of urban bias 
and corruption, the international aid agencies eventually took all aspects of 
distribution into their own hands to fully implement their ‘greatest need’ policy.
In spite of their differences, it is worth noting that the ‘Sudanic’, ‘Islamic’ and 
Sudanese government’s approaches, as described by de Waal, all run into odds 
with the principle of impartiality in a similar manner. This is because all of them 
limit even potential entitlement to aid to a solidarity group, whether that be based 
on kinship, religion, or clientelism, as opposed to humanity as a whole. Although 
the ‘Islamic’ approach -  which de Waal appears to favour for its greater 
inclusiveness -  may in practice include a larger number of people as recipients of 
relief assistance than either the ‘Sudanic’ one or that of the Sudanese government,
67 Ibid., p. 198.
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this must be seen primarily as a factor of the relative sizes of the kinship groups, 
the Muslim community, and the urban dwellers in the Sudan, rather than as 
representing a fundamental structural difference between these three sets of 
distributive principles. After all, in all three approaches, those outside the 
solidarity group, whether that be non-Muslim, non-kin, or non-urban dwellers, 
receive little or no assistance. In an area populated almost exclusively by 
Muslims, as Darfur appears to have been, the ‘Islamic’ approach would obviously 
lead to more inclusive results in practice. Nonetheless, this would appear to be 
purely the outcome of contingent circumstances, rather than evidence of some 
intrinsic commitment to inclusiveness: for example, if it had been adopted as the 
general distributive principle by aid agencies in Sudan as whole, with its Christian 
and indigenous belief communities in addition to the Muslims, its effects would 
have been equally problematic from the point of view of aid agencies emphasising 
impartiality as those of the ‘Sudanic’ ideology or, for that matter, those of the 
Sudanese government’s clientelistic approach. Nonetheless, both the ‘Sudanic’ 
and ‘Islamic’ approaches do appear to subscribe to some notion of proportionality 
in that they distinguish among the members of the solidarity group on the basis of 
need, as the primary recipients of aid under both of these approaches are those 
unable to provide for themselves, in the ‘Sudanic’ case the elderly, the disabled 
and orphans, and in the ‘Islamic’ case the fagiir and the miskin. By contrast, given 
that the target group of the government’s aid, government employees and urban 
dwellers, seem to have been the relatively better off ones in Darfur, the Sudanese 
government appears to have been little or not at all concerned with 
proportionality. In the case of the Islamic approach, however, the fact that both
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the destitute fagiir and the relatively better off miskin are entitled to the same 
fraction of the zaka, one eighth, demonstrates that considerations other than strict 
proportionality, i.e. that aid should be distributed in proportion to the needs of 
each person, also seem to have played a role.
In conclusion, de Waal’s description of the different indigenous relief ideologies 
in Darfur demonstrates that local cultural and traditional ideas can differ relatively 
radically from those of the international humanitarian aid agencies regarding the 
principles on the basis of which relief assistance ought to be distributed. In 
practical terms, this can have problematic implications, in particular in situations 
where aid agencies use the locally existing distributive channels for the delivery 
of aid. In addition, de Waal’s description also serves to highlight the fact that 
there is not necessarily a single local ‘culture’ regarding a particular norm or 
practice, but that aid workers may have to negotiate their way between multiple, 
competing ‘local’ approaches to the same issue. Under such circumstances, 
putting ‘respect for culture and customs’ into practice may become a complex 
balancing act with potentially serious implications for the (perceived) neutrality of 
the aid organisations and their employees.
In this section, I have tried to give an overview of what is as of yet a very small 
body of academic literature on cultural issues in international humanitarian 
assistance. While many important points are made in these articles, it is a ‘mixed 
bag’ of literature, both in terms of its content as well as the depth in which the 
implications of cultural issues for humanitarian aid are considered. What is clear,
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however, is that there is much scope for further research, both with regard to the 
conceptual implications of cultural diversity for humanitarian aid, as well as on 
the interaction of cultural norms and the humanitarian principles in the context of 
specific aid operations. For example, given that during the Taleban-era, 
Afghanistan provided almost a text-book case of a context where the local norms 
and practices ran virtually across the board into conflict with the principles and 
aims of the international aid organisations, it is surprising that -  to my knowledge 
-  no systematic study has been made on this topic.68
CONCLUSION
Two primary influences can be said to have contributed to the increasing attention 
to cultural issues in the context of humanitarian assistance during the 1990s: first, 
the cumulative experiences of humanitarian aid workers and organisations of the 
concrete problems that had arisen when cultural and customary factors had been 
ignored in the past, and second, broader intellectual and political currents -  
located both among Western thinkers and academics, as well as in Asia and in the 
Muslim world -  that increasingly have sought to highlight the importance of 
cultural specificity in relation to universal values. Together, these factors can be 
seen to have been mutually reinforcing in making humanitarian aid workers and 
organisations, as well as academics working on humanitarian issues, aware of the
68 Partial studies on this topic exist, however. See for example Guglielmo Verdirame’s analysis of 
the relationship between international law and the policies of UN agencies in relation to the status 
of women in Afghanistan, in Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘Testing the Effectiveness of International 
Norms: UN Humanitarian Assistance and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan,’ Human Rights 
Quarterly (Vol. 23,2001), pp. 733-768.
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importance of cultural and customary issues in international humanitarian 
assistance.
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an introduction to the emergent 
norm of respect for culture and customs in international humanitarian assistance, 
as presented in the existing literature. A variety of different types of sources were 
drawn upon, including legal texts, principles of aid organisations, operational 
guidelines, and academic articles.
In the first section of the chapter, both international legal texts, as well as more 
informal principles and guidelines intended for humanitarian practitioners -  in 
particular, the Red Cross Code o f Conduct, the Sphere Project, UNHCR’s People- 
Oriented Planning approach, and the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies -  were 
examined, specifically with regard to how they approach the issue of culture and 
customs. All of these documents can be seen to acknowledge, even if in somewhat 
differing ways, the important role that awareness of, and respect for, the culture 
and customs of the recipients plays in the success of humanitarian aid operations. 
Something that is missing in these documents, however, is a systematic 
examination of the possibility that there may sometimes be an irreconcilable 
conflict between the cultural and customary norms and practices of the 
beneficiaries and the humanitarian principles, as well as the implications of such 
conflicts for humanitarian assistance. Moreover, these documents have a tendency 
to focus only on the culturally specific norms and practices of the recipients, thus 
overlooking the role that the cultural specificities of humanitarian aid workers and
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organisations may play in international humanitarian aid.
In the second section, I gave an overview of the existing academic literature 
dealing with culture and humanitarian assistance. While many important issues 
are raised, as of yet, this is a very small body of literature, and there would appear 
to be much scope for further research on both the conceptual dimensions of this 
issue as well as case studies on how the issue of culture plays out in the specific 
contexts of humanitarian aid operations.
In the next chapter, I will examine more systematically some of the issues that 
have arisen through this literature review. In that chapter, I will develop a 
typology of both the different ways in which respect for culture and customs may 
contribute positively to the realisation of the aims and values of international 
humanitarian assistance, as well as examining the different types of conflicts that 
may arise between the culture and customs of the recipients and the humanitarian 
values, and the various ways in which such conflicts may be addressed.
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In te rnational H um an ita rian  A ssis tan ce : 
C oncep tua l an d  Ethical Im plications
INTRODUCTION
Let me begin by briefly recapping the argument that has been made so far. I 
started off by arguing that international humanitarian assistance is a rare form of 
international action in that it is based on explicitly stated ethical principles, on at 
least a basic minimum of which there exists arguably a relatively broad consensus. 
In Chapter 1 ,1 discussed the sources and content of these principles, emphasising 
in particular the role of the principles of humanity and impartiality as constituting 
the basic normative framework underpinning contemporary international 
humanitarian assistance. Briefly described, the principle of humanity can be said 
to be the fundamental principle of international humanitarian assistance, while the 
principle of impartiality is its distributive principle. The principle of humanity can 
be defined as a call to save lives and prevent and alleviate suffering, while the 
principle of impartiality can be broken down to two related but distinct 
components, namely non-discrimination and proportionality. Non-discrimination 
refers to the idea that all human beings are equally entitled to humanitarian 
assistance, without negative distinction on the basis of a membership in any social 
group, while proportionality serves to qualify non-discrimination by singling out
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need as the only acceptable basis for differential treatment
As was pointed out in the introductory chapter, however, in recent years the 
meaning and role of the humanitarian principles has been challenged from a 
number of directions. Chapter 2 focused on describing the context of emergence 
and features of one of these challenges, namely the emergent norm of ‘respect for 
culture and customs’. The idea of respect for culture and customs has been given 
increasing attention since the mid-1990s by both humanitarian practitioners and 
academics. Although it appears in a number of contexts, the document that has 
expressed the normative commitment to respect for culture and customs perhaps 
most authoritatively to date is the 1994 Code o f Conduct, which states, as the fifth 
of its ten principles, ‘We [the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and NGOs 
engaging in disaster relief] shall respect culture and custom: we will endeavour to 
respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we 
are working in’.1 The idea of respect for culture and customs is also given 
operational content in a number of documents, including the Sphere Handbook, 
UNHCR’s People-Oriented Planning approach, and the same organisation’s 
Handbook for Emergencies.
Together, Chapters 1 and 2 served to provide the necessary background 
information for the discussion that I am going to embark on in this chapter. The 
purpose of the present chapter is to examine the conceptual implications of the
1 Code o f  Conduct fo r  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief the full text o f the Code o f  Conduct is 
available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/.
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relationship between the contemporary humanitarian principles and practices and 
respect for culture and customs. The chapter is structured as follows: in the first 
section, I will examine the different types of relationship that may exist between 
respect for culture and customs and the principles and practices of humanitarian 
assistance. Three basic types of possible relationship between the two will be 
identified: first, they may be neutral or irrelevant in relation to one another; 
second, respect for culture and customs may be beneficial or even necessary for 
the realisation of the aims of contemporary humanitarian assistance; and third, 
respect for culture and customs may conflict with the principles and practices of 
humanitarian assistance. The second section will then concentrate on examining 
different ways of how international humanitarian assistance could deal with the 
last -  and most problematic -  type of relationship, namely conflict. Five possible 
ways of approaching apparent cultural conflicts will be examined and evaluated: 
the use of dialogue in order to uncover already existing shared values; the 
assertion of the moral primacy of the humanitarian principles over the conflicting 
values; the negotiation of agreement about values that all parties can accept; the 
approach of non-intervention in spheres where no agreement can be reached; as 
well as the assertion of the humanitarian values not as somehow morally prior but 
rather as the values specific to the humanitarian context.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESPECT FOR CULTURE AND 
CUSTOMS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
The purpose of this section is to examine the different types of relationships that 
may exist between the principles of humanitarian assistance, on one hand, and
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respect for cultural and customary norms and practices, on the other. First, I will 
examine those contexts in which the two can be said to be neutral or irrelevant in 
relation to one another. Second, some types of situations where respect for culture 
and customs may actually be beneficial or even necessary for the realisation of the 
humanitarian principles will be identified. Third, I will discuss three ways in 
which respect for culture and customs may run into conflict with the principles of 
humanitarian assistance.
It is an undeniable empirical fact that the world is characterised by cultural 
diversity, or a variety of world-views and systems of value. The idea of respect for 
culture and customs, however, goes beyond merely stating this fact: in addition, it 
suggests that there is something valuable, in other words, deserving of respect, 
about this cultural diversity. What does this mean for the principles of 
humanitarian assistance, humanity and impartiality, which are after all put 
forward as universal, or as applying to humankind as a whole?
First, it is obvious that the principles of humanitarian assistance can coexist quite 
comfortably with many forms of cultural diversity. This is because cultures are 
extensive collections of norms and practices, dealing with all aspects of human 
life; thus, it is conceivable, even likely, that many elements of a particular culture 
will simply have no consequences whatsoever, either positive nor negative, for 
humanitarian assistance. For example, the performing of traditional music, 
especially insofar as it requires no material resources, might be a case in point in 
many contexts. In such cases, the relationship between cultural and customary
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norms and practices and the principles of humanitarian assistance could be 
characterised as being one of neutrality or irrelevance.
Having said this, it should be noted that it may be difficult to categorise any 
particular type of activity as being somehow a priori neutral or irrelevant for 
humanitarian assistance, irrespective of context: rather, whether something is 
neutral or irrelevant must in the last instance be determined for each specific 
setting. This is because in some contexts -  and, in particular, this would seem to 
be true for armed conflicts -  what may to an outsider appear mundane cultural or 
customary activities or objects may in fact have become potent elements of the 
conflict in itself. Take, for example, the example given above, the ‘performing of 
traditional music*: while the performing of traditional music may be an innocuous 
activity in many situations, it is also possible for such activities to become highly 
politicised (one need only to think of the role of music during the Protestant 
‘marching season’ in Northern Ireland). Of course, the politicisation of a cultural 
or customary activity or object alone need not mean that it may not remain neutral 
from the point of view of humanitarian assistance. Nor should any of this be taken 
to mean that humanitarians should necessarily tiptoe around such politicised 
activities or objects.
Whatever the course of action they decide to take, however, it does seem that 
humanitarians would do well if they sought out as much information as possible 
regarding the symbolism that may be attached to even apparently mundane 
cultural and customary activities and objects. For example, during the war in
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Bosnia (1992-5), the coffee cup reportedly became a powerful political symbol in 
‘Republika Srpska’, or the ethnic Serb controlled areas of Bosnia. Apparently, 
shortly after the beginning of the war,
[s]ome Banja Luka Serbs began to throw away their small earless coffee cups. 
The cups had been used for drinking strong Turkish-type coffee. Now the cups 
represented the connection between Bosnia and Turkey, and thereby Muslim 
culture, and had to disappear. Serb homes could only have cups with an ear, 
those were fitting for Slavs. Only a short time earlier the people o f Banja Luka, 
like other Yugoslavs, had drunk coffee from any cup they pleased.2
Similarly, during the same conflict, the colour green -  traditionally understood to 
be the colour of Islam -  became associated with the Muslim-Croat federation, and 
people could be beaten up simply for wearing green clothing in the Bosnian Serb 
areas.3 It is important that humanitarians seek to inform themselves of such 
symbolism, because a lack of awareness of such issues may have unpredictable 
effects for international humanitarian assistance. At an extreme, it is conceivable 
that, if a foreign aid worker were unwittingly to offer someone coffee in a green, 
earless cup, this apparently mundane act might have serious consequences for the 
perceived neutrality and safety of that aid worker, his or her organisation, and 
ultimately for the success of humanitarian aid. For these reasons, it is worth 
emphasising that cultural or customary traditions that may be neutral or irrelevant
2 Terttu Lensu, Marijan Hiljainen Sota (Marija’s Silent War), Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom
Osakeyhtio, 2000, pp. 22-23 (my translation from the Finnish original).
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for humanitarian assistance in one context may not be so in another. Nonetheless, 
it still remains the case that out of the elements that make up any given culture, 
many will probably be neutral or irrelevant from the point of view of any 
particular humanitarian assistance operation.
Second, the relationship between cultural and customary norms and practices, on 
one hand, and the principles of humanitarian assistance, on the other, may also go 
further than mere coexistence. This is because respect for culture and customs 
may at times be beneficial, or even necessary, for the realisation of the principles 
and aims of humanitarian assistance. Below, I will give a few examples of the 
types of situations where this may be the case.
In Chapter 1, the principles of humanity and impartiality were defined as a call to 
save lives and prevent or alleviate suffering in an impartial manner, proportional 
to needs. Traditionally, this has been understood to mean in practice that the aims 
of international humanitarian assistance should primarily be about ensuring 
survival and attending to basic physiological needs, including food, water, shelter, 
sanitation and medical care. In recent years, however, the scope of what are 
understood to be the tasks of humanitarian assistance has arguably become 
broader. In particular, this has involved a more expansive understanding of what 
the preventing and alleviating of suffering requires, incorporating attending to 
non-physiological needs among the core tasks of international humanitarian 
assistance. In particular, there has been an increased emphasis on psychosocial
3 Ibid. p. 23.
142
Chapter 3
support, for example making services such as trauma therapy or rape counselling 
available.4
It seems obvious that the broader the view we take of what the aims of 
humanitarian assistance should include, the more likely it is that we demand that 
humanitarian assistance include cultural and customary considerations as well. 
More interesting, however, is the argument that even if we take a relatively 
‘narrow’ view of humanitarian assistance and focus strictly on physiological 
needs, respect for culture and customs can still play a decisive role in the 
realisation of the aims of humanitarian assistance. This is because in some 
contexts it may be difficult to disentangle the physiological and non-physiological 
benefits associated with ‘respect for culture and customs’. This is because there 
are certain conventional forms of provision for basic physiological needs in every 
cultural context5 To an outside observer comparing different cultures, many of 
these forms of provision may appear similarly adequate. They may also be 
equivalent from a physiological point of view, in terms of being equally capable 
of ensuring the survival and/or physical well-being of human beings. At the same 
time, this does not mean that they are interchangeable from the point of view of 
the members of the particular cultures. This is because the form of provision
4 See, for example, the IFRC’s work on the psychological aspects of health care, available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/what/health/psycholog/. For an example of a specific project relating to this 
area, see the International Rescue Committee’s activities in Sierra Leone, which include 
psychosocial support for children who have suffered, witnessed, or been forced to take part in, 
violence during the internal armed conflict in that country, available at 
http://www.theirc.org/where/index.cfm?fa=show&locationII>=36.
51 draw here on David Braybrooke’s discussion of culturally specific provision for basic needs in 
a more general context, which he calls ‘the conventional limits to variety in forms of provision’.
See David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 102-
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preferred by one culture or society may simply be abhorred by another. For 
example, the members of one culture may reject pork, whilst those of another will 
not eat beef. Some cultural traditions may insist on a communal shelter or 
dwelling, while in others, separate dwellings must be provided for each nuclear 
family. In some societies, male and female patients may be attended by male or 
female doctors and nurses alike, whereas in others, female patients cannot be 
attended to but by female doctors and nurses, and so on. Naturally, the stringency 
with which some forms of provision are excluded, and others included, varies. 
The sanctions attached to breaching the rule will also vary, depending on the rule 
and culture in question.
Of course, it might be argued that, while accommodating such culturally specific 
forms of provision may be an important matter for social policy under non­
emergency conditions, catering to preferences of this type is not something that 
international humanitarian assistance, aimed at providing emergency relief under 
crisis circumstances, should have to concern itself with. There is clearly 
something to this criticism, not least because it brings out a more general problem 
involved with including attending to non-physiological needs as part of the tasks 
of international humanitarian assistance. This is the question what, if any, relative 
order of priority should be given to the physiological and non-physiological 
needs, respectively, in international humanitarian assistance. The relative order of 
priority matters in so far as we, for one reason or another, must choose in favour 
of one type of assistance over another. Such choices may become necessary either
103.
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because the requirements of the physiological and non-physiological needs 
conflict, or due to limited resources.
The point here is, however, that even i f  we hold the view that humanitarian 
assistance should give primacy to the basic physiological needs necessary for 
survival, there are contexts where it may be very difficult to distinguish between 
conventional forms of provision, on one hand, and physiological needs, on the 
other. What appears decisive here is the stringency that is attached to the 
conventional form of provision. As David Braybrooke expresses this point: 
‘Sometimes, the conventions are so exacting and (not quite the same thing, though 
intimately connected) sometimes people’s attachment to the conventions is so 
deep-seated that one can hardly distinguish between the need for some form or 
other of provision and the preference for one form. It diminishes the facts to speak 
of devout Jews or Muslims preferring to eat lamb to eating pork’.6
At one extreme, there may be cases where culturally or customarily specific goods 
or services are so intimately connected with physical survival that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in a culturally or customarily appropriate (or at least in a 
not inappropriate) form and manner can be seen as inherently necessary for the 
purpose of saving lives and alleviating suffering in a strictly physical sense. For 
example, if women -  for cultural or religious reasons -  cannot receive medical 
care except from a female provider, then there would seem to be a relatively 
strong case for arguing that a failure to ensure that there are sufficient female
6 Ibid., p. 103.
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health care providers available for the female population in question must be 
considered tantamount to a failure to ensure that women receive medical care at 
all. Another example might be that there may be people who would rather die than 
eat food that they thought to be somehow impure or otherwise taboo for cultural 
or religious reasons (this is probably an accurate description, for example, of the 
relationship of at least some devout Muslims and Jews to pork, or Hindus to beef). 
In such a situation, the provision of food assistance in a culturally or customarily 
inappropriate form should be seen as equivalent to not providing food at all.
In addition to situations of the type described above, there may also be contexts 
where culturally and customarily appropriate assistance is the most effective or 
efficient -  even if not the only conceivable, as it is in the previous category -  way 
of providing humanitarian assistance. For example, even where it is not a matter 
of an absolute taboo, people usually prefer certain foodstuffs over others. This 
means that if they are provided with the less-preferred foods, they will divert and 
trade them, making the distribution inefficient, not to mention the kind of effects 
this may have on local socio-economic structures by creating new forms of trade.7 
Johan Pottier reports an example of this phenomenon from Tanzania, where 
‘...[Rwandan] refugees sold donated cooking oil and maize grain to diversify their 
diet or, more accurately, to purchase foods regarded as essential [sweet potatoes, 
cassava flour, sorghum, sugar and fresh vegetables]’; however, this led to 
inefficiency because ‘...the prices they received for the foods they sold ... were
7 Arafat Jamal, Evaluation Officer, UNHCR, personal communication, 27 September 2002.
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low relative to the food prices charged in Tanzania’.8 Pottier also quotes a 
UNHCR Nutrition Coordinator from the same camp, who reports that ‘[i]n 
general, it can be seen that when maize is sold to buy back fresh staples, a lot of 
energy is ‘lost’, with the reduction factor ranging from 4.3:1 to 8.8:1’.9
Moreover, even if the inappropriate goods are not traded, they may be subject to 
labour-intensive (and thus inefficient) adaptation, as was the case in Sudan, where 
culturally inappropriate (even if perfectly functional and in part technically 
superior) imported tools were melted down and refashioned by the recipients to 
suit local preferences.10 Also, culturally and customarily appropriate goods and 
services are usually those that are available locally or within the region, thus 
limiting transport costs. Moreover, relief goods that are familiar to the 
beneficiaries mean that they will be able to prepare their own foods and/or 
construct their own shelters after having been provided with the raw materials, 
and therefore less personnel will have to be hired to undertake these tasks. In 
addition, using traditional structures to distribute assistance (for example, by 
giving it to village elders to be distributed further) may be the most effective way 
of reaching the recipients. In other words, in many contexts, there may be
8 Johan Pottier, ‘Why Aid Agencies Need Better Understanding of the Communities They Assist: 
The Experience of Food Aid in Rwandan Refugee Camps,’ Disasters (Vol. 20, No. 4,1996), pp. 
330-331.
9 A. Hoogendoom, ‘End of Mission Report by UNHCR Food and Nutrition Coordinator,’ 
Tanzania, Rwandan/Burundi Refugee Camps, 15 August-23 December 1994, Ngara: UNHCR, p. 
5; quoted in ibid., p. 330.
10 Pierson R.T. Ntata, ‘Participation by the Affected Population in Relief Operations: A Review of 
the Experience of DEC Agencies during the Response to the 1998 Famine in South Sudan,’ Report 
Prepared for the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Assistance, June 1999, p. 31 (available at http://www.alnap.org/pubs/pdfs/ntatafinal.pdf).
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instrumental as well as intrinsic reasons for giving humanitarian assistance in a 
manner that is culturally and customarily appropriate.
Third, there may be cases where culturally or customarily appropriate assistance, 
while neither the only conceivable way of providing assistance, nor necessarily 
more effective or efficient than other forms of assistance in material terms, 
nonetheless has psychological or emotional benefits that other ways of providing 
assistance do not possess. In this respect, for example, the significance of familiar 
foods and objects to people who have undergone the upheaval of a disaster should 
not be underestimated. Moreover, being able to cook for one’s own family or to 
construct a shelter may be not only cost-effective but also give people affected by 
a disaster a sense of being able to help themselves, rather than remaining passive 
‘victims’, as well as providing something to do in a situation where normal life 
patterns have been completely disrupted. Similarly, it has been pointed out that 
‘[i]n some cultures, traditional healers are especially skilled at resolving 
psychological problems’.11 In cases like these, culture and customs may play a 
significant part in the alleviation of suffering, understood in broader terms than 
simply physical pain.
Fourth, cultural appropriateness may also be a contributing factor to the security 
of aid workers. As one practitioner interviewed for this study pointed out: ‘the 
best security you can get is actually acceptance from local community
11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook fo r  Emergencies (second edition), 
Geneva, 2002, p. 110 (available via www.unhcr.ch).
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structures’.12 For example, whether inadvertent or intentional, culturally 
inappropriate behaviour (e.g. pointing one’s feet at others in many parts of the 
world, insisting on having a chair when others sit on the floor, and so on) will 
usually be interpreted as lack of respect and can damage relations. Maintaining 
mutual respect and good communications with the local population is essential for 
security as the local inhabitants can often be the most accurate and up-to-date 
source of security information, for example with regard to the location of 
landmines. Many aid organisations, such as the ICRC, have in recent years began 
to exhibit awareness of the role that culture plays in such contexts:
When the ICRC tried to understand why it had so many problems in obtaining 
access to the victims and ensuring its delegates’ security, it came to the 
conclusion that i f  it had a better understanding o f cultural differences and a 
greater awareness o f what it was when it intervened in other societies, its work 
would be better understood and in the long run better acceptedP
It may be noted that the above discussion leaves open the question what the 
relationship between the physiological and non-physiological requirements of the 
principle of humanity ought to be. In other words, if faced with a situation where 
both physiological and non-physiological aspects of alleviating suffering cannot 
be simultaneously attended to (for example, due to limited resources or because
12 Charles Petrie, UNDP, personal communication, 19 March 2002.
13 Paul Grossrieder (Director General of the ICRC), ‘Humanitarian Standards and Cultural 
Differences,’ a speech given at the ICRC Seminar for Non-Governmental Organizations on 
Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences, 14 December 1998 (available via 
http://www.icrc.org).
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their requirements conflict with one another), are there reasons why the 
physiological needs ought to be given priority as a matter of course (which tends 
to be the current practice) or can non-physiological needs sometimes be more 
important? It seems to me that, at face value at least, assistance related to 
physiological needs would seem in some sense to be a precondition for 
psychosocial support and therefore primary; after all, it would seem very difficult 
for people to benefit, for example, from trauma therapy if they were dying or if 
their physical injuries or illness were left untreated. The counter-argument to this 
might of course be that it is possible to think of situations where people do not 
always give priority to their own survival and physical well-being over other 
considerations. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that, even if it 
had the will to do so, humanitarian assistance simply does not normally have the 
capacity to keep people alive against their will; the most it can do is to make 
goods and services available. I will return to this question in the context of the 
discussion regarding whether it is possible to establish a distinction between 
wants or preferences, on one hand, and needs, on the other, below. For now, 
however, the point here has been simply to illustrate the types of situations where 
respect for culture and customs may contribute in a positive way to the realisation 
of the aims of international humanitarian assistance.
To sum up what has been said so far, even if we see the task of humanitarian 
assistance as being limited to addressing basic physiological needs, the 
satisfaction of those needs must be seen at least in part as being inextricably tied 
to a culturally or customarily specific form or manner of provision. In so far as
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this is the case, there would seem to be a strong case for incorporating respect for 
culture and customs into international humanitarian assistance, solely from the 
point of view of being able to meet these physiological needs. Moreover, there 
may also be effectiveness- and efficiency-based reasons for giving humanitarian 
assistance in a manner that is appropriate to culture and customs. In addition, if 
we broaden the interpretation of the tasks of humanitarian assistance -  as has 
increasingly been done by the humanitarian aid community in recent years -  and 
include psychological needs as well as physiological ones, respect for culture and 
customs may also have less material, but possibly just as important, benefits for 
international humanitarian assistance. Indeed, it is experiences of failures to 
provide appropriate assistance in situations of all of these types that probably 
inspired the current concern with respect for culture and customs in international 
humanitarian assistance.
What ties the above types of relationship between cultural and customary norms 
and practices and the principles of humanitarian assistance together, however, is 
that in each of these cases cultural or customary norms and practices are basically 
in harmony with the values expressed by the principles of humanitarian 
assistance. This applies both to those situations where the relationship is one of 
neutrality or irrelevance, as well as to those where respect for culture and customs 
may be beneficial or even necessary for realising the aims of international 
humanitarian assistance. If this was always the case, the relationship of respect for 
culture and customs and the humanitarian principles would be a relatively 
unproblematic one. Respect for culture and customs would simply be a means to
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realising the humanitarian ends, saving lives and alleviating suffering. The trouble 
is, however, that the relationship between the cultural and customary norms and 
practices and those of humanitarian assistance is not necessarily a harmonious 
one. There is also the possibility that the cultural and customary norms and 
practices of the beneficiaries clash with the principles and practices of 
humanitarian assistance. In such cases, the relationship is not one of harmony, or 
even neutrality or irrelevance, but of conflict.
Arguably, there are two main ways in which the conflict between the principles 
and practices of humanitarian assistance, on one hand, and cultural and customary 
norms and practices, on the other, can occur: first, there may be conflicts with 
regard to conceptions of needs or at least their relative order of priority. In other 
words, the recipients’ cultural and customary norms or practices may challenge 
the way in which international humanitarian assistance has traditionally tended to 
see addressing basic physiological needs as its primary task. Second, there may 
also be culturally or customarily specific conceptions of what the just distribution 
of humanitarian assistance would involve, which differ from the conception of 
just distribution expressed in the principle of impartiality. Let me now examine 
some of the features of these problems in more detail. I will begin by addressing 
issues related to different conceptions of needs and then go on to discuss different 
ideas regarding distribution.
As I have already pointed out above, the way in which the principles of 
humanitarian assistance have been put into practice has traditionally been
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understood to involve attending to basic physiological needs as a matter of 
priority and to include the provision of food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical 
care. Moreover, while in recent years there has been a move to extend the scope of 
international humanitarian assistance beyond the purely physiological needs, this 
has in practice tended to involve a relatively limited range of activities aimed at 
promoting psychological or emotional well-being in contexts directly related to 
the emergency situation, such as rape counselling or trauma therapy.
It is, however, conceivable that some people might, on cultural or customary 
grounds, give priority to the satisfaction of entirely different types of needs. On 
one hand, this might involve a significantly broader definition of what the 
alleviation of suffering would require, incorporating needs related to the survival 
and upholding of cultural traditions. For example, respondents to a needs 
assessment might indicate that their primary need was the building of a church, 
temple, or a mosque, for which they might even willingly forego the satisfaction 
of at least some of their physiological needs. On the other hand, the conflict 
regarding needs might be an even more fundamental one, involving a challenge to 
the basic idea that saving lives is desirable in the first place. In this vein, for 
example, the recipients of humanitarian assistance might argue that, instead of 
food, water, shelter or medical care, what they really needed were weapons, to 
defend their honour or to exact blood revenge. Neither of the above examples 
should be considered far-fetched or unrealistic. In fact, to the best of my 
knowledge, both are based on real cases. The first example, the request for the 
building of a house of worship as a primary need as indicated by the beneficiaries,
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apparently occurred in the context of a needs assessment conducted by a well- 
known aid agency in an African country,14 while the second argument has been 
frequently raised in the context of the war in Bosnia in particular.
In addition to conflicts related to different conceptions of needs, there may also be 
conflicts in relation to differing ideas regarding the appropriate distribution of 
humanitarian assistance. As has already been pointed out, humanitarian assistance 
has traditionally viewed, through the principle of impartiality, every human being 
as in principle equally entitled to humanitarian assistance, by virtue of his or her 
humanness alone. Moreover, differences in needs -  however defined -  have been 
seen as the only legitimate basis for differentiating between recipients of 
humanitarian assistance. Conflict between the humanitarian principles and the 
idea of "respect for culture and customs’ arises in this context insofar as the 
recipients of humanitarian assistance hold ideas other than those expressed in the 
principle of impartiality regarding the appropriate distribution of humanitarian 
assistance. One concrete example of a conflict of this type might be that, in many 
parts of the world, it is customary that women eat last, and therefore usually the 
least, even if their physiological needs may in fact be greater than those of men, 
for example due to pregnancy or breastfeeding.15 Gender is not, however, the only
14 Personal communication with Hakan Seckinelgin, lecturer in Non-Governmental Organisations 
at the Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics.
15 For anthropological case studies regarding such practices, see, for example, Alice Stewart 
Carloni, ‘Sex Disparities in the Distribution of Food within Rural Households,’ Food and 
Nutrition (Vol. 7, No. 1, 1981), pp. 3-12; Lincoln C. Chen, Emdadul Huq and Stan D’Souza, ‘Sex 
Bias in the Family Allocation of Food and Health Care in Rural Bangladesh,’ Population and 
Development Review (Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1981), pp. 55-70; and Una M. Fruzetti, The Gift o f  the 
Virgin: Women, Marriage and Ritual in the Bengali Society, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1982, pp. 100-101.
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possible characteristic on the basis of which inequalities in distributing aid can be 
justified: reportedly, among Rwandan refugees, ‘[t]he regional identity of local 
health workers was an important social factor in whether refugees were able to use 
facilities. When agencies began to pull out or scale down activities, it became 
clear that the southerners who relied on services run by northerners risked being 
discriminated against.’16 Similarly, as was discussed in Chapter 2, Alex de Waal 
has described indigenous conceptions of distribution of relief in Darfur, Southern 
Sudan, where solidarity, based on kinship or shared religious faith, was given 
priority over considerations of physiological needs when distributing 
humanitarian assistance.17
I have thus far proceeded in this chapter as if the norms and practices of the 
recipients of humanitarian assistance would be the only potential source of 
cultural conflict, and as if the principles of humanitarian assistance, or the 
humanitarian aid workers, were in themselves somehow ‘culturally neutral’. At 
this juncture, however, it is necessary to ‘open the brackets’, as it were, in this 
regard. This is because -  as was pointed out in Chapter 2 -  the issue of cultural 
conflict in international humanitarian assistance is further complicated by the fact
i o  m
that humanitarian assistance also comes with its own cultural baggage. This 
cultural baggage has a number of dimensions: for one, the culture of
16 Pottier, op. cit., in note 8, p. 334.
17 See Chapter 8 in Alexander de Waal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989.
181 would like to thank Sarah Owen-Vandersluis for emphasising the significance of this point to 
me.
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contemporary humanitarianism reflects arguably to a great extent the culturally 
specific values of Western universalism and individualism, as well as Christian 
beliefs. Thus, cultural conflicts in international humanitarian assistance should be 
interpreted as the pitting of the values of one culture against those of another -  
rather than in terms of a conflict between culturally neutral universalism, on one 
hand, versus local particularism, on the other. This is further complicated by the 
fact that humanitarian assistance is also in practice administered by people, both 
local and expatriate, whose cultural norms and practices -  which may be local just 
as well as Western ones -  cannot but affect how international humanitarian 
assistance is carried out in specific contexts. Combined with the fact that there are 
a number of overlapping cultural allegiances in all societies and that social 
breakdown is often accompanied by changes in the conditions of cultural 
coexistence, this has two possible types of consequences: first, it is not necessarily 
a matter of foreign assistance versus local culture in the singular and thus the 
relationships and impacts involved may be complex. Second, aiding or failing to 
aid particular cultural groups (or the perception of either) may also have a 
significant impact on the perception of the impartiality and neutrality of 
humanitarian assistance and thus on the success of aid.
To sum up what has been said in this section, humanitarians have traditionally 
tended to take saving lives and attending to physical well-being to be the primary 
ends they ought to pursue. They have also taken the view that the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance should be based on the idea that every human being is in 
principle entitled to humanitarian assistance, qualified only by the extent of his or
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her needs. As a result of the introduction of ‘respect for culture and customs’, and 
in the relative absence of discussion of how this idea should be applied in practice, 
however, humanitarians have (perhaps unwittingly) brought upon themselves the 
prospect of having to justify their position against potentially innumerable 
alternative ends, as well as alternative conceptions regarding just distribution. In 
any case, what is required is a systematic discussion of how humanitarians should 
relate to cultural and customary norms and practices that conflict with the 
contemporaiy principles and practices of international humanitarian assistance.
Due to the possibility of conflicts like the ones I have described above between 
the cultural and customary norms and practices of the recipients, on one hand, and 
the humanitarian principles, on the other, the introduction of the norm of ‘respect 
for culture and customs’, while in many contexts clearly a necessary measure for 
the improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance, is 
also potentially problematic as cultural and customary norms and practices may 
fundamentally challenge the basic principles and practices of international 
humanitarian assistance. The question that this raises is what weight should 
humanitarian practitioners give to ‘respect for culture and customs’ in relation to 
humanitarian principles and current practices. In the next section, four possible 
approaches to this problem will be examined.
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DEALING WITH CULTURAL CONFLICTS: OPTIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
To say that a practice endorsed by tradition is bad is to risk erring by imposing 
ones own way on others who surely have their own ideas o f what is right and 
good. To say that a practice is all right wherever local tradition endorses it as 
right and good is to risk erring by withholding critical judgement where real evil 
and real oppression are surely present.19
In the previous section, I sought to highlight the different types of relationship that 
may exist between cultural and customary norms and practices, on one hand, and 
the principles and practices of humanitarian assistance, on the other. The basic 
argument was that, while cultural and customary norms and practices may in some 
contexts be neutral or even beneficial in relation to the principles of humanitarian 
assistance, it is also conceivable that the two may conflict. It is possible to divide 
such conflicts as occurring primarily along two axes: first, in relation to different 
conceptions of needs, and second, in relation to various conceptions of how 
humanitarian assistance ought to be distributed. In addition, the relationship is 
further complicated by the fact that humanitarian assistance also carries its own 
cultural baggage, both real and perceived. The puipose of the present discussion is 
to explore the different courses of action that may be taken to address conflicts 
between the principles and practices of humanitarian assistance, on one hand, and 
cultural and customary norms and practices, on the other.
19 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Introduction’, in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds.), Women,
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The problem of what should be done when non-Western and often illiberal 
cultural and customary norms and practices conflict with Western liberal 
universalistic and individualistic conceptions of what is appropriate, just, right, 
fair, or good is of course not limited to international humanitarian assistance. 
Indeed, it can be said to be one of the most pervasive problems that contemporary 
political thought struggles to address. In the domestic political context, this 
problem has primarily been debated in the context of the liberal-communitarian 
debate, as well as the related literature on multiculturalism, which deals with the 
question how the Western, liberal state should deal with the traditional, and often 
illiberal, communities inside it.20 In the international context, these issues have 
been addressed under the headings of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate as
^  t
well as those on ‘Asian values’ and Islamic beliefs.
It seems difficult to deny that some cultural and customary norms and practices 
appear, at least when looked at from certain vantage points, to be fundamentally 
unjust in ways that affect the quality of life and survival of people in a most basic 
manner. One of the most salient ways this can be seen is by looking at the way 
culture and customs affect the role and treatment of women in many parts of the
Culture and Development: A Study o f Human Capabilities, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 1.
20 The liberal-communitarian debate has primarily taken place between John Rawls and his 
communitarian critics, including Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. For an 
introduction to the debate, see for example Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and 
Communitarians, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1992; on multiculturalism, see for example 
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995.
21 For an introduction to the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, see Chris Brown, International 
Political Theory: New Normative Approaches, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992; 
for an introduction to the issues related to Asian values and Islam, see for example Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘The Attack on Human Rights,’ Foreign Affairs (November-December 2001), pp. 102-
159
Chapter 3
world, something which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. On the 
other hand, to present the cultural and customary norms and practices in certain 
parts of the world as somehow morally inferior smacks suspiciously of the legacy 
of imperialism and colonialism, something that is condemned by most 
contemporary thinkers. Thus, any answers that are offered to this question should 
be sensitive to both types of concern.
In what follows, I will examine the advantages and limits associated with four 
basic approaches that have been offered by contemporary thinkers for dealing 
with this problem: first, dialogue between those holding different value systems in 
order to identify shared values; second, asserting the moral primacy of the 
humanitarian principles over the conflicting values; third, negotiating agreements 
about values that all parties can accept; and fourth, non-intervention in spheres 
where no agreement can be reached.
It is often suggested that conflicts between different world-views and value 
systems can be resolved, or even dissolved, through a dialogue between the 
representatives of the different value systems. This argument comes in two basic 
versions:
In the first version, the purpose of the dialogue is to collect and compile 
information about the respective value systems, in order to identify already
116.
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existing shared values.22 The argument here is that what at first sight appear to be 
conflicting values may in fact upon closer examination turn out to be the same, or 
at least significantly similar values, which are simply expressed differently in a 
different context. For example, the ICRC appears to have taken something 
resembling this approach in relation to the humanitarian principles when it 
‘brought together a group of Burundians, representing different groups and strata 
of society, to consider where in their own culture they could identify the 
aphorisms and cultural values that conveyed humanitarian principles’.23
There is clearly something to be said for this approach, as it addresses the 
possibility that what appears to be a conflict between the humanitarian values and 
those of a particular culture is in fact simply the result of a misunderstanding or 
lack of information. For this reason, this approach is probably the necessary 
starting point for approaching any apparent clash between the principles of 
humanitarian assistance and any particular cultural or customary norms.
The problem with this version of the dialogical argument is, however, that it 
cannot account for conflicts between the humanitarian principles and cultural and 
customary values that are real rather than apparent. It seems implausible to 
suggest that all disagreements about values can be resolved by showing that what
22 Arguments of this type are put forward by many people and they are difficult to associate with 
any specific theorist. See, however, for example, Segun Gbadegesin, ‘Bioethics and Cultural 
Diversity,’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 1998, pp. 24-31, or 
Stephen Chan, ‘Aspirations and Absent Methodologies in Universalism: Towards a Multicultural 
Normative Theory,’ in Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz (eds.), Value Pluralism, Normative 
Theory and International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, pp. 59-75.
23 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  Or War, Boulder, CO: Lynne
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appear to be conflicting values is in fact just a different way of expressing the 
same values. For example, as was described in Chapter 1, humanitarians 
sometimes try to justify the principles of humanitarian assistance through the 
argument that these principles can be uncovered in all the major world religions 
and secular philosophies.24 The fact that the argument needs to be made at all, 
coupled with the historical record of the problems of access that humanitarian 
assistance has faced, however, would appear to suggest that the ubiquitousness of 
the principles of humanitarian assistance, or at least their status relative to other 
considerations, is nowhere near as self-evident as the proponents of this argument 
would like to claim.
Having rejected the argument that conflicts between the humanitarian principles 
and cultural and customary values can always simply be reduced to lack of 
information or misunderstanding -  that is, the claim that ‘all human beings 
believe in the humanitarian principles, lest they but knew it’ -  how can 
humanitarians then deal with those value conflicts that are real rather than 
apparent?
Arguably, what will be seen to be the appropriate choice here depends to some 
extent on whether the respect for culture and customs in international 
humanitarian assistance is ultimately seen as being based on their intrinsic or 
instrumental value. In other words, what matters is whether respect for culture and
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 30.
24 See, for example, Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles o f  the Red Cross: Commentary, 
Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1979, p. 33.
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customs is seen simply as a means for realising the ends of humanitarian 
assistance -  that is, saving lives and alleviating suffering -  which are seen as 
being of absolute value, or whether culture and customs are believed to have some 
intrinsic value of their own, irrespective of whether or not they further the ends of 
humanitarian assistance. To express this in more philosophical terms, what would 
appear to be at issue here is the choice between value monism or absolutism, on 
one hand, or value pluralism, on the other.25 In essence, the difference between 
value monism or absolutism, on one hand, and value pluralism, on the other, is 
that the former posits that there is a single, knowable ultimate value or value 
system, whereas value pluralism suggests that there may be multiple equally valid 
basic values or value systems. In this context, however, it should be noted that, in 
addition to these comprehensive approaches to the question of value (i.e. value 
monism/absolutism and value pluralism) there is also another alternative: it is 
possible to reject monism/absolutism but still maintain that the obvious principle 
to follow in cases of extreme need is the humanitarian one. In other words, this 
alternative would involve taking the position that, while there may not be a single 
comprehensive value system or ultimate value, this nonetheless does not mean 
that one cannot reasonably affirm definite value priorities in particular contexts, 
such as the humanitarian one. I shall call this position value contextualism. Let me 
now examine each of these positions -  value monism/absolutism, value pluralism, 
and value contextualism -  in turn:
25 For a more detailed philosophical analysis of the issues at stake between value monism and 
value pluralism, see, for example, Brian Barry’s discussion in his Political Argument: A Reissue 
with a New Introduction, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990, pp.
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Certainly, much of the current concern with respect for culture and customs 
among humanitarian practitioners seems to be based on instrumental 
considerations. For example, as the above-cited quote from Paul Grossrieder, the 
Director General of the ICRC, demonstrates, the ICRC became interested in 
cultural differences as a result of the realisation that cultural differences and 
intervention in other societies could cause ‘problems in obtaining access to the 
victims and ensuring its delegates’ security’.26 In other words, for the ICRC at 
least, respect for culture and customs appears to be a means for making 
international humanitarian assistance (the value of which is taken for granted) 
more effective and efficient, rather than as having any intrinsic value of its own. 
This would seem to suggest either the value absolutist or the value contextualist 
view with regard to the humanitarian principles -  i.e. that the values represented 
by the humanitarian principles are given priority over other values, such as respect 
for culture, which are deemed to have instrumental value only -  either in an 
ultimate sense (value absolutism) or within the humanitarian context (value 
contextualism).
Let us first consider the alternative of value absolutism. Now, if it were to be 
possible to conclusively establish that humanitarian principles and practices were 
of absolute value and that ‘respect for culture and customs’ must therefore be seen 
as purely instrumental to the realisation of the principles of humanitarian
xxxix-xliv.
26 Paul Grossrieder, ‘Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences’, ICRC Seminar for Non- 
Governmental Organizations on Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences, 14 December 
1998 (available via http://www.icrc.org).
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assistance, the preferred course of action would be relatively simple: because the 
principles of humanitarian assistance express what is ultimately of value, any 
conflict between them and the cultural or customary norms and practices of the 
beneficiaries should always be resolved in favour of the humanitarian principles. 
This is one possible interpretation of what Hugo Slim is arguing for when he says 
that humanitarianism must ‘stand firm against what is a real [cultural] 
difference’.27
The problem with the view that the values expressed in the principles and current 
practices of humanitarian assistance are of absolute value and therefore 
unproblematically take precedence over cultural values is, however, that such 
moral certainty may simply not be available to contemporary humanitarians. 
Unlike earlier humanitarians, contemporary aid workers can rarely draw absolute 
certainty from the ‘God-given’ truth of their religious beliefs. Even where 
contemporary humanitarians may themselves be motivated by a particular set of 
religious beliefs, they usually have to acknowledge that those with whom they 
come into contact through their work cannot be expected to share their beliefs. 
Probably as a consequence of this uncertainty about the ultimate, and universal, 
justification of the values its principles express, humanitarianism is today 
sometimes presented even by its proponents as being representative of the 
culturally specific values of Western Europe and North America. In this vein, for 
example, Slim writes of ‘Western humanitarianism’ engaging with ‘other
27 Hugo Slim, ‘Relief Agencies: Cultural Challenges and Cultural Responsibility,’ ICRC Seminar 
for Non-Governmental Organizations on Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences, 14 
December 1998 (available via http://www.icrc.org).
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cultures’, and refers to ‘the culture of humanitarianism’.28 Indeed, one of the 
reasons why the idea of respect for culture and customs has gained currency 
among humanitarian practitioners in recent years may well have been this nagging 
sense of uncertainty about the universal justification of the principles on which 
their work is based.
One way of trying to resolve the problem about justification, at least regarding 
conflicting conceptions of needs, would be if it were possible to demonstrate that 
there are something that could be called ‘basic human needs’ in the sense that they 
should be attended to as a matter of priority even if the people concerned 
themselves did not express a preference for their satisfaction. Many philosophers 
and social thinkers have sought to establish that such basic needs do indeed exist 
The way they have usually gone about this has been by distinguishing between 
wants or preferences, on one hand, and needs, on the other. One way of 
attempting to make this distinction is to point out that it is possible to need 
something the existence of which one is not aware of, whilst it is impossible to 
want something that one does not know about. The famous example cited in this 
context relates to insulin: even if they did not know about insulin, indeed even 
before its scientific discovery, diabetics have always needed insulin in order to 
stay alive. In a similar vein, it is has been pointed out that is also possible to want 
things that one does not need, cigarettes or alcohol being an often-cited example.
2&Ibid.
29 For contemporary attempts at making an argument of this type, see, for example, Braybrooke, 
op. cit., in note 5, or Len Doyal and Ian Gough, A Theory o f  Human Need, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1991.
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The problem with these examples, however, is that -  insofar as they are presented 
as universally applicable, independent of context -  they still beg the question that 
they set out to answer. This is because, at bottom, the distinction between needs 
and wants in both of these examples implicitly relies on the assumption that being 
alive is in some sense a matter of ultimate moral priority (diabetics need insulin in 
order to stay alive\ we may want cigarettes even though they can cause us to die), 
although the assumption remains implicit and no effort is made to justify it 
Indeed, it is not entirely clear how such an assumption could be justified, at least 
not without appealing to some religious or otherwise metaphysical authority. 
Certainly, it cannot be justified with reference to a general moral consensus about 
this matter, as it is clearly not the case that everyone would share this belief (e.g. 
suicide bombers).
Arguably, problems relating to different conceptions of needs can in fact to some 
extent be said to be intrinsic to the concept of ‘need*. This is because, although it 
may at first sight appear to be possible to define needs on the basis of objective or 
scientific considerations, the concept is actually an inherently derivative one; in 
other words, further justification is always required to give it a normative 
meaning. One of the best discussions of this property of the concept of need has 
been provided by Brian Barry in his Political Argument?0 Barry points out that 
needs statements always at least implicitly take the form of ‘x is needed in order to 
produce y \  On its own, such a statement gives no (normative) reason for doing x.
30 See Barry, op. cit., in note 25, pp. 47-49.
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In order for such a reason to be provided y  must be shown to be (or taken to be) a 
desirable end to pursue. And, even if -  as Barry acknowledges -  when it comes to 
persons, in other words, in statements such as lA needs x’ and where A is a. person, 
the ends to which the concept of need may refer are more limited, the concept 
remains no less derivative.
Similarly, it may also be difficult to argue that the conception of just distribution 
embodied in the principle of impartiality is somehow the only reasonable one to 
adopt in all circumstances. For example, in many poor societies, mothers tend to 
favour their older children over infants, allocating the older children 
proportionally more food at times when food is scarce. While this practice may at 
first sight appear barbaric to outsiders (and humanitarians have frequently tried to 
counteract such practices, e.g. by setting up supplementary infant feeding 
schemes), upon closer examination it is at least possible to follow the reasoning 
behind it. Given their very real experience that the chances of infants* surviving 
past their early years are comparatively low at best of times, mothers will favour 
those children whose chances of survival are the greatest and who are already past 
the many dangers that threaten the lives of infants in most poor countries. This 
behaviour is no doubt also reinforced by the fact that children who are able to 
reach adulthood are also the only form of social insurance that may be available in 
these societies. When resources are scarce, it does not seem unreasonable to focus 
efforts on helping those most likely to benefit from the assistance, as opposed to 
favouring the ‘most vulnerable’ irrespective of their prospects. Indeed, this 
reasoning does not even seem particularly ‘non-Westem’ (cfr. for example
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resource allocation in our hospitals). Indeed, the mothers’ position -  if I have 
represented it correctly -  could be interpreted as a type of utilitarian approach, 
where the aim is to maximise overall welfare. By contrast, humanitarians have 
traditionally tended towards a rights-based approach, i.e. one that seeks to provide 
some minimum level of welfare for everyone.
Above, I have discussed the problems associated with a value monist/absolutist 
take on the humanitarian principles. At first sight, the second type of dialogical 
argument appears to overcome some of the problems associated with value 
monist/absolutist position on humanitarian values as described above. By contrast 
to the first type of dialogical argument that was discussed earlier, in this version 
the aim of the dialogue is not so much to uncover already existing shared values 
but instead to reach agreement about values that both (or all, if there are more than 
two parties) sides can accept.31 There is something undeniably appealing about the 
suggestion that it is possible to reach agreement about values, rather than simply 
identifying existing ones, as it opens up the possibility that the rules governing 
social relations (including international humanitarian assistance) may be 
changeable, subject to human agreement, rather than being pre-existing and 
immutable.
The problem with this second version of the dialogical argument, however, is that 
-  while it goes further than the first version by taking into account the possibility
31 This is a simplified representation of what is a popular way of approaching value conflicts 
among social and political theorists today, perhaps most predominantly associated with the 
German social theorist Jurgen Habermas.
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that some moral disagreements may be real rather than just apparent -  it still 
assumes that it is always possible to reach agreement about values. This overlooks 
the fact that there may be value conflicts that are the result of mutually exclusive 
interests which both (or all) sides see as absolute, and therefore as not subject to 
compromise. Or the conflicting values may be perceived as reflecting the will of a 
divine being or some other metaphysical source, and therefore as not subject to 
negotiation by human beings. Moreover, it is also conceivable that people may 
disagree not about the values themselves, but rather about their relative order of 
priority (person X ranks value A over B, while person Y does the reverse). 
Moreover, even where agreements both about values and their order of priority 
may in principle be reachable, it is questionable to what extent it is actually 
possible to conduct genuine dialogue (in other words, dialogue that would meet 
the conditions of an ‘ideal speech situation’ as specified by Habermas, or some 
similar criteria32) under the chaotic and changeable conditions that normally 
characterise the situations where humanitarian assistance is provided. This is 
compounded by the power imbalances implicit in the relationships between 
donors and aid workers, on one hand, and the recipients of humanitarian 
assistance, on die other. Indeed, it may be questioned whether it is possible to 
meet the conditions of an ideal speech situation under any real world conditions, 
let alone under the particularly challenging conditions of humanitarian assistance.
32 According to Habermas, the rules of the ideal speech situation (or discourse ethics) are: ‘1. 
Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; 2a. 
Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; 2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any 
assertion whatever into the discourse. 2c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and 
needs; 3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights 
as laid down in (1) and (2).’ Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990, p. 86.
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For these reasons, even if we acknowledge the importance of this approach as a 
necessary step in approaching what appear to be irreconcilable conflicts about 
values, it does not seem sufficient on its own for addressing such conflicts.
Let me now turn to examining the value pluralist alternative. Briefly defined, 
value pluralism represents the conviction that first, there are a limited number (but 
more than one) of objective values, and second, that to some extent such values 
conflict. In addition, these conflicts are seen as irresolvable in value terms because 
the values are incommensurable. Incommensurability refers to the idea that two or 
more values cannot be objectively ranked, either in general or relative to each 
situation, in such a manner that any informed and reasonable person would agree 
that value A either ranks higher than value B or is equal to it; thus, two such 
persons may disagree on the ranking without one of them being right and the other 
one wrong. Value pluralism should be distinguished from value relativism; by 
contrast to value pluralism, relativism represents the view that there are no 
objective values and that all value judgements are therefore relative to the value 
system or culture within which they are made. Although both value pluralism and 
value relativism involve the view that value conflicts may not be resolvable, there 
are a number of problems associated with the relativist position which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
As was stated above, value pluralism reflects the assumption that certain value 
conflicts are irresolvable and that therefore an ethical ‘common ground’ cannot 
always be found, at least not on all issues. If we assume that incommensurability
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characterises the relationship between the humanitarian values and (at least some 
of) the cultural values that conflict with them, the only ethical way of dealing with 
such intractable value conflicts would appear to be that humanitarians simply 
refrain from intervening with those cultural beliefs, norms and practices that 
conflict with the humanitarian principles, and where the conflict cannot be shown 
to be the result of misinformation or be resolved through negotiation. In other 
words, to the extent that it is impossible to reach agreement regarding 
fundamental values, it would appear that the best that can be done is to agree to 
coexist: where humanitarianism and the local cultural and customary norms and 
practices come into intractable conflict, they can agree not to interfere in each 
other’s business, and only interact in those areas (if any) where a common ground 
can be established.
Much depends here on whether the approach of non-intervention is applied 
primarily to groups or individual persons, however. On the face of it, a non- 
interventionist approach to entire cultural communities appears attractive because 
of its refusal to pass judgement and therefore apparent tolerance. There are, 
however, problems associated with adopting a stance of non-intervention at the 
group level in international humanitarian assistance that humanitarian aid workers 
should at minimum be aware of. The story about the African widow who was left 
starving by aid workers who had adopted what appears to have been a non- 
interventionist position at the group level (cited in the Introduction to this thesis) 
can be seen to illustrate what is potentially so troubling about this position in the 
humanitarian context Let me now examine some of the problems associated with
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non-intervention at group level in more detail.
There is something undeniably persuasive about the idea of ‘respect for culture 
and customs’. In the past, there has arguably been a tendency to see the task of 
humanitarian assistance to be the satisfaction of basic needs, defined primarily in 
physiological terms. The introduction of the idea of ‘respect for culture and 
customs’ has challenged this understanding of humanitarian assistance on two 
levels. First, it has made clear that physiological requirements provide only a set 
of relatively broad boundaries within which most of the basic needs can be 
satisfied in widely differing ways. It has suggested that, in addition to the 
physiological criteria, cultural beliefs, norms and practices may play a crucial role 
in determining whether a particular form of assistance actually succeeds in 
keeping people alive or in alleviating their suffering. In so doing, it has also 
reinforced an interpretation of alleviation of suffering that encompasses more than 
just attending to physical pain. Second, ‘respect for culture and customs’ has also 
questioned the principles of humanitarian assistance on a more fundamental level, 
suggesting that it may be legitimate to adopt values other than those expressed by 
the principles of humanitarian assistance. Thus, ‘respect for culture and customs’ 
has emphasised, in quite a radical way, the value of self-determination of the 
recipients of humanitarian assistance over paternalism. In doing so, it has 
suggested that what ultimately matters most is that people -  even, or perhaps in 
particular, in a disaster or conflict situation -  should be able to determine the 
course of their lives for themselves.
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Clearly, it must be true that humanitarian assistance becomes meaningless if it 
occurs against the will of those that it seeks to assist. The problem with framing 
the issue of self-determination in terms of ‘respect for culture and customs’ is, 
however, that it only captures a part of what is involved in self-determination. It is 
obviously true that human beings grow up and develop their sense of selfhood and 
systems of value in the context of particular culture, and that culturally specific 
beliefs, norms and values provide the horizon against which they develop their 
systems of value. But it is equally clear that people can also reflect critically on 
those values, and at times reject them. This would seem to be more than ever the 
case in the contemporary world, characterised as it is by ever-expanding networks 
of communication, which means that more and more people are exposed to ideas 
and values that originate outside their societies and cultures. The question is then 
whether what ultimately matters is the self-determination of ‘cultures’, on one 
hand, or that of some other groups (such as women), on the other. Or perhaps 
humanitarians should not concern themselves with the self-determination of 
groups at all, but instead emphasise the self-determination of persons. Of course, 
where the different forms of self-determination point in the same direction, no 
choice between them needs to be made, but where they conflict, it is unclear why 
cultural self-determination should be given priority over the self-determination of 
women, or indeed why either form of group self-determination should ultimately 
be given priority over the self-determination of persons. This would seem to be 
particularly strongly the case when we are dealing with matters of life and death, 
as humanitarian assistance does. After all, the kinds of intractable conflicts that 
are likely to occur between the humanitarian principles and cultural and
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customary norms and practices will primarily be about refusing life-saving 
assistance, either in favour of another type of assistance, or altogether. Under such 
circumstances, individual consent would seem to be of the essence: it is one thing 
to prefer suicide or ‘heroic’ death over living for oneself, but something very 
different indeed to want to deprive others of food, water, shelter, or medical care, 
whether on cultural or any other grounds.
For these reasons, if the aim of introducing the norm of ‘respect for culture and 
customs’ into international humanitarian assistance is to strengthen and improve 
humanitarian assistance rather than to undermine it, humanitarian practitioners 
must be extremely careful that ‘respect for culture and customs’ does not became 
a way of legitimating coercive practices, degenerating into ‘respect for existing 
power structures’. Mary B. Anderson offers a stark illustration of this point with 
the example of Rwandan refugees who arrived in eastern Zaire in 1994. An 
international aid workers’ report initially described this group of refugees as ‘an 
aid provider’s dream’ (in terms of being able to rely on locally existing 
capacities).33 This was because entire villages arrived together with their 
leadership structures intact The aid providers accepted these leaders as the 
appropriate channel for food distributions. As the aid workers later discovered, 
however, the camp ‘leadership’ was in fact the Hutu militia that had carried out 
the genocide in Rwanda, and who used the distribution of the relief items 
provided by the international aid agencies to keep civilian populations under their
33 Mary B. Anderson, ‘Some Moral Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid’, in Hard Choices: Moral 
Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Jonathan Moore (ed.), Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 145.
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control, as well as to rearm and prepare to return to battle in Rwanda.34
The point of the Rwandan example is that what appear to be cultural communities 
are not necessarily expressions of self-determination but may equally well be 
about the violent imposition of the values and interests of a powerful subgroup 
over others. For this reason, one particularly important question in this context 
would seem to be how ‘cultural representation* in international humanitarian 
assistance is realised in practice. ‘Cultures’ rarely speak with a single voice, and 
there are likely to be conflicting interpretations of any particular culture. Who can 
speak for a ‘culture’, and how are conflicting voices accommodated? These are 
thorny issues even in domestic politics under the best of circumstances, and they 
will be particularly problematic for international humanitarian assistance 
operations, which are characterised by the frequent absence of any local 
representative institutions, in addition to the generally chaotic and rapidly 
changing conditions. I will return to the issue of cultural representation in Chapter 
5 when discussing culture and participatory measures in humanitarian assistance.
The argument so far can be summed up as follows: on one hand, attempting to 
justify the humanitarian values, humanity and impartiality, as having in some 
sense ultimate moral primacy, does not seem possible in the contemporary 
secularised world; on the other hand, the stance of non-intervention in relation to
34 The Rwandan case is by now a famous one and has been cited as a cautionary example in a 
number of contexts. See also, for example, Ian Martin in ‘Hard Choices after Genocide: Human 
Rights and Political Failures in Rwanda’, also in Moore (ed.), op. cit., in note 32, p. 160; Pottier, 
op. cit., in note 8; and Johan Pottier, ‘Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; 
Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers,’ African Affairs (Vol. 95, No. 380, 1996), pp. 403-429.
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cultural communities carries serious problems with itself, in particular when 
dealing with matters of life and death as humanitarianism does. Is there then any 
way out of this conundrum? I would argue that there is. Above, I have examined 
the problems that humanitarians may face insofar as they seek to assert the 
ultimate moral primacy of staying alive in the context of the discussion on value 
monism/absolutism. It may be questioned, however, whether humanitarians in fact 
need to be able to assert the moral primacy of staying alive in some ultimate sense 
to legitimately give priority to saving lives in their actions. Instead, humanitarians 
might simply argue that they can rightly assume that the overwhelming majority 
of people (even if not everyone) wants to stay alive; therefore, the task of 
humanitarianism is to help those people. There are of course people whose 
commitment to their beliefs appears to override their urge for physical survival, 
for example, suicide bombers. Those who do not want humanitarian assistance, 
however, do not need to accept it. Thus, the stance of non-intervention would in 
this approach be applied at the individual, rather than group, level. This is the 
position that I have above called value contextualism. In this conception of 
humanitarianism, staying alive need not be the end in itself; instead, staying alive 
is valuable because whatever else one may value in this world depends on 
remaining alive. Thus, adopting this position in the context of humanitarian 
assistance would also be consistent with a more comprehensive position of value 
pluralism. It is not life as such that humanitarians are protecting but human life, 
and a human life consists of much more than simply remaining physically alive. 
The realities of contemporary humanitarian assistance would only seem to 
reinforce this position: as has already been pointed out earlier, humanitarians do
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not usually have enough resources to help all of those actively seeking assistance, 
let alone to force humanitarian aid on anyone reluctant to receive it. At the same 
time, this should not be taken to mean that it is the humanitarians’ business to 
evaluate what people want to do with their lives. Rather, it should be seen as a 
reaffirmation of the position outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, which may 
be summarised as the view that ‘[t]he humanitarian idea is not an elaborate 
political philosophy with an accompanying design to address all aspects of human 
need and aspiration’,35 but rather a necessary complement for the realisation of a 
variety of more comprehensive conceptions of human well-being. Thus, from this 
perspective, humanitarians are simply helping people to obtain something that 
‘everybody’ wants and some would not have without them.
A value contextualist position may also be adopted with regard to conflicts 
regarding the principle of impartiality. This is because, as was argued in Chapter 
1, impartiality has a central role in the basic normative framework underpinning 
humanitarian assistance and, as such, ought not be easily compromised even if it 
conflicts with cultural norms and practices. If directly as a result of this decision, 
lives are threatened (i.e. the second-order distributive principle of impartiality 
threatens the realisation of the first-order principle of humanity), then the aid 
workers in question would have to choose between firmly holding on to the value 
of impartiality or compromising, although it may not be necessary to say for all 
aid workers and all situations that one is better than the other (though obviously a 
choice must ultimately be made in each situation). If the fundamental value
35 Hugo Slim, ‘Fidelity and Variation: Discerning the Development and Evolution of the
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commitment of humanitarianism is that human life is valuable from each person’s 
perspective (and if it is not, such persons need not live against their will) rather 
than to say that human life as such is the basic commitment of humanitarianism 
(in which case humanitarians would also have to consider forcing people to stay 
alive if necessary -  something which they appear both unable and unwilling to 
do), as has been argued above, then it might at first sight seem to follow that 
humanitarianism should allow people to live as they please, and thus accept 
patriarchy and other inegalitarian practices without qualification (at least insofar 
as such practices appear to be accepted by those adversely affected by them). 
However, what would appear to count against accepting this view is that 
humanitarians are committed to each person’s equal value and hence to the 
principle of impartiality. Thus, insofar as impartiality is fundamental to the 
humanitarians’ value scheme -  as I have argued in Chapter 1 it is -  in principle 
they should not compromise it. Humanitarians are offering aid to people and to 
people equally, and this should be clear to the recipients. At the same time, it is 
again important to distinguish between this approach in the context of 
humanitarian assistance in an immediate sense (understood as saving lives and 
alleviating physical suffering) and broadening it out to other aspects of the lives of 
the people to be assisted: asserting the principle of impartiality in the 
humanitarian context should not be taken to mean that humanitarians should seek 
to change the local society in the long run, however much they may think such 
change desirable. Both the justification of the principle of impartiality in the 
humanitarian context as well as the extent of justifiable social change by
Humanitarian Idea,’ The Fletcher Forum o f  World Affairs (Vol. 24, No. 1,2000), p. 8.
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humanitarians will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s, the international humanitarian aid community has become 
increasingly aware of the significance of cultural and customary issues in 
international humanitarian assistance, culminating in the Code o f Conduct's 
commitment to ‘respect culture and customs’. On one hand, respect for culture 
and customs is clearly important for the successful provision of international 
humanitarian assistance. All too often, mistakes have been made in humanitarian 
assistance operations due to an inadequate understanding of, or insufficient 
respect for, the culture and customs of the recipients. On the other hand, 
humanitarians should also be aware that in some contexts it may be impossible to 
simultaneously adhere to the humanitarian principles and respect the cultural and 
customary norms and practices of the recipients. This is because, even if cultural 
and customary norms and practices are in many cases beneficial or at least neutral 
in relation to the normative framework underpinning international humanitarian 
assistance, cultural and customary norms and practices can also conflict with the 
principles of humanitarian assistance.
Five basic ways of approaching conflicts between the humanitarian principles and 
the cultural and customary norms and practices can be identified. These different 
approaches should be seen -  to some extent at least -  as complementing one
180
Chapter 3
another, rather than as being mutually exclusive. In the first instance, conflicts 
between cultural and customary norms and practices, on one hand, and the 
humanitarian principles, on the other, should be approached in the spirit of 
dialogue, in order to find out whether what appears to be a conflict is in fact the 
result of a misunderstanding or lack of information. Moreover, even where a 
conflict is deemed to be real rather than apparent, it may be possible to use the 
dialogue to negotiate an agreement or a compromise. In the event that the 
dialogue yields no solution to the conflict, however, humanitarians are faced with 
the choice between asserting the humanitarian principles over the cultural norms 
and practices, on one hand, or not interfering with the culture and customs of the 
people in question, on the other. Contemporary, secular humanitarians may find it 
difficult to justify asserting the humanitarian principles over the cultural and 
customary norms and practices of others. By contrast, a policy of cultural non­
interference may seem attractive because it appears to emphasise the self- 
determination of the recipients of humanitarian assistance. The problem with non­
interference is, however, that conceptualising self-determination solely in cultural 
terms gives priority to the self-determination of the (cultural) group at the expense 
of other forms of self-determination, for example the self-determination of 
women, or more generally individual self-determination. This means that, by not 
interfering with culture and customs, humanitarians may risk becoming complicit 
in what are essentially coercive practices. In part, this problem can be addressed 
through a careful evaluation of the structures through which cultural and 
customary norms and practices come to be represented in international 
humanitarian assistance. In addition, however, I have suggested that in the face of
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intractable conflict between the humanitarian principles and cultural values, 
humanitarians are justified in asserting the principle of humanity and focusing on 
saving lives on the basis that being alive is something that most people can be 
assumed to want, irrespective of whatever else they may want (and if they do not 
want it, they need not stay alive against their will) and that it is the task of 
humanitarian action to help such people. Moreover, humanitarians may also 
affirm the principle of impartiality in their work on the basis that it is a central 
element of their value system -  even if secondary to the principle of humanity -  
and those who do not wish to participate under these terms need not do so. I have 
called this position value contextualism. Value contextualism has the dual 
advantage of providing aid workers a clear sense of what ethical action in the 
humanitarian context consists of, while at the same time being consistent with a 
nearly unlimited variety of more comprehensive conceptions of human life. 
Nonetheless, I also emphasised the importance of maintaining the distinction 
between adopting this position in the humanitarian context narrowly defined, on 
one hand, and broadening it out to other aspects of the lives of the people to be 
assisted, on the other.
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H um an ita r ian  A ss is tance
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at the issue of gender and, in 
particular, the relationship between the goal of gender equality or equity, on one 
hand, and ‘respect for culture and customs’, on the other, in international 
humanitarian assistance. In doing so, it examines different ways in which 
humanitarians might approach these two (in part contradictory) normative 
commitments, as well as addressing the broader question of what the justifiable 
scope for social change in the context of international humanitarian assistance 
might be.
In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition that men and women 
experience emergencies at least in some important respects differently. This 
recognition has been accompanied by a growing interest in the issue of how the 
humanitarian response -  previously thought to be gender neutral -  affects women 
in particular. Traditionally, humanitarians have arguably tended to see gender as 
something that should not count, for fear of negative discrimination. By contrast, 
the contemporary literature (both by practitioners and academics) on gender issues 
in international humanitarian assistance seeks to emphasise women’s gender-
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specific needs and capacities in emergencies. In doing so, it has focused on three 
issue areas: first, that the equitable provision of humanitarian assistance should 
include attending to the gender-specific basic needs of women in emergencies 
(e.g. gynaecological and obstetric care, menstrual hygiene, and the protection of 
women from rape and sexual assault); second, that the contribution that women 
can make to emergency response should be recognised, both in the interests of 
gender equality and/or because women may be able to contribute to disaster 
response in ways that that men cannot; and third, that the humanitarian response 
should explicitly challenge the subordination of women in order to reduce their 
vulnerability to disasters.
Paying special attention to gender issues when examining the implications of 
‘respect for culture’ in international humanitarian assistance is important for a 
number of reasons. For one, gender and culture are factors that crosscut and 
overlap in affecting people’s experiences and needs during disasters and armed 
conflict. In particular, as many of the examples in previous chapters have 
demonstrated, it is especially in relation to the treatment of women that many 
humanitarian practitioners are in practice likely to experience problems with 
‘respect for culture and customs’. In other words, it is those cultural and 
customary norms and practices that are related to the status and role of women 
that often appear to conflict with the principles of humanity and impartiality. 
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some of the issues at stake. This is all the more 
important as no such analysis appears to have taken place so far, at least not 
specifically in the context of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, as Deborah Clifton
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and Fiona Gell have recently pointed out, much of the existing literature on 
gender in international humanitarian assistance in general tends to be ‘anecdotal 
rather than analytical’,1 and, in particular, a systematic examination of the 
relationship between gender and culture in international humanitarian assistance is 
yet to be undertaken. An additional but related reason for taking a closer look at 
gender issues in international humanitarian assistance is that it also provides an 
opportunity to examine further what the role of humanitarians ought to be in those 
situations, referred to in the previous chapter, where there may be the danger of 
‘respect for culture’ degenerating into simply upholding existing power structures.
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section presents a brief 
overview of the way that gender issues are currently being addressed in the 
literature -  both academic and practitioner-oriented -  dealing with international 
humanitarian assistance. Against this background, the second section discusses 
the relationships that may exist between gender considerations and ‘respect for 
culture and customs’ in humanitarian assistance. The third section suggests a way 
in which the concern with gender equality/equity and respect for culture may be 
reconciled with the values of international humanitarian assistance. Finally, the 
fourth section addresses the broader question of what the justifiable scope for 
social change in international humanitarian assistance might be.
1 Deborah Clifton and Fiona Gell, ‘Saving and Protecting Lives by Empowering Women,’ Gender 
and Development (Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2001), p. 8.
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GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the way in which gender 
issues have so far been dealt with in the context of international humanitarian 
assistance. This will provide the necessary context for the discussion about the 
relationships between gender issues and ‘respect for culture’ in the section that 
follows. Before embarking on the discussion itself, however, a couple of questions 
of terminology should be settled:
First, one of the recurring difficulties when addressing this issue area is whether to 
call the subject matter ‘women’ or ‘gender’. Here, I have chosen to use the term 
‘gender’, not least because it is currently the ‘going term’: in other words, most of 
the authors and documents discussed below use it rather than ‘women’ to describe 
this issue area. This also reflects a shift in development literature and practice 
from the earlier approach of ‘women in development’ (WED) to ‘gender and 
development’ (GAD), where the first approach focused solely on women and their 
specific needs, in particular as mothers, leaving the larger issue of gender relations 
largely untouched.2 ‘Gender’ is a term that is usually used to refer to the socially 
constructed, rather than simply the biological, differences between men and 
women, as well as to the social relationships between them. Indeed, some 
contemporary thinkers understand the meaning of the term gender even more 
broadly, to include an exploration of marginalised or more ambivalent social roles
2 See, for example, Bridget Byrne with Sally Baden, Gender, Emergencies and Humanitarian 
Assistance, Bridge Report No. 33, Report Commissioned by the WID desk, European 
Commission, Directorate General for Development, Brighton: Institute for Development Studies,
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more generally, rather than being limited just to typical male and female roles. 
Moreover, because gender is socially constructed, its practical expressions may 
vary across societies and change over time. Despite these differences, those who 
see gender issues as a distinctive concern would argue that, in spite of their 
various manifestations, one characteristic of gender relations that appears to be 
(near) universal is the subordination of women in most societies. For this reason, 
there is also a tendency for those concerned with gender issues to focus mainly on 
the gender roles and status of women, rather than of both men and women as the 
term ‘gender’ might seem to suggest.
The second terminological question relates to the usage of two central terms, 
‘gender equality’ and ‘gender equity’. Equality and equity are, of course, not the 
same thing. Equality refers to having in some important respect the same rights or 
status, whereas equity refers to fairness without any necessary implication of 
sameness of treatment or outcome. In general, equality is usually invoked in 
contexts and to the extent in which women’s needs or abilities are seen to be the 
same as those of men, whereas the question of equity arises insofar as women are 
seen to have needs or abilities that are different from, even if equally important as, 
those of men. There is a tendency in the literature discussed here to use the terms 
‘equality’ and ‘equity’ to some extent interchangeably, however. While this in 
some ways glosses over an important distinction, ‘equity’ can also be interpreted 
as the general idea that men and women should be treated fairly, with ‘equality’ as 
a specific form of fair treatment (to be used in those contexts where the needs and
November 1995, p. i.
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interests of men and women are the same). For this reason, in most of the chapter, 
I will refer collectively to ‘gender equality or equity’, and only use the terms in 
isolation in those contexts where either equality or equity, but not both, are 
relevant.
Having addressed these questions of terminology, let us now turn to look at the 
way in which gender concerns have so far been dealt with in the context of 
international humanitarian assistance:
In recent years, there has been a widespread recognition that men and women 
experience disasters and armed conflict differently at least in some important 
respects. Due to a combination of biological differences as well as differences in 
the social roles that men and women occupy they face different threats to their 
physical security, food security, health, or other aspects of their well-being in 
emergencies.3 Qualitatively, differences in women’s experiences of disaster in 
relation to those of men can be seen as primarily stemming from their 
reproductive role and the responsibilities that most societies allocate to them in 
relation to the children and the home. These differences are, however, not only 
qualitative but also quantitative: on average, women are more likely to be poor 
than men, they have fewer assets and greater reproductive burden, and have less 
power than and an inferior status to men, in addition to being less mobile and 
having fewer defences against violence.4 These factors can be seen as contributing
3 See ‘Editorial’, Gender and Development (Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2001), p. 2.
4 Ibid.
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to their added vulnerability during emergencies. This realisation of the differences 
in men and women’s experiences of emergencies has been accompanied by an 
increasing interest in the issue of how the humanitarian response affects the 
wellbeing and status of women. Since the mid-1990s, a substantial body of (both 
academic and practitioner-oriented) literature has emerged on the topic.5 The 
issues that this body of literature deals with can be roughly divided into three 
main categories:
(1) The immediate needs of women during disasters and armed conflict;
(2) the role of women in reconstruction and reintegration; and
(3) recognising and challenging the subordination of women.6
5 For the academic literature, see, for example, Elaine Enarson and H. Morrow (eds.), The 
Gendered Terrain o f  Disaster: Through Women’s Eyes, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1998; Susan Forbes Martin, Refugee Women, London: Zed Books, 1995; Judith Gardam, 
‘Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law,’ International Review o f  the Red 
Cross (No. 324, September 1998), pp. 421-431; Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth, 
‘Protection of Women in Armed Conflict,’ Human Rights Quarterly (No. 22, 2000), pp. 148-166; 
Ronit Lentin (ed.), Gender and Catastrophe, London: Zed Books, 1997; Julie A. Mertus, War’s 
Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press Inc., 2000; and Celia A. Palmer and Anthony B. Zwi, ‘Women, 
Health and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict,’ Disasters (Vol. 22, No. 3,1998), pp. 236-249. For the 
more practitioner-oriented literature, see, for example, Mary B. Anderson, Ann M. Howarth 
(Brazeau) and Catherine Overholt, A Framework fo r  People-Oriented Planning in Refugee 
Situations Taking Account o f  Women, Men and Children, Geneva: UNHCR, 1992; Judy A. 
Benjamin and Khadjii Fancy, The Gender Dimensions o f  Internal Displacement: Concept Paper 
and Annotated Bibliography, New York: Office of Emergency Programmes Working Paper Series, 
UNICEF, 1998; Bridget Byrne and Sally Baden, Gender, Emergencies and Humanitarian 
Assistance, Brighton: BRIDGE, 1995 (commissioned by the European Commission); Elaine 
Enarson, Gender and Natural Disasters, InFocus Programme Crisis Response and Reconstruction 
Working Paper 1,2000 (published by the International Labour Organisation); E. Kasmann and M. 
Komer, Gender Aware Approaches to Relief and Rehabilitation, Eschbom: Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 1996; Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United 
Nations Response, New York: UNDAW, 1998; Eftihia Voutira, Improving Social and Gender 
Planning in Emergency Programmes, Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1995 (commissioned 
by the World Food Programme); Bridget Walker (ed.), Women and Emergencies, Oxford: Oxfam 
GB, 1994; and Weaving Gender in Disaster and Refugee Assistance, Washington, DC:
InterAction, 1998.
6 See Judy El Bushra, ‘Social Differentiation between Men and Women in Humanitarian 
Interventions,’ in Claire Pirotte, Bernard Husson and Fran?ois Griinewald (eds.), Responding to 
Emergencies and Fostering Development: The Dilemmas o f  Humanitarian Aid, London: Zed
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Let me now briefly look at each of these categories in turn:
First, the issues highlighted in the context of the immediate needs of women are 
based on the recognition that men and women may have different needs during 
disasters or armed conflict. For example, largely as a result of their reproductive 
role, women may have gender-specific assistance needs in addition to those that 
they share with men; such needs may include the provision of gynaecological care 
(including contraception, the termination of unwanted pregnancies, prenatal care, 
and obstetrics) and distribution of menstrual hygiene products. On the other hand, 
gender-specific forms of violence may also create gender-specific protection 
needs. For example, in addition to being vulnerable, like men, to the other forms 
of violence that constitute armed conflict, women and girls are often deliberately 
targeted by combatants for rape and sexual assault, designed to humiliate the 
enemy. Moreover, women and girls -  especially when separated from their 
families (or ‘unaccompanied women’, as the humanitarian jargon calls them) -  in 
refugee or IDP camps are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault or harassment7 
Indeed, a recent study conducted by UNHCR and Save the Children UK 
demonstrated that aid workers may themselves sometimes constitute part of the 
problem in this regard, revealing a pattern of sexual abuse of refugee women and 
girls in the West African countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea by
Books, 1999, pp. 97-101.
7 See, for example, Sabina Faiz Rashid and Stephanie Michaud, ‘Female Adolescents and Their 
Sexuality: Notions of Honour, Shame, Purity and Pollution during the Floods,’ Disasters (Vol. 24, 
No. 1, 2000), pp. 54-70.
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peacekeepers and (primarily local) aid workers.8 Preventing such attacks may 
require specific protection measures, including provision of protective fencing or 
lighting, or assigning a greater number of female staff to camps. In addition, as 
one practitioner interviewed for the purposes of this study put it: ‘...the issue is 
very often how to find other activities for the men. That can be leisure activities, 
that can be productive activities, particularly for young men that before have been 
engaged in warfare’.9 Moreover, in addition to provision of the physical aspects of 
protection, effectively addressing women’s gender-specific protection issues may 
also require particular sensitivity to the fact that ‘women are often dissuaded by 
social norms from reporting incidents of gender-based violence and abuse’.10 
Indeed, in addition to the difficulties associated with reporting serious violations, 
women may also in a more general way be discouraged from discussing their 
needs. For example, analysing the relations between aid workers and recipients in 
South Sudan, Jok Madut Jok has observed that,
[djuring assessments, even women aid workers do not realise that they have to 
make an extra effort to allow women to express themselves and participate in 
describing their conditions and how best to implement programmes. Often, when 
an interview is being conducted with a woman in her house while the husband is 
absent, the conversation flows well until the man walks in. Usually, the woman
8 See, for example, BBC world news item ‘Child refugee sex scandal’, 26 February 2002, available 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/l 842512.stm.
9 Henk van Goethem, ReachOut Project, IFRC Geneva, personal communication, 23 September 
2002.
10 Julie A. Mertus, War’s Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press Inc., 2000, p. 70.
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Despite problems that may be associated with giving adequate attention to 
women’s immediate needs in practice, and even if there may still be some debate 
as to their significance relative to other considerations, it can nonetheless be said 
that the ‘immediate needs of women’ are today by and large accepted as 
legitimate and necessaiy concerns for humanitarian assistance. This is illustrated, 
for example, by the following passages from the Sphere Handbook:
Neo-natal and maternal morbidity and mortality should be prevented by:
establishing ante-natal services for preparing to handle obstetric emergencies;
making available and distributing clean delivery kit; ensuring that UNICEF
midwife TBA [Traditional Birthing Assistant] kits or the UNFPA reproductive
health emergency kits are available at health centres. Health care providers
should plan for the provision o f comprehensive reproductive health services by
10identifying sites for the future delivery o f those services.
Women and girls o f reproductive age should have access to suitable materials for  
the absorption and disposal o f menstrual blood. I f  these materials are to be 
provided by the agency, women should be consulted on what is appropriate. 
Where cloths are washed, dried and re-used, women should have access to a
11 Jok Madut Jok, ‘Information Exchange in the Disaster Zone: Interaction between Aid Workers 
and Recipients in South Sudan,' Disasters (Vol. 20, No. 3,1996), p. 210.
12 The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 
Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2000, p. 252.
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In most emergency situations the responsibility for procuring water falls to 
women and children. However, when using communal water and sanitation 
facilities, for example in refugee or displaced situations, women and adolescent 
girls are also more vulnerable to sexual violence or exploitation. It is important, 
therefore, to encourage women’s participation in water supply and sanitation 
programmes wherever possible. Their involvement will help to ensure that the 
entire affected population has safe and easy access to water supply and sanitation 
services, and that services are equitable and appropriate.14
Similar passages could be quoted from almost any contemporary operational 
handbook for humanitarian aid workers. Indeed, it can now justifiably be said that 
‘[g]ood practice on gender in emergencies has come to mean paying attention to 
women in food distribution, providing sanitary towels, and ensuring adequate 
lighting and health services for women’.15
Whereas the first category focuses on the gender-specific needs of women, the 
second category emphasises their gender-specific capabilities. The role of women 
in reconstruction and reintegration refers to the interest that has in recent years 
been expressed in the contribution that women can make to the rebuilding of
n  Ibid., p. 38.
14 Ibid., p. 18.
15 Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in note 1, p. 8.
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disaster-afflicted communities. A main goal of this literature has been to challenge 
the prevailing image of women as helpless victims by emphasising their existing 
capabilities. In this vein, for example, the Code of Conduct states: ‘we recognise 
the crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure 
that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes’.16 Two 
arguments are usually made in this context: on one hand, women’s participation in 
disaster response and prevention is seen as a step towards gender equality and 
therefore positive: ‘the experience of participating on an equal footing with men 
in disaster management can be a very empowering one for women’.17 The 
argument here is that there is no reason why women could not contribute to 
disaster management and prevention equally well as men. By contrast, others 
argue that women, qua women, are in some respects more suited than men for 
making a contribution to reconstruction and reintegration, for instance because 
they are (perceived to be) fairer or more peaceful. For example, groups of 
refugees in Tanzania reportedly elected women rather than men to distribute food 
aid amongst their members, as women were felt to be more honest and fairer.18 
Another example that has been cited in this context has been the Sierra Leonean 
organisation Women Organise for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN) and 
the contribution that it has made to the reconstruction and reintegration of that
16 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in 
Disaster Relief, in Sphere Handbook, op. cit., in note 12, p. 314.
17 Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in note 1, p. 10.
18 See Z. Mirghani and R. Bhatia, ‘The Role of Women in Food Management’, The Field 
Exchange (January 1998), pp. 18-19.
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country after a drawn-out civil war.19
While the concerns expressed in the first two categories can be described as being 
relatively uncontroversial, what remains much more contentious amongst both 
humanitarian practitioners and academics alike are the concerns expressed by the 
third category: in other words, to what extent, if at all, should the humanitarian 
response challenge, or seek to alter, practices that subordinate women? On one 
side of this debate are those who believe that explicitly striving towards the 
general goal of gender equality or equity in the societies where they work is an 
essential task for humanitarian organisations and aid workers. They argue that, as 
a result of their subordination, women are more vulnerable to the effects of 
disasters and armed conflict, and therefore suffer disproportionately. In this vein, 
for example, Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth point out that ‘armed 
conflict often exacerbates inequalities (in this context, those based on gender) that 
exist in different forms and varying degrees in all societies and that make women 
particularly vulnerable when armed conflict breaks out’.20 Similarly, Deborah 
Clifton and Fiona Gell argue that ‘[g]ender-fair emergency management ... 
[should seek] to challenge the longer-term structural barriers to women’s 
vulnerability to disasters.’21 Thus, striving towards gender equality or equity is 
seen as a major factor in reducing women’s vulnerability and ultimately their
19 See Fabrice Weissman, ‘Liberia: Can Relief Organisations Cope with the Warlords?’ in 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (ed.), World in Crisis: The Politics o f  Survival at the End o f  the 2Cfh 
Century, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 102-3.
20 Gardam and Charlesworth, op. cit., in note 5, p. 150.
21 Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in note 1, p. 9.
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suffering during armed conflict or disaster. On the other side of the debate are 
those who, for various reasons, do not see the promotion of gender equality or 
equity as being an appropriate task for humanitarian assistance. They are 
concerned, for example, that striving for gender equality or equity means 
engaging in time-consuming social research instead of the rapid response required 
in an emergency, that gender advocacy may take what are already limited 
resources away from other activities, or that engaging in outspoken gender 
advocacy may in some contexts result in the denial of access to beneficiaries for 
humanitarian aid organisations.22 In addition, and most importantly for the 
purposes here, a concern that is often voiced in this context is that promoting 
gender equality or equity may involve unfairly interfering with local culture 
during at a time when the community is particularly vulnerable and dependent on 
external assistance 23
The purpose of this section has been to provide an overview of the kinds of issues 
that have been raised in relation to gender in international humanitarian 
assistance. Three main categories of issues were identified, namely the immediate 
needs of women in emergencies, the contribution of women to reconstruction and 
reintegration, and recognising and challenging the subordination of women. In the 
section that follows, I will examine the relationship of ‘respect for culture and
22 See, for example, the arguments against gender equality or equity described by Clifton and Gell, 
op. cit., in note 1, pp. 12-13, and Suzanne Williams, ‘Contested Terrain: Oxfam, Gender and the 
Aftermath of War,’ Gender and Development (Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2001), p. 23.
23 See, for example, Clifton and Gell, who cite this as one of the objections that are frequently 
voiced against gender equality or equity in humanitarian assistance. Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in 
note 1, p. 12.
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customs’ to the issue of gender in international humanitarian assistance in more 
detail.
GENDER, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE
Having given a brief overview of the issues that the contemporary literature on 
gender and humanitarian assistance deals with above, let me now turn to 
examining the relationship between gender concerns and respect for culture and 
customs in humanitarian assistance.
To begin with, it is worth noting that there are many parallels between the 
literature on ‘respect for culture and customs’ and that on ‘gender’ in the context 
of international humanitarian assistance. For one, both the concern with gender 
issues and that with ‘respect for culture and customs’ appeared around the same 
time, in the mid-1990s, in the academic and practitioner literature. In what must 
be seen as a rather dramatic break with the humanitarian tradition until then, both 
emphasised group-specific concerns in international humanitarian assistance, each 
singling out a particular social group -  women or the cultural community -  as 
requiring special attention in international humanitarian assistance. The break can 
be said to be dramatic because, in the past, humanitarians had arguably tended to 
be concerned with social group differences only in the sense that they should not 
count, for fear of the effects of negative discrimination (see the discussion of the 
principle of impartiality in Chapter 1). By contrast, both those concerned with 
‘respect for culture’ and those involved with gender advocacy argue that this
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approach of gender- and/or cultural neutrality has meant that the concerns and 
needs of these two groups have been inadequately addressed, or neglected 
altogether, in the past, and that therefore a new approach that explicitly focuses on 
addressing the specific needs of these groups is needed. Because of the virtually 
simultaneous timing of their emergence as concerns in humanitarian assistance, 
and because of their emphasis on improving the status of marginalised social 
groups, both can also be seen as thematically connected to broader debates 
relating to group rights, gender and culture that have been going on in other 
spheres since the 1990s.24
Given these similarities, what are then the conceptual relationships that may exist 
between gender concerns, on one hand, and respect for culture and customs, on 
the other, in the context of international humanitarian assistance?
In many situations, there would seem to be no reason why respect for culture and 
customs could not comfortably coexist with a concern for gender in international 
humanitarian assistance. For one, this is because in some contexts, respect for 
culture and gender considerations simply do not come into contact with one 
another. While the relationship between gender and culture is in many respects a 
closely intertwined one -  given that gender roles and relationships are (despite the 
biological differences between sexes) to a large extent socially constructed and 
therefore culturally specific -  it seems nonetheless possible to identify cultural
24 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990, and Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory 
o f  Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
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elements that have no explicit gender dimension. For example, the prohibition of 
eating pork in Judaism and Islam applies equally to men and women, and the 
same can be said for many other food-related cultural norms and practices (even if 
there are also gender-specific food taboos, for example, relating to pregnant or 
breastfeeding women). In addition, even in many contexts where cultural elements 
and gender are intertwined, respect for culture and a concern with women’s 
gender-specific needs, or gender equity, are often in harmony with one another. 
For example, cultural norms may dictate the type of contraception or sanitary 
protection that should be distributed, or the degree of privacy and hygiene 
expected from menstruating women and therefore the type of latrines and washing 
facilities that should be made available. In such situations, the demands of respect 
for culture and gender considerations would seem to point largely in the same 
direction. Moreover, depending on the stringency of the norm in question, cultural 
appropriateness may even be a necessary precondition for responding to women’s 
needs at all in some contexts. For example, as was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, in contexts where culture or customs dictate that women cannot be 
attended to by male doctors or nurses the provision of female medical personnel 
may be necessary so that women can receive medical care at all.
In addition to these scenarios, however, there are also some situations where it 
may not be possible to simultaneously respect culture and customs and attend to 
women’s needs in an equal or equitable manner, or at all. This is because there are 
certain cultural and customary norms and practices that specifically dictate that 
women’s needs (however conceived) should either be systematically given lower
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priority than those of men or sometimes even be ignored altogether. For example, 
as was mentioned in the previous chapter, in many parts of the world it is 
customary that women (and female children) eat last, and therefore usually the 
least, even if their physiological needs may be the same as, or even greater than 
those of men, for example due to pregnancy or breastfeeding. Another example 
of a similar phenomenon that was also referred to earlier is the case of the 
widowed African woman who was left completely outside the local structures for 
distributing food because she was considered to be ‘dead already’ as a 
consequence of her husband’s death.26
In situations like these, respect for culture and customs and the concern for gender 
equality and equity clearly run into a conflict with one another. Indeed, even if the 
two can be reconciled in many contexts, ultimately or ‘in the last instance’, the 
two approaches would appear to pull humanitarian assistance in diametrically 
opposite directions: while ‘respect for culture’ seems to require non-interference 
with the existing norms and practices, promotion of gender equality or equity 
would appear necessarily to involve attempting to change existing norms and 
practices insofar as they subordinate women.
The conflict between upholding cultural norms and improving the status of
25 For anthropological case studies regarding such practices, see, for example, Alice Stewart 
Carloni, ‘Sex Disparities in the Distribution of Food within Rural Households,’ Food and 
Nutrition (Vol. 7, No. 1,1981), pp. 3-12; Lincoln C. Chen, Emdadul Huq and Stan D’Souza, ‘Sex 
Bias in the Family Allocation of Food and Health Care in Rural Bangladesh,’ Population and 
Development Review (Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1981), pp. 55-70; and Una M. Fruzetti, The Gift o f  the 
Virgin: Women, Marriage and Ritual in the Bengali Society, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1982, pp. 100-101.
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women is, of course, not limited to humanitarian assistance, but occurs in a broad 
range of contexts. Evidence suggests, however, that this problem may be 
exacerbated by the dynamics of an emergency situation. Especially during armed 
conflict, ‘cultural norms that may not be strictly enforced in peacetime may 
become symbols of cultural identity and social cohesion’.27 In particular, 
‘[w]omen’s idealised roles as guardians of the honour and identity of a culture 
may come under special scrutiny, and societies undergoing stress have been 
observed to erode women’s human rights as a reaction to pressure from external 
forces’ 28 For example, in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, purdah was 
reported to have been much more strictly enforced than it had been in the pre-war 
communities of origin, with married women not being able to even visit the 
dispensary without being accompanied by their husbands until after the birth of 
their second child. Similarly, in Somalia the de facto military authorities 
introduced the death penalty for women suspected of mixing too freely with 
foreign soldiers.30 Indeed, communities in an emergency situation may react 
particularly strongly against the (perceived) threat posed by outsiders, including 
aid workers, in particular if they are seen to actively attempt to change gender
26 See the Introduction to this thesis.
27 Celia A. Palmer and Anthony B. Zwi, ‘Women, Health and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict,’ 
Disasters (Vol. 22, No. 3,1998), p. 242.
28 Judy El Bushra and Eugenia Piza-Lopez, ‘Gender, War and Food,’ in Joanna Macrae and 
Anthony Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger: Rethinking International Approaches to Complex 
Emergencies, London: Zed Books, 1994, pp. 186-187.
29 See N. H. Dupree, The Present Role o f  Afghan Refugee Women and Children, Studies and 
Evaluation Paper No. 7, The Hague: Bernhard Van Leer Foundation, 1992, cited in Palmer and 
Zwi, op. cit., in note 27, p. 242.
30 See K. Maier, ‘Women Fall Victim to Somalia’s Prejudice,’ Independent, 5 January 1993.
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roles or relations in the society in question. This may in turn have unintended 
negative consequences for the women in question. The possibility of such a 
backlash is something that humanitarians should take seriously insofar as their 
aim is to improve the status of women, not least because by the very nature of 
their exercise their presence is often relatively brief in duration and the women 
will be left to deal with the long-term effects of their intervention on their own.
Moreover, that the conflict between respect for culture and gender equality/equity 
has very real practical implications for humanitarian assistance is illustrated by 
the following observation regarding the problems faced by humanitarian aid 
agencies in the (then) Taleban-mn Afghanistan: ‘[a]gencies face immense 
challenges as they try to structure programs to meet the needs of women and girls 
and also to uphold a human-rights based framework. The problem is made more 
complex by the fact that agencies are committed as a matter of principle to respect 
local cultural and religious practices...’31
In this section, I have examined the relationships that may exist between ‘respect 
for culture and customs’, on one hand, and gender considerations, on the other, in 
the context of international humanitarian assistance. Briefly summarised, the 
argument was that, while in many contexts the relationship between the two may 
be a neutral or harmonious one, the two can also conflict, in particular where 
culture and customs dictate that women’s needs should either be systematically
31 Mertus, op. cit., in note 10, p. 60.
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given lower priority than those of men, or even be ignored altogether. The 
question that then arises is how this conflict should be addressed. It is this 
question to which the next section will seek to offer an answer.
DEALING WITH THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GENDER 
EQUALITY/EQUITY AND RESPECT FOR CULTURE IN 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, the choice between respecting cultural and 
customary traditions, on one hand, and striving for gender equality or equity, on 
the other, can be a ‘fiendishly difficult’ one:
On one hand, it seems impossible to deny that traditions perpetrate injustice 
against women in many fundamental ways, touching on some o f the most central 
elements o f a human being’s quality o f life -  health, education, political liberty 
and participation, employment, self-respect, and life itself On the other hand, 
hasty judgements that a tradition in some distant part o f the world is morally 
retrograde are familiar legacies o f colonialism and imperialism, and are 
correctly regarded with suspicion by sensitive thinkers in the contemporary 
world.32
As Nussbaum mentions, one of the dangers in this context is making ‘hasty 
judgements’. One obvious problem with haste is that it may lead us to misjudge 
what is in fact at issue in a given situation. For this reason, as was pointed out in
32 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Introduction,’ in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds.), Women, 
Culture and Development: A Study o f  Human Capabilities, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 1.
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the previous chapter, the initial approach to any apparent conflict between gender 
equality or equity and cultural norms and practices should involve trying to find 
out through dialogue with all those concerned whether the conflict is real, or 
simply the result of a misunderstanding or misinformation. Let us assume for the 
sake of argument, however, that any possible misunderstandings have been 
cleared and that the conflict between respect for culture and gender considerations 
turns out to be a real one. Can gender equality and/or equity and respect for 
culture and customs somehow be reconciled in international humanitarian 
assistance, or must humanitarians ultimately choose between one or the other? To 
provide an answer to this question, it seems important to examine the cases that 
can be made for gender equality and/or equity, on one hand, and respect for 
culture and customs, on die other, in the context of humanitarian assistance.
Within the basic normative framework underpinning contemporary international 
humanitarian aid, the case in favour of gender equality and/or equity seems fairly 
strong. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the principle of impartiality clearly 
identifies sex as one of the characteristics that should not serve as the basis for 
(negative) discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Instead, 
impartiality singles out need as the only legitimate basis for discriminating 
between recipients. It seems difficult to offer a plausible argument for why 
women, as women, would somehow systematically need food (or water, shelter, 
sanitation and medical care for that matter) any less than men do, even if we
33 For a discussion of similar issues in the development context -  albeit in more detail and 
philosophical depth than is possible in the present context -  see Jonathan Glover, ‘The Research 
Programme on Development Ethics,’ in Nussbaum and Glover (eds.), op. cit., in note 32, pp. 116-
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acknowledge that the form of provision for their needs may sometimes differ from 
that of men. Moreover, as was argued in Chapter 3, the central place of the 
principle of impartiality in the humanitarian value system supports the case in 
favour of gender equality over alternative principles. Indeed, this view would 
seem to fall in line with a more general consensus amongst contemporary theorists 
of justice that -  whatever else justice may require -  gender in itself is not a 
relevant characteristic for the purposes of just distribution.34
For their part, cultural communities that perpetuate norms and practices the 
respect for which would mean that women would receive less humanitarian 
assistance than men, or even no assistance at all, undoubtedly also have their own 
reasons that serve to justify such practices. The potential range of such reasons 
would appear to be a nearly unlimited one, in particular as the argument is in 
many cases likely to be made with reference to some religious or metaphysically- 
based authority (for example, ‘it is God’s will that women should eat after 
men/widows should starve to death’). Thus, it is impossible to even begin to offer 
an exhaustive description of such reasons here, both because they would be very 
different in each cultural context, and because the examination of the content of 
different religious or otherwise metaphysical belief systems seems more the 
domain of theology than normative theory. Thus, I will concentrate on the kinds 
of reasons that could be given within the normative framework underpinning 
humanitarian aid for respecting culture and customs.
139.
34 Ibid., p. 121.
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Even if there appears to be something of a consensus on the basic idea of gender 
equality in the distribution of humanitarian assistance, the question remains what 
role and weight in that distribution should be given to the actual or subjective 
preferences (or wants or desires) of people, as opposed to some ‘objective’ 
conception of their needs and interests. In particular, this issue would appear to be 
important in those contexts where the affected people themselves seem to be 
supportive of those cultural norms and practices that to outside observers -  
including humanitarian aid workers -  seem oppressive. Such cases appear to 
occur relatively frequently in the gender context: for example, Chen et al 
observed that, in rural Bangladesh, ‘...it was the women, not men, and often the 
mother herself, who distributed food within the family. Contrary to customary 
descriptions, men rarely made explicit demands for food beyond the share 
allocated by women.’35 In other words, it was the women themselves rather than 
the men who upheld the sequential feeding practice (first adult men, followed by 
male children, adult women, and female children) as well as the allocation of both 
qualitatively and quantitatively inferior food to those lower in the sequence, 
including themselves. Moreover, the distinction between needs and preferences 
matters all the more if humanitarians aim to go beyond mere life saving and 
alleviation of physical suffering, and effect more far-reaching change in the 
societies where they intervene. After all, if it can be established that there are 
some things that may be described as objective, universal human needs, the kind 
of social change envisaged would be likely to look very different from change that
35 Chen et al., op. cit., in note 25, p. 67.
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aimed to create the conditions that made the realisation of subjective preferences -  
whatever they happened to be -  possible.
As the discussion at the end of Chapter 3 on this issue already sought to 
demonstrate, however, it is very difficult to make the argument in favour of basic 
human needs as something universal and objectively existing. In the face of the 
existing diversity in the world with regard to gender relations, the idea of 
universal, knowable, basic human needs would appear to rely at least implicitly on 
the existence of something like the Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’, i.e. 
the idea that people’s actual preferences or desires do not necessarily reflect their 
‘real’ needs and interests. The problem with the idea of false consciousness is that 
it seems very difficult to provide a plausible account of what it in fact is. After all, 
the idea of false consciousness depends on the possibility of distinguishing 
between actual desires, wants or preferences, on one hand, and ‘real* needs or 
interests, on the other, something which -  as was argued in Chapter 3 -  remains to 
be persuasively demonstrated. In the absence of such an account, however, 
overriding people’s actual desires with reference to some view regarding their 
‘real’ needs or interests in the context of international aid raises concerns about 
paternalism and moral imperialism.
Nonetheless, for humanitarian aid (insofar as it primarily seeks to save lives and 
alleviate physical suffering) this problem may not be quite as serious as it would 
be for an activity that seeks to promote a more comprehensive view of human 
welfare (such as a theory of justice for a society under normal circumstances or an
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ethics of development assistance). This is because -  insofar as the main argument 
against the basic needs approach is the indeterminacy as to what would constitute 
such needs -  there are limits to this indeterminacy in the humanitarian context, 
even if such needs cannot be defined in some ultimate sense. As was already 
pointed out in the previous chapter, all that we need to assume is that persons 
seeking humanitarian aid want to stay alive. Then such persons have basic needs 
-  variable to an extent according to climate, deeply embedded custom, and 
possibly other matters -  determined by their commitment to stay alive, namely 
food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical care. On the basis of empirical 
evidence, we can assume that the majority of people would indeed value staying 
alive, whatever else they may value. Moreover, those that do not wish to stay 
alive do not need to do so against their will.
What this approach cannot do, however, is to give an unequivocal answer to what 
ought to be done about people who -  while not wholly rejecting aid -  appear not 
to seek aid to an equal extent as others, i.e. who appear to favour some distributive 
principle other than impartiality and therefore egalitarianism. In the previous 
chapter, I suggested that a stance of non-intervention would appear to be the best 
available course of action in situations like these; in what follows, I want to 
examine what such non-intervention would involve in greater detail. Assuming 
that the people in question cannot be shown to be in any obvious sense 
unreasonable or uninformed, an explanation of such behaviour might be that they 
may simply have a different, but equally valid, conception of just distribution. An 
argument of this type has been in particular associated with communitarian
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political theory. Briefly described, the communitarian argument is that it is 
impossible to give an universal account of justice that is independent of the 
‘shared understandings’ of a particular society or community. In his book Spheres 
o f Justice, Michael Walzer gives the example of an Indian village, where food is 
distributed unequally according to the positions in the caste system (which has 
obvious parallels to the plight of the women who only eat men’s leftovers).36 
Walzer allows that a visitor might try to convince the villagers to give up the 
beliefs on which the system is based. However, in the absence of such persuasion, 
justice ‘does not rule out the inequality of the portions; it cannot require a radical 
redesign of the village against the shared understandings of its members’.37 To 
require such a radical redesign would be tyrannical, Walzer argues.
What are the implications of the communitarian argument for gender 
equality/equity in humanitarian assistance? For one, it is worth re-emphasising 
that to be valid, Walzer’s argument requires that the understandings on which the 
inequalities of distribution are based are in fact shared. In this context, the consent 
(or at least not the explicit lack of consent) of those adversely affected by the 
practices would seem particularly central. Thus, the communitarian argument 
applies only to situations where the apparently negatively-affected people 
themselves appear supportive of such practices. Given this caveat, the 
communitarian position can be interpreted in two ways:
36 See Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, Basic Books: New York, 1983, p. 312-314.
37 Ibid., p. 313.
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First, it can be seen as condemning the forceful imposition of change upon a 
reluctant community. At face value, there would seem to be little danger of such 
imposition in the context of humanitarian aid: as has already been mentioned, 
given the means available to them, humanitarians can normally only make 
assistance available for those who wish to have it (and often not even all of them); 
even if they wanted to, they would rarely if ever have the resources to force their 
aid upon someone reluctant to receive it, whether at all, or to an equal extent 
Moreover, few humanitarians would probably condone the use of force to achieve 
gender equality and/or equity, however important a goal they might feel it to be. 
Thus, interpreted in this way, the communitarian argument would appear to be 
somewhat moot for the purposes of humanitarian aid.
It should, however, be noted that the above interpretation may represent what is 
involved in forceful change in too limited a way, as it focuses narrowly on 
physical violence. Nonetheless, it does not seem befitting of those concerned with 
eliminating the unequal power relations between men and women to ignore the 
potential effects of another set of unequal power-relations, namely those between 
the givers and recipients of humanitarian assistance. This seems all the more 
relevant the more extensive the social change envisaged. Simply put, people who 
are both physically and mentally shaken by an emergency, as well as dependent 
on outside assistance for their day-to-day survival, will more than likely find it 
extremely difficult to challenge donors* and aid workers’ views about what would 
constitute a change for the better in their society. This leads us to the second 
possible interpretation of the communitarian argument, and one that would seem
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to pose a greater problem for humanitarians than the first one. This version of the 
argument suggests that there are very tight limits on outsiders to even criticise the 
existing practices, let alone interfering with them. It is conceivable that even 
making an alternative available -  in the manner that humanitarian assistance does 
-  would be interpreted as unjustifiable interference.
The latter interpretation of the communitarian argument can be characterised as 
the position of moral relativism. As was already pointed out in the previous 
chapter, moral relativism represents the view that there are no objective values; 
instead, the truth of a value judgement is relative to the culture or value system 
within which it is made. On the face of it, relativism in this context seems 
attractive on a number of grounds. For one, on the basis of anthropological 
evidence, it is clear that a belief in gender equality or equity is not a cultural 
universal. Moreover, in the contemporary secularised world, many people 
(including many humanitarians) have abandoned the belief that morality 
originates in ‘God’s mind’ or some other metaphysical source, and instead see 
morality as a human creation. Given the fact that humans appear to have created a 
number of different moral systems, combined with the apparent lack of an 
ultimate arbiter, it seems difficult to evaluate the moral systems in relation to one 
another.
One way of challenging the relativist position would of course be to point out that 
there is no reason why the existence of a diversity of beliefs about some matter 
should mean that we must assume that the different beliefs are equally valid.
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Jonathan Glover provides an illustrative example of an argument of this type: ‘if 
one group of people thinks that masturbation makes you blind, while another 
disagrees, we do not have to conclude that there is no objective truth about the 
matter. One group may just be wrong’.38 It should be noted, however, that 
Glover’s chosen example is one where it is possible to collect scientific evidence 
on the basis of generally agreed-upon criteria to support one’s argument; by 
contrast, no such relatively undisputed method exists for establishing the truth 
about many other moral disagreements.
Another well-known argument against relativism, made for example by Bernard 
Williams, would be that it is logically inconsistent to argue that all moral beliefs 
are relative, and then to use this argument as the basis for an allegedly non- 
relative moral prohibition on intervention in other societies.39 As Glover points 
out, however, this does not do away with the fact that, within ‘our system of 
values, our recognition of that system’s own local and limited status weakens the 
case for propagating it outside its own context’.40 We -  i.e. in this case the 
contemporary, Western humanitarians -  believe that values are human creations. 
As a result of this belief, compounded with the importance that our belief system 
gives to choice and self-determination, we may find it difficult to justify to 
ourselves being critical of the values of others, let alone imposing our values on 
them. Indeed, it seems that the concern with respect for culture and relativism is
38 Glover, op. cit., in note 33, p. 130.
39 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, London, 1979.
40 Glover, op. cit., in note 33, p. 128.
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something internal to the Western value system rather than a universal truth, given 
that many of the value systems contemporary humanitarians see themselves as 
owing respect to do not reciprocate this sentiment, but instead are seen by their 
members to represent a universally valid moral law.
Having said this, it is questionable whether seeing values as human creations 
necessarily commits one to relativism in the manner Glover appears to imply it 
would. Arguably, the same premises could perhaps even more persuasively be 
used to justify equality as a foundational principle. In particular, contemporary 
liberal political theory is standardly based on the conception of human beings as 
value creators, combined with a belief in the moral equality of persons. The 
liberal argument is that it is difficult to see what the alternative to treating all 
value creators as equally valuable is. This is because, in the absence of some 
objective scale of values that had not been created by humans, it seems difficult to 
justify the claim that some human beings would be somehow superior value 
creators than the others. At face value, since values come into the world through 
value creators, it is hard to see how any one value -  including equality -  could be 
inherently superior than the other. Nonetheless, if all are equally valuable if 
anyone is valuable, then there cannot be a moral basis for peaceful interaction 
between human beings other than the value creators’ mutual respect as equals. 
Thus, contemporary liberal political theory is committed to the superiority of this 
view as the basis for moral interaction over other views. In that sense, although 
the liberal view begins with the rejection of values as ‘out there’ in the world 
binding on human beings, it ends with the position that there are good arguments
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for treating equality as the foundational moral principle. While the liberal view is 
open to counter-arguments, it in the meanwhile claims to have the best available 
arguments, which is not a relativist position. Thus, if we accept the superiority of 
the liberal argument over the relativist position, in combination with the central 
role of impartiality in the humanitarian value scheme, the weight of the argument 
would appear to tip in favour of gender equality (and moral equality of persons 
more generally) rather than cultural relativism.
In this section, I have examined some questions related to the issue of how the 
conflict between the gender equality and respect for culture could be resolved in 
international humanitarian assistance. Contemporary humanitarians -  certainly to 
a much greater extent than their predecessors -  clearly seem concerned with the 
subjective preferences, whether they be culturally based or not, of the recipients of 
humanitarian assistance. In the previous chapter, I suggested that "respect for 
culture and customs’ may make most sense in the humanitarian context if we see 
it as an expression of a concern with self-determination. Moving away from an 
earlier position of ultimately religiously or metaphysically-based moral 
absolutism, humanitarians have come to see that, to be meaningful, assistance 
must incorporate the actual concerns of those to be assisted. If we assume that it is 
not possible to provide an objective and universal account of human needs, it 
seems plausible to claim that what constitutes assistance cannot be determined by 
the would-be helper alone, but that the actual preferences of the recipients must 
play a role. One concrete route by which humanitarians have sought to approach 
self-determination has been respect for culture. Arguably, the recent emphasis on
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the promotion of gender equality and/or equity can at least in part be interpreted in 
this light as well. Whereas the first focuses on cultural self-determination, the 
latter emphasises the self-determination of women.
There are good reasons for using gender and the cultural community as concrete 
entry-points to the problem of self-determination, not least because in both cases 
there is a well-known historical record of subordination, in the form of 
colonialism and (cultural) imperialism, on one hand, and patriarchal structures, on 
the other. Examining the interrelationship between gender and culture as has been 
done above, however -  as opposed to examining them one by one, as is usually 
the case -  reveals a problem associated with focusing on the needs of a specific 
social group, be that women or the cultural community or anything else, as a way 
of addressing the problem of self-determination. The potential conflicts between 
the two illustrate that neither ‘women* nor the ‘cultural community’ are 
necessarily monolithic groups in any society, but instead their memberships 
crosscut and overlap both with one another as well as with potentially 
innumerable other roles and memberships. This means that the (subjectively 
defined) needs and interests of some women/members of a cultural community 
may genuinely be served by norms and practices that nonetheless equally 
genuinely oppress others. Indeed, the problem with focusing attention and effort 
on one of the possible axes of discrimination between recipients of humanitarian 
assistance -  whether culture or gender -  is that it occurs potentially at the expense 
of others (such as race, religion, nationality, class, political opinions, or something 
else entirely), which both overlap with one another and which may in some
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contexts be equally (or more) significant as gender/culture. This is important not 
least because evidence from many recent conflict zones, such as the Balkans, 
demonstrates that the promotion of differences by the international community 
can sometimes be deliberately used to reinforce social divisions where they exist. 
Nor is it clear that siding with the ‘underdogs’ and attempting to raise their status 
in itself can guarantee that the emerging new social order is significantly more 
just than the previous arrangement, as events for example in Kosovo have 
demonstrated. Moreover, if humanitarians begin to identify and support sub­
groups that have been marginalised or silenced, what would constitute the limits 
of that process? There is the danger that the groups will become smaller and 
smaller, that the process of identification will in itself create such groups, and that 
the emergence of an ever-increasing number of such sub-groups will have 
unpredictable effects on the societies in question.
By contrast, the principle of impartiality (and its assumption about the moral 
equality of persons) has the advantage that it cautions the humanitarian aid 
community to be on its guard against all, even previously unforeseen, types of 
negative discrimination. In the discussion above, I have suggested a possible way 
of justifying this principle in a way that does not require shared metaphysical 
assumptions but instead is consistent with the contemporary view of values as 
human creations. In this section, I have explored some of the normative 
dimensions of the conflicts between respect for culture and customs and the 
concern with gender equality/equity in the context of international humanitarian 
aid. In the final section, I will explore the broader issue to what extent
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humanitarians can justifiably attempt to effect change in the societies in which 
they intervene.
HUMANITARIAN AID AGENCIES AS AGENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
In addition to the issue of the relationship between respect for culture and gender 
equality and/or equity in the context of humanitarian assistance in a more narrow 
sense, which was addressed in the previous section, the debates surrounding 
gender in international humanitarian assistance also raise the more general 
question of what is the justifiable scope of social intervention in international 
humanitarian assistance. This is because, rather than simply arguing that the needs 
of men and women should be addressed in an equal or equitable manner in 
emergencies, gender advocates often take a much broader view of the role that 
humanitarian assistance should play, emphasising the need and/or opportunity that 
disasters may provide for more extensive structural change with regard to gender 
roles and relations. Indeed, this raises questions that are not just limited to the 
gender context -  rather, discussing them can highlight the cultural issues around 
the legitimate scope of social intervention by humanitarian aid agencies in a more 
general sense.
Some gender advocates argue that the striving for gender equality or equity should 
be expanded to encompass areas more and more removed from the basic concern 
of saving lives and alleviating suffering. In this vein, for example, an Oxfam 
nutritionist reportedly made the following recommendation to field officers after
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visiting some feeding programmes in south Sudan during the 1998 famine: 
‘[w]omen are naturally subservient and do not speak out; they are marginalised 
and their opinions are considered unimportant Oxfam should therefore take the 
opportunity to challenge these traditional inequalities in the implementation of the 
programme, and indeed make this one of the core objectives of the programme.’41 
In a similar manner, while Clifton and Gell welcome the attention that in recent 
years has been paid to meeting ‘women’s immediate practical needs’ in 
emergencies, they argue that, in order to be truly ‘gender-fair’, humanitarian 
assistance should also ‘challenge the long-term structural barriers’ that contribute 
to women’s vulnerability42 Likewise, El Bushra and Piza-Lopez argue that 
‘agencies should change the basic assumptions on which they plan their 
responses, away from the formulaic application of service projects (food, water, 
medication) and towards a planning framework based on assessment of a broad 
range of community and individual needs -  including those which do not appear 
to an outsider to be a priority but which may be vital in raising levels of women’s 
self-esteem’ 43 Neither Clifton and Gell nor El Bushra and Piza-Lopez in fact 
propose any concrete measures beyond those that could not just as well be 
justified on the more traditional grounds of their contribution to women’s 
(physical) well-being in the most immediate sense (such as the inclusion of
41 Quoted in Pierson R. T. Ntata, ‘Participation by the Affected Population in Relief Operations: A 
Review of the Experience of DEC Agencies during the Response to the 1998 Famine in South 
Sudan,’ London: ALNAP, 1999, p. 36 (available at http://www.alnap.org/pubs/pdfs/).
42 Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 8-9.
43 El Bushra and Piza-Lopez, op. cit., in note 28, p. 191.
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‘sanitary towels, rape counselling or cooking pots’44 in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance). Nonetheless, the justificatory arguments they employ -  
the need to eliminate ‘structural barriers’ or to move away from a basic needs 
approach to address a broad range of community and individual needs -  have 
potentially much broader implications that seem problematic.
In this context, it should be emphasised that the point is not to deny that power 
structures that subordinate women exist in most parts of the world. Neither is it to 
claim that it is somehow unreasonable to argue that, were such power structures 
not to exist, women would not suffer as disproportionately as they currently do in 
emergency situations. Indeed, there are probably a great many reasons, not only 
related to women’s vulnerability in emergencies, why undoing such structures 
would be a good thing. Nonetheless, the question is whether -  and if so, to what 
extent -  it is the role of humanitarian aid organisations to actively strive for 
undoing such structures, over and above to how they may end up challenging 
them simply by seeking to attend to the immediate needs of men and women in 
emergencies in an equal and equitable manner.
This section will be devoted to highlighting some of the main concerns in this 
context. These concerns can be divided into four sets of questions: (1) how gender 
equality or equity should be promoted; (2) where (i.e. in what spheres of activity) 
it is to be promoted; (3) who should promote it; and (4) when is it the right time to 
promote gender equality or equity. It is important to address these questions in
44 Ibid.
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order to be able to evaluate the alternative that the ‘gender perspective* proposes 
both to current humanitarian practice in general and to the approach of ‘respect for 
culture’ in particular. Let me now examine each of these categories in turn:
First, it is important to distinguish between two different ways of dealing with 
gender inequalities. One way of conceptualising the problem -  and one that raises 
concerns of paternalism -  is to advocate a specific blueprint of what gender 
relations (and social relations more generally) ought to look like, irrespective of 
context. While I have argued above that the assertion of the principles of 
humanity and impartiality in the context of humanitarian assistance is justifiable 
even if they conflict with cultural norms, this has been on the basis that staying 
alive is the basic precondition for the realisation of a wide variety of conceptions 
of human well-being. Thus, the argument made in this and the previous chapter 
about the difficulties involved in establishing what ultimately constitute human 
needs still applies in relation to more comprehensive conceptions of human 
welfare. Another way would be a more open-ended participatory approach that is 
genuinely responsive to the preferences of the beneficiaries, both women and 
men. In practice, most current gender advocates in the humanitarian literature 
appear to try to combine elements of both. Nonetheless, there is a tension between 
the two that is not easily skimmed over. As Julie Mertus notes in the context of 
Afghanistan, even notwithstanding the Taleban views on women, ‘Western 
gender views may in some respects be incompatible with Afghan wishes. A 
thorny issue for gender and human rights advocates is therefore how to help
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Afghan women without causing harm or alienation.’45 Of course, it may be 
possible to address this problem through devising adequate representative 
structures and, as such, it is a problem that is probably more associated with the 
specific features of current practice than any fundamental inconsistency. At the 
same time, for reasons that will be discussed below, it is doubtful whether 
humanitarians would be the best choice for undertaking such efforts.
Second, by explicitly stating that attending to men’s and women’s immediate 
needs in emergencies in an equitable manner is necessary but not sufficient, 
Clifton and Gell appear to suggest that humanitarians should engage in undoing 
the structures that promote women’s inequality more generally. The question here 
is what, if any, would be the limits of such activity. After all, there are many 
activities that admittedly promote gender equality or equity but are nonetheless 
likely to contribute only marginally, if at all, to the tasks that are arguably most 
central to the self-understanding and raison d ’etre of humanitarian assistance, 
namely saving lives and alleviating suffering. The example of admitting women 
as members of a previously male-only sports club might be (an admittedly 
remote) case in point. Even if such measures may over time contribute to an 
overall improvement in the status of women, which in turn may mean that they 
will become less vulnerable to the effects of disasters or armed conflict, their 
relationship to humanitarian assistance is, at best, indirect. In such cases, there 
would seem to be a strong case to be made that the promotion of gender equality 
or equity, while probably a good thing in itself, would be a misuse of the scarce
45 Mertus, op. cit., in note 10, p. 67.
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resources available to humanitarian assistance. Indeed, in contexts like these, the 
argument from proportionality (i.e. that humanitarian aid should be provided in 
proportion to the degree of suffering that it seeks to address) would appear to 
work against, rather than in favour of, striving for gender equality or equity. Of 
course, the sports club membership example is an extreme point on a scale where 
on the opposite end would be activities that are directly relevant to the business of 
saving lives and alleviating (physical) suffering, with undoubtedly many much 
more ambiguous cases in between. Moreover, it may be impossible to determine 
once and for all where the ‘cut-off point’, as it were, would be, independent of 
context. At the same time, it is important to be clear that such a continuum does 
exist, rather than simply asserting that gender equality or equity ought to be 
promoted across the board.
Of course, in response to the above argument it could be said that what constitute 
appropriate tasks for humanitarian aid agencies is in many ways precisely what 
needs to be debated, rather than assuming in advance that saving of lives and 
alleviating suffering in a direct sense must always take priority. Especially if the 
idea that there is some set of universal basic human needs is abandoned, this 
seems a relevant issue to raise. This leads us to the third question, namely 
whether, and to what extent, international humanitarian aid organisations are the 
appropriate agents of fundamental social change. The normative argument often 
made in this context is that any radical change should be initiated by the members 
of the society themselves, rather than from the outside.46 This argument is usually
46 This argument is usually attributed to John Stuart Mill. A more recent advocate of this position
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based on the idea that self-determination, ‘life lived from the inside* and 
according to one’s own values, is more valuable than even the greatest good that 
is imposed from the outside.47 Even if the argument about the importance of self- 
determination is accepted, however, it may nonetheless be asked how it would in 
concrete terms be possible for those subordinated in virtually all areas of their 
lives (in this case, women) to muster the necessary strength to overhaul the social 
arrangements that are the source of their subordination without outside help even 
if that was what they sincerely wanted to do. Even if we believe that it may in 
principle be legitimate to have ‘outside help’ in initiating social change, however, 
there are a number of reasons for doubting whether humanitarian aid agencies 
would be appropriate to this task:
As has been frequently noted in recent years, the activity of humanitarian 
assistance is plagued by what appears to be a structural problem of lack of 
accountability, in particular in relation to the recipients of humanitarian 
assistance 48 Even with the measures that have been taken recently to address this 
problem (such as the Code of Conduct, the Sphere Project, or the Humanitarian 
Accountability Project), it is by no means clear that it can ever be wholly 
eliminated. After all, ‘international humanitarian assistance’ remains a set of 
loosely connected, largely unregulated (or, at most, self-regulated), often ad hoc 
processes, engaged in by an extremely diverse set actors, including NGOs, IGOs
is Michael Walzer, in particular in his book Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books, 1977.
47 For a discussion of this argument see, for example, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 199-205.
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and governments. There are many practical advantages to this diversity. For one, 
although governments provide the bulk of funding for humanitarian assistance, 
they are unlikely to gain direct access to beneficiaries in the territory of other 
states due to concerns with sovereignty, national pride, espionage, and the like. 
Thus, insofar as a fundamental overhaul of the existing states system is not on the 
cards, NGOs and IGOs are needed to carry out humanitarian assistance in 
practice, even if they are largely dependent on governments for their funding. 
Similarly, the lack of accountability and the ad hoc nature of the system may also 
actually serve a purpose: in order to save lives, it is often important to be able to 
make decisions quickly in emergencies, and the more people need to be consulted, 
the longer the decision-making process is likely to be. Whatever their advantages, 
however, the point here is that, amidst this heterogeneity and lack of 
accountability, it seems that if anything, we would be better off by seeking to limit 
the powers of humanitarians to what is necessary for saving lives here and now, 
rather than encouraging them to take on broad projects for sweeping social 
change.
There is also the question of access: outspoken advocacy and criticism of the 
existing societal arrangements, including gender relations, may sometimes prevent 
humanitarians from engaging in activities where they do in fact have a 
comparative advantage. A case in point here would seem to be the decision taken 
by Oxfam GB in Afghanistan, when the Taleban took control of Kabul in 1996 
and Oxfam’s local female staff were prevented from coming to work. According
48 See Chapter 1 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
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to Suzanne Williams,
There was considerable debate between those who thought that Oxfam GB should 
take a high-profile position on what was happening to women, and not implicitly 
support an unjust system by working with ‘approved’ women, and those who 
thought Oxfam should try to find ways o f working with women wherever possible, 
within the constraints. In the end, it was judged that the net benefits to women o f 
Oxfam GB staying and working with the opportunities which could be found, were 
greater than abandoning direct interventions to focus exclusively on advocacy for  
women’s rights*9
As Clifton and Gell rightly point out, the situation of Afghanistan under the 
Taleban was in many ways unique.50 For this reason, any general lessons from 
this experience should be drawn with care. At the same time, the dilemma faced 
by Oxfam GB (and similar experiences by other humanitarian organisations51) 
does demonstrate that adopting an undifferentiated policy of promoting gender 
equality or equity may in some contexts actually serve to undermine what are 
arguably the main tasks of humanitarian aid.
Arguably, there are other institutions much more suited to engaging in far-
49 Suzanne Williams, ‘Contested Terrain: Oxfam, Gender, and the Aftermath of War,’ Gender and 
Development (Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2001), p. 22.
50 See Clifton and Gell, op. cit., in note 1, p. 13.
51 See, for example, Julie A. Mertus’s description of how a number of different aid agencies 
(including CARE, Save the Children-US, and an NGO called the International Assistance Mission) 
coped with the same problem. Mertus, op. cit., in note 10, pp. 60-61.
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reaching social change, in particular each individual state within its jurisdiction 
and the states system as a whole. The fact that they, for various reasons, often fail 
to engage in promoting such change in practice should not be taken to mean that it 
is necessarily the role of humanitarian aid agencies to do so. Both humanitarian 
practitioners themselves as well as academics writing about humanitarian 
assistance sometimes behave as if the responsibility for addressing every social 
problem in the world rested on the shoulders of international humanitarian 
assistance. Indeed, as Mark Duffield has observed: ‘There is a certain narcissism 
of aid at work in which relatively small inputs are credited with powers and 
effects beyond reasonable expectation.’52 Clearly, humanitarians need to be 
careful so as not to exacerbate the existing problems, or to create new ones 
through their intervention. At the same time, this should be distinguished from a 
responsibility, or indeed a licence, to intervene in spheres unrelated to their 
mandate or capabilities.
Fourth, another question is whether it is worth it in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster or armed conflict to try to take on cultural norms and practices, even if 
they do discriminate against women, as long as they do not directly threaten their 
lives or physical well-being. On one level, the issue here is about the use of 
resources and giving priority to where needs are most urgent in a given context. 
On another, it is about social research: those trying to alter societal structures for 
the better should be very well-informed indeed about the features of the society 
they seek to change, as well as what the consequences of their interventions are
52 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging o f  Development and
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likely to be. As Joanna Macrae has pointed out, this ‘requires great sensitivity and 
careful political analysis’.53 Such efforts are by definition time-consuming and 
should not be engaged in lightly. At the same time, successfully saving lives and 
alleviating suffering in disaster situations tends to require quick decision-making 
and action. Whether we like it or not, there is a real tension between being 
sufficiently informed and accountable to be able to actually help people in 
changing their society for the better in the long-term, and intervening quickly in 
order to save lives under the chaotic circumstances of a disaster.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to try to shed some light on some of the most 
important issues regarding the interrelationship between gender issues and 
‘respect for culture’ in international humanitarian assistance, an area of research 
that has previously been neglected. The first section of the chapter gave a brief 
overview of the issues that have been raised in relation to gender issues in 
international humanitarian assistance, while the second section examined the 
relationship between the aim of ‘gender equality or equity’ and ‘respect for 
culture’ in international humanitarian assistance. The third section examined the 
normative arguments that could be made in favour of ‘gender equality and/or 
equity’ and respect for culture, respectively. Finally, in the fourth section,
Security, London: Zed Books, 2001, p. 98.
53 Joanna Macrae, ‘Foreword,’ in Claire Pirotte, Bernard Husson and Franfois Griinewald (eds.), 
Responding the Emergencies and Fostering Development, London: Zed Books, 1999, p. xx; see 
also Frangois Grunewald, ‘The Choice of Partners: The Naive and Ideologists Need not Apply,’ in 
the same volume, pp. 80-82.
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concerns regarding whether it should be the role of humanitarian aid agencies to 
actively promote social change in the societies where they intervene were also 
examined.
There is no question that the debates surrounding gender issues have made an 
important contribution to international humanitarian assistance. In particular, they 
have brought much needed attention to the fact that some basic needs may be 
gender specific, or should be addressed in a gender-specific manner. In addition, 
in relation to ‘respect for culture’, the arguments made regarding gender serve to 
bring home the point that culture and customs are only one axis of concern for 
humanitarian assistance, and one that may in some contexts be limited, or even 
trumped, by other considerations. At the same time, as I have tried to show in this 
chapter, it is important to put both of these group-specific concerns, gender and 
culture, into perspective regarding the overall aims of humanitarian assistance. In 
particular, it is important to be careful not to ‘over-correct’ for past mistakes and 
oversights with regard to gender and/or culture at the expense of other 
considerations. On one hand, the reason for this is a normative one: humanitarians 
need to avoid the pitfalls of both cultural imperialism and cultural relativism. On 
the other hand, it is pragmatic: humanitarian assistance has limited capacities and 
resources. This makes it necessary to set priorities, which also sometimes involve 
difficult trade-offs.
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C u s to m s  fo r  H um anita rian  Policy an d  
Practice
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, I first described the existing normative framework of 
international humanitarian assistance and the emergence of the norm of respect for 
culture and customs that has taken place since the mid-1990s amongst 
humanitarian practitioners and aid organisations. I then went on to examine the 
conceptual implications of respect for culture and customs for the existing 
normative framework, as well as discussing the relationship between gender 
considerations and respect for culture in the humanitarian context. The purpose of 
the present chapter is to bring some of the ideas expressed in the earlier chapters 
onto a more concrete level and examine the implications of the issues raised so far 
for contemporary humanitarian policy and practice. Therefore, in contrast to the 
more theoretical approach of the two preceding chapters, the emphasis of this 
chapter lies on operational considerations and practical methods for approaching 
cultural issues in humanitarian assistance.
Obviously, the concern with culture and customs is only one aspect of 
humanitarian assistance and thus the resources -  whether they be time, money,
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material or personnel -  devoted to it have to be balanced with those required by 
other tasks. At the same time, as the discussion in previous chapters has sought to 
demonstrate, cultural issues can have serious implications for the success of 
humanitarian assistance. Thus, they should not, in any case, be treated as a luxury 
or marginal consideration.
Indeed, there is a broad recognition amongst aid workers and organisations today 
that cultural and customary issues have both ethical and practical significance for 
humanitarian assistance. This is evident both from the documents examined in the 
previous chapters, as well as from the interviews conducted with practitioners for 
the purposes of this thesis. Two major types of problems can be identified in this 
context, however. First, the concern with cultural norms and practices remains to 
a large extent to be translated into a sustained practice in humanitarian assistance. 
Second, there appears to be an inadequate recognition that respect for culture may 
not always be in harmony with the principles or other goals of humanitarian 
assistance. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine on one hand 
practical methods by which the positive effects of respect for culture can be 
harnessed for the improvement of humanitarian assistance, while at the same time 
clarifying some of the potential conflicts and suggesting ways of dealing with 
them in practice.
One problem with making detailed suggestions about how to deal with culture on 
the level of policy or practice is that, although it may be possible to talk about 
‘cultural universals’ (even if their actual existence is disputed), culture as a
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concept is usually used to describe differences between groups of people (as 
opposed to individuals), and in particular those differences that are socially 
constructed (as opposed to e.g. biological ones). For this reason, there are obvious 
built-in limitations to what can be said about cultural issues on a general level, 
without referring to specific cultural practices. Nonetheless, it may be possible to 
make certain general remarks.
In this regard, there are five main points that I want to make in this chapter, each 
of which carries with itself a set of distinctive operational considerations. First, 
despite the difficulties associated with working in an emergency context, 
humanitarians need to find ways of informing themselves about cultural norms 
and practices in the environments where they operate in order to evaluate their 
potential impact on their work. Second, in order to operationalise the norm of 
respect for culture and customs, it is important to develop concrete ways in which 
it is possible to support, or at least not undermine, cultural norms and practices in 
humanitarian aid operations. Third, while in most cases the relationship between 
cultural norms and practices, on one hand, and the principles and practices of 
humanitarian assistance, on the other, is basically harmonious, humanitarians also 
sometimes have to deal with ‘hard cases’ where cultural norms and practices 
conflict with humanitarian principles and practices; such situations require 
specific operational considerations. A particular subset of hard cases that seem to 
occur especially frequently in the context of humanitarian aid, and therefore need 
to be given special consideration, involve the interaction between humanitarian 
assistance, culture, and gender roles. Fourth, in order to deal with cultural issues
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in the humanitarian context, it is necessary to involve the recipients (as well as 
stakeholders more broadly) of humanitarian assistance in the assistance process at 
all stages. Finally, fifth, taking cultural considerations into account in the hiring 
and training of humanitarian aid workers is also significant.
Each of the above-mentioned issue areas will be addressed in turn below. First, 
however, I will make some general remarks about the role of culture and customs 
in contemporary humanitarian policy and practice.
TOWARDS A MORE CULTURALLY AWARE HUMANITARIAN 
POLICY AND PRACTICE?
To make full sense of its implications for humanitarian policy and practice, the 
discussion about cultural diversity and respect for culture needs to be located 
within the wider context of recent attention to diversity both within the 
humanitarian community, as well as more broadly in contemporary social and 
political thought. Diversity, including cultural diversity, between both individuals 
and groups is an empirical fact that can have profound implications for the 
success of humanitarian assistance. The emphasis on diversity in the context of 
humanitarian aid is relatively new: in the past, humanitarian thought and practice 
tended to see humanitarian assistance as responding to a set of universal and 
objective basic human needs, centred around physiological survival and physical 
health. Humanitarian aid was taken to be something of an ‘exact science’, where 
what mattered was getting things like calorific and nutrient requirements or litres 
of available drinking water per person right. Experience has shown these
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assumptions to be, if not entirely mistaken, at least insufficient on their own. 
Diversity, both ‘natural’ and socially constructed, and both between groups of 
people and between individuals, can mean that aid that saves lives and alleviates 
suffering in one context fails to do so in another, or at least works less effectively 
and/or efficiently. Thus, in recent years, academics, policy makers and 
practitioners dealing with humanitarian assistance have increasingly become 
concerned with how humanitarian assistance can accommodate diversity, whether 
that be based on culture, gender, or some other factor. This concern has been 
reinforced by broader developments in social and political thought that have 
emphasised the significance of various forms of diversity.
With regard to cultural diversity, however, this concern is to a large extent yet to 
be translated into a sustained practice, certainly at least when compared to other 
forms of diversity such as gender. On one hand, the reason for this may be the 
perception of relatively low priority of cultural issues from the part of the relevant 
actors, and especially donors -  whose requirements after all determine to a large 
extent the emphases in humanitarian aid programmes. In this context, it is worth 
emphasising that it is in fact in the material interest of donors to require cultural 
issues to be taken into account, as it can increase the effectiveness and efficiency 
of aid. On the other hand, the practical difficulties associated with collecting and 
using information in the emergency context may also stand in the way of putting 
respect for culture and customs into practice. In this regard, the aim of this chapter 
is to point to some issues that need to be taken into account when collecting 
information about cultural norms and practices, as well as using this information
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in an operational context, as well as suggesting some possible tools for that 
purpose.
As has already been stated above, the understanding, and to a large extent also 
accommodation, of cultural diversity is necessary for the success of humanitarian 
assistance. At the same time, it is important to note that the recognition of cultural 
diversity and the requirement that it be respected does not only have positive 
implications for humanitarian assistance, but may also bring with itself some 
problems.
For one thing, focusing on shared culture may obscure important differences 
within it. Members of a cultural group are not all the same, and in many contexts, 
shared cultural membership may be less important than distinctions within the 
group, for example based on differences in wealth, urban or rural background, 
education, and so on. A particularly important distinction may in this context be 
gender, as gender roles are both culturally specific and often connected to unequal 
power structures. There is also the danger that culture will be seen as static and 
immutable rather than something that can and does change over time, with or 
without the intervention of humanitarian aid agencies.
In addition, the attempts to accommodate cultural diversity in practice may bring 
their own problems. One such problem may be the conviction that because each 
context is different, it is not possible to draw any lessons from one context to the 
next, or to set standards or identify best practices. This is an issue that has been
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raised, for example, by the Quality Platform in its criticism of the existing efforts 
to set standards for humanitarian aid, such as the Sphere Project. As Mary B. 
Anderson has pointed out with regard to similar issues in the development 
context, however, this problem can perhaps at least in part be dealt with by 
focusing on standardising the process regarding the questions to be asked, rather 
than the solutions offered.1
A further problem is the question of how to respond to situations where the 
culturally specific norms and practices conflict with the universalistic principles 
and norms of humanitarian assistance. Respect for culture is sometimes 
interpreted to mean that outsiders cannot express any judgement regarding the 
cultural norms and practices of others. This is the position of cultural relativism. 
In the absence of a common yardstick on the basis of which different cultural 
norms and practices could be evaluated, relativism seems an attractive and 
tolerant approach. At the same time, culture may serve as a justification of norms 
and practices that threaten the lives and/or health of certain groups or individuals, 
irrespective of their consent. In such cases, adopting a cultural relativist position 
would appear fundamentally inimical to the most basic humanitarian values and 
indeed the entire raison d ’etre of humanitarian aid.
Those who see interference with cultural practices by outsiders as in principle 
unjustified should be prepared to accept the full consequences of their position: to
1 Mary B. Anderson, ‘Understanding Difference and Building Solidarity: A Challenge to 
Development Initiatives,’ Development and Social Diversity, A Development in Practice Reader, 
1996 (available at http://www.developmentinpractice.org/readers/socdiv/anderson.htm).
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engage in humanitarian assistance by definition involves some degree of 
interference and if all interference is deemed unacceptable, then the only real 
answer is not to give humanitarian aid at all. If we accept, however, that 
interference does not necessarily have (only) negative effects, then there are a 
number of issues to consider. An open-minded search for a common ground is a 
good starting point for dealing with cultural conflicts. However, it is not clear that 
a common ground can always be found, and the prospect of acting against the will 
of at least some members of the cultural group can arise. In this context, it is also 
important to distinguish between humanitarian assistance as a narrowly defined 
activity aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering, on one hand, and the task 
of more comprehensive social change, on the other. While the argument in the 
previous two chapters has been that the principles of humanitarian assistance, 
humanity and impartiality, should be affirmed in the context of humanitarian 
assistance narrowly defined (as the business of saving lives and alleviating 
suffering), the argument has also been that humanitarians should not seek to 
interfere with the societies in which they operate beyond what is necessary simply 
to carry out their primary tasks.
Having made these general remarks on the kinds of issues that respect for culture 
raises in humanitarian policy and practice, let me now turn to discussing some 
concrete methods for addressing the issue of culture in the context of 
humanitarian aid operations.
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EXISTING TOOLS FOR DEALING WITH CULTURAL ISSUES IN 
HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE
On the level of policy, most aid organisations working on international 
humanitarian assistance today pay at minimum lip service to the importance of 
being aware of the local cultural and social context. Perhaps the best-known 
expression of this sentiment has been the Code o f Conduct's commitment to 
‘respect for culture and customs’. Suggestions of how to go about putting these 
principles into practice are harder to come by, however. In this context, three 
programming and training tools, the UNHCR’s People-Oriented Planning 
approach, the same organisation’s Handbook for Emergencies, and the broad- 
based Sphere Project can be identified as going relatively far in taking concrete 
steps to incorporate cultural issues into their approach. The People-Oriented 
Planning approach, as well as the UNHCR and Sphere handbooks each provide 
excellent starting points for approaching the issue of culture and customs in 
international humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of 
how these documents address the issue of culture). At the same time, they also 
have their limitations.
Out of the existing tools for planning humanitarian aid programmes, the People- 
Oriented Planning approach provides perhaps the most detailed example of what a 
framework for analysing a broad set of social factors -  including culture and 
customs -  that can contribute to the needs of the recipient population might look 
like in practice. The broad categories of interrelated factors identified by People- 
Oriented Planning include, among others, community norms, social hierarchies,
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family and community power structures (including protection mechanisms for 
women and children); economic activity (including division of labour according 
to gender); religious beliefs and practices; demographic considerations; attitudes 
of recipients to aid workers; and (in the case of recipients that are refugees) 
attitudes to refugees in both the country of origin and the receiving country. 
Conducting an assessment of this kind at the outset of an aid operation will help to 
identify cultural issues that are relevant to the particular assistance situation. An 
advantage of the People-Oriented Planning approach is that it also locates cultural 
issues in the context of other, closely interrelated issues, rather than dealing with 
them in isolation.
The limitations of the People-Oriented Planning Approach as well as the UNHCR 
and Sphere handbooks include the fact that all (and in particular the UNHCR 
documents because of the organisation’s explicit refugee focus) have a tendency 
to deal exclusively with camp situations. As has frequently been pointed out in 
recent years, the question of setting up camps need not arise in all humanitarian 
assistance contexts, as people may either be able to remain at their homes or be 
housed together with a host population. Aid organisations, however, may often 
prefer the camp context as it means that they can have more control over the 
situation. Obviously, such control may have both positive and negative 
consequences, and in many humanitarian aid operations setting up camps may 
simply be unavoidable. The greater the extent to which aid organisations and aid 
workers ‘run the show’, however, the more likely it is that issues related to the 
local context, existing structures and practices -  including those related culture
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and customs -  are relegated to the back-seat. As one practitioner expressed this 
problem,
[tjraditional humanitarian action has been very substitutive in its approach, 
especially since Yugoslavia and all the big UN operations. It has been very 
refugee focused, and what [UNJHCR does by definition, establish alternative 
administrative structures for people who have been radically displaced. That 
approach, [which] should be limited to a specific situation, seems to have 
permeated throughout humanitarian action. Under the rubric protection o f 
humanitarian space, protection o f the integrity o f humanitarian action, we have 
had great difficulty or we have justified not engaging with local community 
leaders or local community structures. And we find it extremely difficult to 
empower, to a certain extent, local communities in the provision o f humanitarian 
aid}
Even if it may be impossible to completely do away with the camps, however, 
making a concerted effort to involve the recipients of humanitarian aid and other 
stakeholders in decision-making at all stages of humanitarian assistance can 
provide a way of alleviating this problem. The use of participatory methods as a 
way of addressing cultural issues in humanitarian assistance will be discussed in 
more detail below.
A further problem with the approaches taken by People-Oriented Planning, the
2 Charles Petrie, UNDP New York, personal communication, 19 March 2002.
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UNHCR Handbook, and the Sphere Project in relation to cultural issues is that 
none of them makes explicit the distinction between those cultural and customary 
norms and practices that are either neutral or even beneficial in relation to the 
principles and practices of humanitarian assistance, and those that fundamentally 
challenge these basic principles. They each give examples of cases of both types, 
advising accommodation in some cases while in others advocating a strong stance 
against certain practices. Yet, they fail to make the reasoning behind taking the 
one or the other stance explicit, essentially leaving it to the intuition of the 
individual aid worker to decide which cases to accommodate and which to 
discourage. For example, the UNHCR Handbook asserts that ‘[cjulture and 
tradition cannot be used as reasons to exclude refugee women from participation 
in decision-making* but does not in any way explain why this might be the case.3 
Yet, aid workers will undoubtedly be faced with questions asking them to justify 
their position from various comers, not least the recipient population, when 
attempting to implement these guidelines. Also, they will likely have to deal with 
cases that do not directly correspond to examples given in the existing handbooks. 
In both cases, being able to trace the reasoning behind the position they are asked 
to take would seem to be of cmcial importance. Thus, these documents cannot 
really offer any guidance for situations where there is a cultural clash between the 
norms and practices of the recipients and those of the aid workers, what I have 
described as the ‘hard cases’ below.
Moreover, because of their broader focus, cultural considerations represent only
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook fo r  Emergencies (second
2 4 0
Chapter 5
one concern among many in the People-Oriented Planning approach, the UNHCR 
Handbook for Emergencies and the Sphere Project. ‘Mainstreaming’ cultural 
issues like this makes of course sense in the context of an operational manual -  
which the People-Oriented Planning approach, UNHCR’s Handbook for 
Emergencies and the Sphere Handbook essentially are -  that has to provide a 
balanced overview of the wide range of issues that may need to be simultaneously 
taken into account in the context of humanitarian operations. It also serves to 
locate cultural issues in a broader context and shows how they relate to other 
considerations. At the same time, this means that cultural considerations may not 
receive as detailed attention as they might require. Indeed, there are still very few 
‘culture check-lists’ or other specialised tools available for aid workers, compared 
to other cross-cutting issues such as gender or environment.4 While locating 
cultural issues in the broader context is undoubtedly necessary, they would benefit 
from being supplemented with specialist material as well.
Having made these remarks about the way in which the issue of culture is dealt 
with in the existing tools for humanitarian aid workers, let me now turn to 
examining the kinds of operational considerations that cultural issues raise for 
humanitarian policy and practice.
edition), Geneva, 2002, p. 115 (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
4 The only exception to this appears to be the checklist on cultural issues and sanitation that 
appears in the UNHCR Handbook fo r  Emergencies. See Ch. 2 (ibid.) for a discussion o f the 
contents of this checklist.
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BEING INFORMED ABOUT CULTURAL NORMS AND PRACTICES
As was argued in Chapter 3, the relationship between cultural norms and practices 
and the principles and practices of humanitarian aid can be either one of neutrality 
(i.e. the two do not influence one another), mutual benefit (i.e. the two positively 
reinforce one another) or conflict (i.e. the two cannot be simultaneously realised). 
In each of these cases, a different course of action may be required. For this 
reason, it is important that humanitarian aid workers and organisations become 
informed about the cultural norms and practices in their areas of operation in 
order to be able to evaluate their possible impact on their work.
When and how should cultural information be gathered in humanitarian aid 
operations? Cultural information can be gathered at all the stages in which 
information of other types is normally collected in the context of aid operations, 
i.e. at the beginning of the operation to assess needs; while the assistance 
programme is running to review progress and make adjustments if necessary; and 
in the end to evaluate whether the goals of the programme were reached. 
Likewise, in terms of methods, information about cultural issues can be gathered 
in much the same way as other relevant information is gathered, i.e. through 
surveys, interviews, household visits, and so on. Collecting information should 
also be viewed as a two-way process: on one hand, it provides the opportunity for 
aid workers to find out about cultural norms and practices that may have an 
impact on their work; on the other hand, it is also a chance to inform the recipients 
about what the aid organisations are doing, as well as to involve them in the
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process of decision-making. As Johan Pottier has observed, ‘[a]ccess to 
information is not only a right refugees should have, but also a strategy to prevent 
misinformation and over-reaction.’5
In principle, collecting cultural information could be either incorporated into all 
exercises of information gathering (i.e. ‘mainstreamed’) or it could be entrusted to 
people who have specifically been given this task. Both approaches have their 
advantages and disadvantages. Like in the case of other ‘cross-cutting issues’ such 
as gender or environmental effects, mainstreaming culture has the benefit of 
locating the relevant issues within a broader context and requiring everyone 
involved in the operation to give some consideration to the issues in question. At 
the same time, in practice mainstreaming often means that the issues that are 
‘mainstreamed* end up only being paid lip-service to and relegated to the back- 
bumer by people whose primary concerns lie elsewhere. By contrast, using 
‘cultural specialists’ means that culture will be given special attention in its own 
terms. The problem with the specialist approach, however, is that the work of the 
specialists often fails to be integrated into the larger whole and therefore has 
negligible effect. Thus, a combination of the two approaches would seem to be 
preferable to using either one in isolation.
What kind of issues should those collecting information about culture for the 
purposes of humanitarian aid focus on? While it has been one of the arguments of
5 Johan Pottier, ‘Why Aid Agencies Need Better Understanding of the Communities they Assist: 
The Experience of Food Aid in Rwandan Refugee Camps,’ Disasters (Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996), p.
327.
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this thesis that physiological or ‘basic’ needs cannot be said to possess some 
absolute or necessary universal priority, there are good reasons why they should 
be given priority in information gathering, as well as in humanitarian aid more 
generally. The most obvious one is that staying alive is a basic precondition for 
whatever else people may wish to do in this world, and therefore the most people 
can be assumed to want to survive, whatever else they may want. Another reason 
is their central role in the value system on which humanitarian assistance is based 
and therefore in its entire raison d'etre. Moreover, in more practical terms, 
humanitarian aid agencies arguably have a comparative advantage in this area 
through their expertise in ensuring survival and satisfying physiological needs. At 
the same time, they also have certain institutional features (e.g. relative lack of 
accountability) that would appear to make them less suited for more 
‘developmental’ tasks that seek to promote a more full-fledged conception of 
human welfare (see the last section of Chapter 4 for a discussion of these issues). 
For these reasons, and given that there are usually limited time and resources in an 
emergency context, it would seem to make sense to begin the exercise of 
information gathering by examining those cultural norms and practices that can be 
directly related to basic physiological needs (i.e. food, water, shelter, sanitation 
and medical care), broadening out if possible and as necessary.
When collecting information about cultural norms and practices, it is also 
important to pay attention to the stringency of, and/or degree of attachment to, the 
cultural norm or practice in question, distinguishing absolute taboos or 
requirements from preferences that may be less exacting. On one hand, this makes
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sense because in situations where there are insufficient resources to accommodate 
all cultural norms and practices (i.e. in most humanitarian aid operations) it may 
become necessary to rank cultural norms and practices both in terms of their 
stringency as well as their necessity in relation to physical survival/physiological 
needs. On the other hand, the stringency of a norm and its importance for survival 
may be decisive factors when deciding how to act in a situation where the norm in 
question conflicts with the principles of humanitarian assistance. Thus, while 
there is arguably a strong case to be made for finding ways to accommodate 
cultural norms and practices that are both essential to survival and highly stringent 
(e.g. certain food taboos or the requirement of gender-specific medical care in 
some cultural contexts) when providing humanitarian assistance (with the 
exception of certain ‘hard cases*, to be discussed below), cultural norms and 
practices that are either less exacting and/or less essential to survival can be 
accommodated to the extent that resources permit
It is also important to emphasise that it should not be assumed in advance that 
certain types of cultural norms or practices will play a particular role in relation to 
humanitarian assistance independent of context. For example, even seemingly 
trivial or innocuous activities or objects with apparently little or no significance to 
humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 3 for a more extended discussion of this 
issue), can especially in the context of an armed conflict have taken on a symbolic 
meaning which may have unpredictable effects on humanitarian aid. Thus, 
information gathering should be carried out for each area of operation separately, 
and experiences from one context should not be assumed to apply across the
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board.
After as much information as possible about the cultural norms and practices of 
the recipients has been gathered, it can be used for decision-making regarding 
how best to go about operationalising the norm of respect for culture and customs. 
It is worth emphasising, however, that gathering information about the culture and 
customs of the recipients should not only be a one-off event at the beginning of an 
aid operation, but rather a continuous process that feeds into programming at all 
stages, including adjustments where mistakes have been made or as the 
circumstances change. This is important not least because cultural norms and 
practices are not immutable but rather may be subject to change, both as a result 
of the humanitarian assistance itself as well as because of other factors.
As was mentioned above, there are many cases in which cultural norms and 
practices are beneficial or at least neutral in relation to humanitarian assistance, 
and thus can and should be supported by aid programmes. There are a number of 
different ways in which the cultural practices of the recipients can in practice be 
supported in the context of a humanitarian assistance operation. It is these that 
will be examined in the next section.
SUPPORTING CULTURAL PRACTICES IN THE HUMANITARIAN 
CONTEXT
Respect for culture can positively affect humanitarian assistance in a variety of 
ways. In some contexts, it may be necessary for aid to be successful at all, whilst
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in others, cultural appropriateness can add to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
humanitarian aid in various ways, as well as signalling respect for the recipients. 
These categories are of course not entirely separate; for example, the perception of 
respect can add to the effectiveness of aid through increasing the commitment of 
the recipients to the aid programme or enhancing the security of the aid workers. 
Thus, in many contexts, it makes sense for humanitarian aid workers and aid 
organisations to not only to tolerate but also actually to offer positive support for 
cultural practices.
In Chapter 3, three types of situations were identified where providing culturally 
appropriate assistance and/or supporting cultural practices can have a positive 
effect on humanitarian assistance. First, there are situations where culturally 
specific goods or services are so intimately connected with physical survival that 
the provision of assistance in a culturally appropriate form can been seen as 
inherently necessary for saving lives and/or meeting physiological needs. 
Examples cited in this context included certain food taboos and the requirement 
that women be treated only by female medical professionals in certain societies. 
Second, even if culturally appropriate assistance is not strictly necessary in many 
contexts, it can add to the effectiveness and efficiency of aid, even if looked at 
strictly from a cost-benefit point of view. Third, there are cases where cultural 
appropriateness, while neither necessary nor necessarily more efficient or 
effective, nonetheless has added psychological or emotional benefits over other 
forms of assistance.
2 4 7
Chapter 5
Arguably, in the context of humanitarian assistance, the primary way of 
supporting cultural norms and practices involves ensuring the cultural 
appropriateness (or at least not inappropriateness) of the provision for basic 
survival needs, namely food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical care. It is 
necessary to consider the effects of cultural factors and traditional practices on 
each of these functional areas separately. As the examples discussed in Chapter 2 
illustrate, out of the existing tools available for humanitarian aid workers the 
People-Oriented Planning approach has provided perhaps the most extensive set 
of concrete examples to-date on how cultural appropriateness can be ensured in 
each specific area of basic needs provision. Likewise, the UNHCR’s Handbook 
for Emergencies and the Sphere Handbook also provide useful examples in this 
regard.
Second, a number of different ways in which cultural appropriateness can enhance 
the effectiveness and efficiency of aid operations were outlined in Chapter 3. For 
example, culturally appropriate supplies can often be procured locally or 
regionally, which can help cut transport costs; providing the recipients with 
culturally appropriate supplies means that they can prepare their own food and 
construct their own shelters, and less personnel will have to be hired either to 
directly carry out these tasks or to teach the recipients how to use the unfamiliar 
supplies; the provision of supplies in a form familiar to and preferred by the 
recipients will also help prevent the diversion and trade of relief items, further 
contributing to the efficiency of aid; using existing distributive structures rather 
than creating duplicate ones may in many contexts be both the most cost-efficient
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and effective way of reaching the recipients; and finally, awareness of cultural 
norms and practices can also contribute to the security of the aid workers, through 
signalling respect to the recipients.
Third, while supporting cultural practices that are essential for physical survival -  
or at least make basic needs provision more effective and/or efficient -  may be of 
primary importance in a humanitarian aid operation, there are also many contexts 
in which support for cultural practices, while not strictly necessary for survival in 
a physiological sense, may help a community whose social rules, values and 
controls have been disrupted by the emergency to regain (at least something 
approaching) cultural normalcy, which may in turn contribute to the mental health 
of individual recipients and/or enable the recipients to re-build or develop their 
community. In particular in contexts where the recipients have been physically 
uprooted (i.e. in the case of refugees and IDPs), active support on the part of the 
aid workers and aid organisations may be a crucial factor in restoring cultural 
normalcy.6
Methods of this type of cultural support may include offering material support for 
the practice of religious or ritual activities; consulting and involving recipients 
(including their leaders) in decision-making; housing people in groupings similar 
to those they lived in at their place of origin; and ensuring the education of 
refugee or IDP children in their mother tongue.
6 The only document that I have been able to identify that addresses issues like these in the 
humanitarian context at any length is the UNHCR’s ‘Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection 
and Care’ (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
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The practice of religious and ritual activities is a central element in regaining 
cultural normalcy. Such activities may include religious festivals and rites of 
passage, such as birth, transition into adulthood, marriage and death. In recent 
years, aid organisations have become increasingly aware of the need to support 
such activities at least in certain contexts. For example, one observer notes that 
‘...the ability to carry out traditional burial practices is an important part of the 
process of coming to terms with bereavement and some agencies are beginning to 
recognise that the provision of less standard relief items, such as burial shrouds, 
may help ease the process’.7 Similarly, the Sphere Handbook includes 
‘[culturally appropriate burial cloth’ in its list of key indicators for the minimum 
standard for clothing.8 Also, the UNHCR’s guidelines on refugee children point 
out that ‘...the provision of extra food for communal meals, or other material 
assistance for funerals (burial cloths, coffins, firewood, etc.) can give vital 
emotional support and sustain culture through a crisis’.9 As the above quotes 
demonstrate, however, this issue is primarily addressed in the current practitioner 
literature in relation to funerals. While the emphasis on death may be 
understandable given the emergency context in which humanitarian assistance 
occurs, it seems equally important for mental health and community re-building to 
find ways of offering support also in the context of happier rites of passage, such
7 Bridget Byrne, Gender, Conflict and Development: Vol. 1, Overview. Report prepared at the 
request of the Netherlands’ Special Programme on WID, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bridge 
briefings on development and gender), 1996, p. 46.
8 The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards, Geneva: The Sphere 
Project, 2000, p. 193 (available at http://www.sphereproject.org).
9 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 3, p. 13.
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as birth or marriage, to the extent that resources permit.
In this context, it should be noted, however, that there may also be some religious 
or ritual activities that humanitarian aid organisations have difficulty condoning, 
let alone actively supporting. Perhaps the best-known example of such a practice 
may be female circumcision or female genital mutilation. This is an issue that will 
be discussed in more detail below in the section on hard cases and cultural 
conflicts.
Like religious or ritual activities, traditional artistic activities, sport or play can 
contribute to the mental health of the recipients by providing entertainment and 
relieving stress, as well as building community spirit. Humanitarian aid agencies 
can play a role in this context by encouraging the assisted population to continue 
to practice and train traditional skills in dance, music, other arts or games, as well 
as providing material support, where required, for such activities.
Involving the recipients of humanitarian assistance in the decision-making 
regarding the assistance they receive is another important way of regaining 
control over their lives in a crisis situation. Because of the centrality of this 
concern, and the complexity of the issues involved, a separate section below will 
be devoted to participatory methods. A special case of participation involves 
traditional leadership: the recipients of humanitarian assistance often have at least 
a part of their traditional leadership structure intact, even if they have been forced 
to flee their homes. Support for traditional leadership may in many contexts be an
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important element of cultural support: to the extent to which aid organisations 
consult and work through these leadership structures, they may both reinforce the 
status of traditional leaders as well as improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the delivery of aid. Where the community has lost its traditional leadership, it may 
also sometimes be necessary to assist in identifying new leaders.
There are some potential problems associated with aid organisations’ support for 
particular leaders (whether traditional or new), however, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the following section. In particular in internal conflicts, which 
after all constitute the majority of contemporary conflicts, what could be 
described as local leadership may either not exist at all or may only represent the 
interests of a part of the population. Indeed, the assumption of ‘conventional 
distinctions and benign interactions between people, army and government’ in the 
context of the new wars where these distinctions have become blurred has been 
questioned by a number of observers.10 As the discussion of Rwandan refugees in 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, supporting the existing leadership does not by definition 
contribute to the welfare of the population and each case should be carefully 
assessed.
Finally, other key measures of cultural support in the case of refugees and IDPs 
include enabling people who have been forced to flee to live in similar groupings 
as they did in their place of origin. Similarly, offering educational support for
10 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging o f  Development and 
Security, London: Zed Books, 2002, p. 100; see also Macrae et al., ‘Conflict, Continuum and 
Chronic Emergencies: A Critical Analysis of the Scope for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and
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refugee and IDP children in the use and maintenance of their mother tongue may 
be an important measure of cultural support
This section has sought to highlight ways in which humanitarian aid can offer 
concrete support to cultural and customary practices. However, in doing so, it has 
also raised a number of questions about contexts where offering such support may 
be difficult or even impossible. In the following section, such cases will be 
examined in more depth.
HARD CASES: DEALING WITH CULTURAL CONFLICTS
In many contexts, respect for cultural norms and practices is either neutral in 
relation to the principles and practices of humanitarian assistance, or may in fact 
positively contribute to the realisation the aims of humanitarian aid. However, aid 
workers and organisations need to be aware that cultural norms and practices can 
also run into conflict with the principles and practices of humanitarian assistance. 
Not all such conflicts are necessarily equally significant from the point of view of 
humanitarian aid and it may often be possible to simply work around them; 
nevertheless, humanitarians cannot easily ignore those cultural norms and 
practices that fundamentally challenge the basic principles of humanitarian 
assistance.
As was already explained in Chapter 3, such conflicts can take two primary forms:
Development Planning in Sudan, Disasters (Vol. 21, No. 3,1997), pp. 309-317.
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on one hand, cultural norms and practices may challenge the primacy that 
humanitarians tend to give to basic physiological needs (i.e. food, water, shelter, 
sanitation and medical care), for example giving the highest priority to religious 
needs or national honour instead. In practice, this can have serious implications 
for needs assessments, especially if they are conducted in a participatory manner. 
On the other hand, the conflicts may be about differing conceptions of just 
distribution. The distribution of humanitarian aid has traditionally been based on 
the principle of impartiality, according to which every human being is in principle 
entitled to aid, by virtue of their humanity alone, qualified only by the urgency of 
their (primarily physiological) needs. A cultural challenge to this principle can 
either take the form that -  on the basis of a cultural norm or practice -  some 
(groups) of people are either not considered to be entitled to assistance at all, or 
that criteria other than physiological need (e.g. gender, kinship, religious or ethnic 
affiliation, and so on; see the discussion on this topic in Chapter 3) should be used 
to decide how to distribute assistance. Again, depending on the degree that the 
recipients are involved in the distribution process, the implications for the 
distribution of assistance may be serious.
How should humanitarian aid workers and organisations then address such 
conflicts in operational contexts? It seems both ethically imperative and necessary 
from the point of view of effectiveness and efficiency of aid that efforts be made 
to resolve such conflicts, especially if and when they threaten the survival or 
immediate welfare of recipients. In the first instance, any apparent cultural 
conflict should of course be approached with an open mind: it may well be that
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what appears to be a conflict is in fact simply the result of a misunderstanding or 
lack of information. Thus, gathering more information from and engaging in 
dialogue with the recipients about the norms and practices that give rise to 
apparent conflicts is a necessary first step. Methods by which this can be done 
have been suggested above. Moreover, even where the conflict is deemed to be 
real rather than apparent, dialogue should be used to try and negotiate an 
agreement or a compromise. In this context, the use of conflict resolution experts 
as facilitators may be helpful. Where the dialogue yields no resolution to the 
conflict, however, humanitarians are faced with the difficult choice between 
asserting the humanitarian principles over the conflicting norms and practices, on 
one hand, or adopting a policy of non-interference in relation to them, on the 
other. Trying to impose the humanitarian principles on reluctant recipients -  even 
when it is done ostensibly for their own benefit -  seems difficult to justify in the 
contemporary world. Moreover, humanitarians usually have relatively few tools at 
their disposal to really ‘impose aid’ in practice even if they wished to do so 
(although the potentially coercive effects of the unequal power relations between 
the givers and recipients of aid should also not be overlooked in this context).
At the same time, while a stance of non-interference may seem both more 
practicable and more respectful of the self-determination of the recipients, 
humanitarians should not lose sight of the fact that cultural self-determination 
may sometimes occur at the expense of other forms of self-determination, such as 
that of women, which may be equally or more important. In other words, a policy 
of cultural non-interference may in some contexts mean that humanitarians
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actually make themselves complicit in what are essentially coercive practices. 
Thus, ‘respect for culture* to a point of non-interference may not always be the 
neutral, tolerant stance that it appears at first sight, but rather may have grave 
consequences for some segment of the population that humanitarian aid seeks to 
help. As was pointed out in Chapter 4, the interaction between culture and other 
factors, such as gender, is something that humanitarians need to be consciously 
aware of. As one practitioner interviewed for this thesis put it:
[tjhe issue o f culture is more awareness o f local realities and respect for local 
customs, and local leadership and local structures. It is respect as much for the 
people as it is for their beliefs. But then you have another side to this whole 
cultural question, which is the Taleban and the women, and how do you address 
that.11
As die above quote illustrates, one context in which humanitarians often 
experience conflicts between the principles and practices of humanitarian 
assistance, on one hand, and cultural norms and practices, on the other, is in 
relation to gender, and in particular the role and status of women. Gender roles 
form an important part of any culture, and in many cases there need not be any 
necessary conflict between respect for culture and gender issues in humanitarian 
assistance. Depending on how essential a particular norm is to physical survival, 
the stringency of the norm in question, as well as the availability of resources, 
humanitarian assistance may be able to accommodate many gender-specific
11 Charles Petrie, UNDP New York, personal communication, 19 March 2002.
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cultural norms or practices. For example, if there is a stringent cultural norm that 
women can only receive care from female medical personnel, it is usually possible 
to make female doctors and nurses available in sufficient numbers to attend, at 
minimum, to the essential medical needs of the females in a given population.
A fundamental conflict arises, however, when cultural or customary norms or 
practices dictate that women’s essential needs should either systematically be 
given lower priority than those of men, or even be ignored altogether, simply on 
the account of their gender. Such norms and practices are in an irreconcilable 
conflict with the idea that each human being is in principle equally entitled to 
humanitarian assistance, qualified only by the extent of his or her needs, 
expressed in the principles of humanity and impartiality. Depending on how the 
distribution of assistance is organised, such norms and practices may have a 
profound effect on the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance on women.
One concrete examples of a practice like this, cited in Chapter 4, is the fact that in 
many societies women customarily eat last and therefore usually the least, even 
where their needs may be equivalent to or even greater than those of men, for 
example as a result of pregnancy or breastfeeding. A somewhat different but 
related question is what stance should aid workers and organisations take on 
traditional practices that are considered harmful, such as ‘female circumcision’ or 
female genital mutilation. While such practices may not necessarily have direct 
implications for humanitarian assistance, the question of how they should be dealt 
with arises especially in camp contexts where aid organisations have some scope
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to influence the behaviour of the recipients.
In such situations, humanitarian aid workers and organisations are faced with 
difficult decisions, as it may not be possible simultaneously to respect culture and 
customs and act in accordance with die humanitarian principles. Moreover, 
situations like these are often further complicated by the fact that the affected 
women themselves may appear satisfied with and supportive of practices that 
from the humanitarian perspective appear oppressive. What can humanitarians 
then do to try to deal with cultural conflicts of this kind in practice? Innovative 
short-term solutions have been described in the literature. For example, Julie 
Mertus cites the example of
[a] resourceful aid worker in the Great Lakes Region o f Africa [who] solved the 
problem o f males hoarding food for themselves by changing the labelling on some 
o f the boxes o f biscuits to read “women ’s biscuits ”. When a rumour spread 
among the men that male consumers would grow breasts, women and girls 
suddenly had more to eat From then on, some aid organisations specifically 
targeted their food provisions, creating new kinds offemale-only food.12
Solutions like this may sometimes be necessary but they will obviously only work 
where the educational level of the recipients is relatively low; moreover, it is
12 Julie A. Mertus, War’s Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Afghanistan (with a case study by Judy A. Benjamin), Bloomsfeld, CT: Kumarian Press Inc.,
2000, p. 112.
2 5 8
Chapter 5
questionable whether resorting to such deception is not in principle unethical and 
in itself signify a fundamental lack of respect for the recipient population. In any 
case, if and when such deception is found out, it may destroy whatever trust may 
have existed between the aid workers and the recipients and thus have far- 
reaching consequences. More importantly, however, solutions like this will only 
address the specific problem at hand, rather than dealing with the broader issues 
associated with the problematic distributive practices.
Similarly, the existing programming tools, such as the Sphere Handbook, the 
People-Oriented Planning Approach and the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 
tend to identify and condemn certain practices, such as female genital mutilation 
or unequal food distributions based on gender, on what appear to be primarily 
health grounds. The focus on specific practices rather than on the issues of 
principle behind them may mean, however, that aid workers ignore practices with 
similar implications if they have not been specifically identified. Moreover, by 
focusing on individual practices only, the broader context within which these 
practices take place is ignored.
How can humanitarians then balance the concerns with respect for culture and 
gender issues in practice? In the previous two chapters, I have argued that, in the 
face of an intractable conflict between cultural norms and practices and the 
humanitarian principles, humanitarians should assert the humanitarian principles, 
humanity and impartiality, and offer their services to those who wish to accept it 
under these terms. Admittedly, this is not necessarily an easy position to take in
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practice, as it involves going against the norms or practices of at least some 
members of the cultural community in question. Ultimately, however, it is 
impossible for humanitarians to please everyone and their work will lose all its 
meaning if aid workers are infinitely flexible with regard to alternative value 
systems. Nonetheless, such situations should be approached with sensitivity and 
transparency. Informing the recipients of the aims of the humanitarian aid 
organisations, as well as offering support for those cultural activities that do not 
conflict with the humanitarian principles, convey respect that will soften the 
effects of going against local cultural norms in other instances. In addition, the use 
of participatory methods to the extent possible can also signal respect for the 
views of the beneficiaries. Moreover, they are useful in situations where it is not 
clear whether the conflict in question is an intractable one, as they provide a 
means for both collecting information and negotiating compromises. It is to them 
that I will turn in the next section.
PARTICIPATORY METHODS AND CULTURE
So far, I have focused on questions related to how cultural issues should be dealt 
with in humanitarian practice. In the two sections that follow, I will deal with 
issues related to who should deal with them. In the present section, I will focus on 
the role that the recipients themselves can play.
In order to address the problem of coercive cultural norms and practices, it would 
seem that the structures through which cultural and customary norms and
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practices come to be expressed in international humanitarian practice should at 
minimum be representative of a wide range of perspectives within each cultural 
community. In particular, it is important to identify groups that are particularly 
vulnerable to abuses of power and ensure that their views are represented. Such 
groups often include women, the elderly, children, disabled, as well as ethnic 
minorities. At the same time, it is important not to assume that any particular 
group is or is not vulnerable independent of a particular context.
One way to give voice to the different perspectives on cultural norms and 
practices among the recipients is through the use of the so-called ‘participatory 
methods’. Unlike on many of the other issues discussed in this chapter, there is a 
fairly extensive body of literature available on the use of participatory methods in 
international humanitarian aid.13 The humanitarian community has also voiced a 
commitment to participatory methods: for example, the Code o f Conduct states 
that ‘[w]ays shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the 
management of relief aid,’ and, according to the UNHCR’s mission statement, the 
organisation is ‘committed to the principle of participation by consulting refugees 
on decisions that affect their lives’.14 Indeed, what is something of a catchall
13 See, for example, Raymond Apthorpe and Philippa Atkinson, A Synthesis Study: Towards 
Shared Social Learning fo r  Humanitarian Programmes, ALNAP, 1999, p. 8 (available at 
http://www.alnap.org/pubs/pdfs/rashared.pdf); Tania Kaiser, ‘Participatory and Beneficiary-based 
Approaches to the Evaluation of Humanitarian Programmes,’ New Issues in Refugee Research, 
Working Paper No. 51, February 2002, Geneva: UNHCR (available via http://www.unhcr.ch); 
Pierson R. T. Ntata, ‘Participation by the Affected Population in Relief Operations: A Review of 
the Experience o f DEC Agencies during the Response to the 1998 Famine in South Sudan,' 
London: ALNAP, 1999 (available at http://www.alnap.org/pubs/pdfs/ntatafinal.pdf).
14 Code o f  Conduct fo r  the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (available via http://www.ifrc.org); 
UNHCR Mission statement (available via http://www.unhcr.ch).
261
Chapter 5
category of ‘participatory methods’ represents currently the primary way of 
involving the recipients in the decision-making about humanitarian aid.
In principle, it is possible to use participatory methods at all stages of 
humanitarian assistance -  from planning through implementation and monitoring 
to evaluation. Possible participatory methods include formal representation by 
traditional or elected leaders, interviews with key informants, household visits, 
focus group discussions, surveys, establishing committees of affected people, and 
the employment of affected people in the programmes (especially in decision­
making positions).
Unlike in development assistance where participatory methods have long ago 
become an established practice, and despite the normative commitments to the 
contrary, the use of participatory methods is yet to obtain a firm foothold in 
humanitarian practice. It has been pointed out that ‘[tjhough ‘participation’ has 
become a buzzword among governments and development agencies, not much has 
changed on the ground. This is more so in refugee and returnee situations’.15 This 
conclusion is underscored by the fact that, in a synthesis study of 250 
humanitarian aid programme evaluation reports on the ALNAP (Active Learning 
Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance16)
15 Gaim Kibreab, ‘The Consequences of Non-Participatory Planning: Lessons form a Livestock 
Provision Project to Returnees in Eritrea,’ Journal o f  Refugee Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2,1999), p.
136.
16 ALNAP is an interagency humanitarian forum ‘dedicated to improving the quality and 
accountability of humanitarian action, by sharing lessons; identifying common problems; and, 
where appropriate, building consensus on approaches’; for more information, see 
http://www.alnap.org/.
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database, Apthorpe and Atkinson discovered that ‘only a few of these evaluations 
comment on the issues of consultation, and few are themselves participatory’.17
Of course, a number of factors limit the way in which participatory methods -  
most of which were originally developed for development assistance programmes 
in stable contexts -  can be imported into humanitarian assistance.18 These include 
an operational context that is often chaotic, the need to take decisions rapidly, and 
the limits for action presented by the available ‘humanitarian space*.19 In 
situations of armed conflict, these factors are likely to be compounded with a 
volatile security situation and the need to take into account the protection needs of 
the affected population. In addition, in some contexts the expectations of the 
recipients may not be reconcilable with those of the aid workers and/or donors. 
For one, many donors are only concerned with ‘upward accountability’ (i.e. 
accountability to themselves) and thus do not require the use of participatory 
methods. Taking participatory methods seriously also means that aid workers 
themselves will have to be willing to relinquish at least some of the control. In 
refugee situations, host governments may also be hostile to the use of 
participatory methods, again perhaps for the fear of loss of control. Additional 
arguments against participatory methods include: the concern that informants may
17 Apthorpe and Atkinson, op. cit., in note 13, p. 8.
18 See Kaiser, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 14-16.
19 ‘Humanitarian space’ reftiS to the -  primarily physical -  space within which humanitarian aid 
agencies are able to operate and have access to recipients in the context of a given aid operation. 
Humanitarian space may be constrained intentionally (e.g. roadblocks, attacks on aid personnel or 
convoys) or as a result of poor infrastructure or climatic factors (e.g. the rainy season making 
roads unpassable). See Alistair Hallam, ‘Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in 
Complex Emergencies,’ RRN Good Practice Review No. 7, September 1998, London: ODI.
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be at risk in conflict situations, as well as that beneficiary populations cannot be 
trusted to provide accurate information for fear of losing assistance, that there is a 
lack of methodological know-how on participatory methods in a humanitarian 
context, and that there are often logistical obstacles that are too great to overcome 
for the sake of beneficiary involvement.20 Together, all these factors may work 
against the widespread use of participatory methods in international humanitarian 
assistance.
The case to be made in favour of participatory methods is, however, at least 
equally strong. In addition to the protection against ‘tyranny of others’ that 
participatory methods offer, they can also more generally contribute to better 
decision-making by providing information about the recipients that might 
otherwise be difficult to obtain. For example, it has been reported that during the 
1998 famine in Sudan,
[p]articipation enabled agency staff to understand important social differences 
among different ethnic groups. This prevented the formulation o f standardised 
programmes which could lead to conflicts among the groups. For example, two 
different social groupings can be identified among the Dinkas. Although they 
speak the same language the Agar and the Gok have substantially different 
cultural orientations with respect to gender. One group has no problem with 
strangers talking to their women while the other will not allow it.21
20 See Kaiser, op. cit., in note 13, p. 15.
21 Ntata, op. cit., in note 13, p. 32.
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Participatory methods also have the added benefit of handing some of the 
responsibility for their welfare over to the recipients themselves. This can help 
prevent dependency and assist in developing skills that will enable the recipients 
to rebuild their lives after the emergency assistance phase is over. Thus, 
participation can provide a concrete means for realising the relief-development 
continuum,22 which is today accepted by most aid organisations as an important 
goal. Moreover, the use of participatory methods is also in itself an indication of 
respect and dignity accorded to the people affected by a disaster.
In addition to the problems associated with translating the talk about participatory 
methods into action in humanitarian assistance, however, there may be a further 
problem associated with participatory methods, or at least the way in which they 
are currently being dealt with in the humanitarian context Involving the recipients 
in the decision-making about aid is obviously a positive step in more than one 
respect; indeed, it is perhaps testimony to the inherent paternalism of 
humanitarian aid that the involvement of recipients has only recently even been 
talked about, let alone acted upon. At the same time, simply promoting 
participation in whatever form may gloss over certain important distinctions. 
Participation, or the fact that a broad range of views are represented in a decision­
making process, on its own says little or nothing about how these different points
22 Relief-development continuum refers to the idea that relief assistance should positively 
contribute to, or at least not hinder, post-emergency development and, vice versa, that 
development assistance should strengthen, or at least not diminish, disaster prevention and 
preparedness (see the Introduction to this thesis for a more extended discussion of the issues at 
stake).
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of view ought to contribute to reaching actual decisions. In particular, it leaves 
what are arguably the two central questions in politics, i.e. how should conflicting 
interests be dealt with and scarce resources allocated, unanswered. Indeed, if we 
look at domestic politics under normal circumstances, most political systems with 
the exception of certain dictatorships can be characterised as being at least to 
some extent ‘participatory* in the sense that different interests are voiced in 
various ways; it is, however, precisely the manner in which these different 
interests are accommodated in political decision-making that distinguishes 
between different types of political systems and enables us to evaluate their 
advantages and disadvantages. Of course, humanitarian assistance is in many 
important respects not identical with domestic politics under normal 
circumstances, and many reasons can be given for why humanitarian aid 
organisations should not even seek to take over the role of the domestic 
government (see e.g. the final section of Chapter 4 on this). At the same time, it 
seems important that, if aid organisations are serious about using participatory 
methods, they carefully examine the implications of the different types of methods 
for their decision-making. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research that 
addresses this question in the humanitarian context; yet, this would seem to be 
something that clearly warrants further investigation even if it cannot be dealt 
with adequately in the context of the present analysis.
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CULTURAL ISSUES IN EMPLOYING AND TRAINING 
HUMANITARIAN AID WORKERS
‘National personnel will play an important role because of their cultural 
knowledge and understanding of the refugees.’23
‘Familiarity with the local culture, patterns of disease and the public health 
services and previous experience in emergencies are as important as an advanced 
knowledge of medicine and medical techniques.’24
Participatoiy methods can be used to harness the capacities of the recipients and 
those affected by the emergency for the purposes of information and decision­
making regarding cultural issues. That participatory methods come to be used in 
the first place, however, requires both individual aid workers and aid 
organisations to be aware of the significance of local context, including cultural 
issues, for their work. Moreover, participatory methods are not the only way in 
which humanitarian aid can be made more attuned to cultural issues, and in some 
contexts their use may be difficult or even impossible. For this reason, 
participation should be supplemented by other methods. It is thus equally 
significant to consider ways in which aid workers who are more aware of cultural 
and customary issues can be employed and trained.
In dealing with functional matters such as health care or nutrition, it tends to be
23 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 3, p. 110 (emphasis added).
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fairly clear whose primary responsibility it is to collect information and contribute 
to decision-making regarding them. For each of these functionally specific areas, 
humanitarian aid organisations employ specialists, such as doctors, nurses and 
other health care professionals, nutritionists, water and sanitation engineers, and 
so on. Responsibilities are much more difficult to allocate, however, when it 
comes to issues like culture that cut across virtually all functional areas that make 
up humanitarian assistance. In principle, there are two basic ways of taking 
culture and customs into account in the selection and hiring of aid workers. First, 
aid organisations can seek to employ people (whether foreign or local) who have 
specialised expertise on the culture and customs of the region; second, they can 
train existing aid workers in methods that enable them to understand cultural 
issues better. The contrast here is similar to that between using ‘gender 
specialists’ or ‘gender mainstreaming’.
The role of cultural experts or specialists would be to research and inform the 
organisation about local traditions and structures in the areas where they operate. 
Such experts could include anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political 
scientists, or others with specialised cultural knowledge. The problem with this 
approach, at least if it is used on its own, is that such experts may not always be 
aware of the other contextual and structural issues faced by aid workers in their 
work. As one practitioner put it: ‘[political scientists, anthropologists, or 
sociologists] should first have their years in the field or should go to the field, and 
then become part of the process, and the same goes for humanitarian practitioners,
24 Ibid., p. 183 (on the issue of hiring specialised health staff; emphasis added).
2 6 8
Chapter 5
they should regularly step out and find ways to do some reflection and thinking’.25 
Thus, ideally, experts would spend time in the field before taking on posts as 
advisors to humanitarian aid organisations, and/or humanitarian practitioners 
should receive training in the political, anthropological, historical and sociological 
dimensions of the issues that they face in the field. It is also possible to approach 
this issue by hiring staff locally and regionally rather than Northern expatriate 
staff wherever possible, with the hope that, in addition to their professional 
expertise, the local employees will bring to their work an understanding of the 
local structures and traditions. The conscious emphasis on hiring local staff is in 
fact something which many aid organisations, such as the IFRC, have already 
started to do 26
When using outside experts, humanitarians also need to be aware that different 
academic disciplines and schools of thought within disciplines frame problems 
differently, which may mean that they also come up with radically different 
solutions. For example, cultural anthropologists tend, by definition, to focus on 
cultural differences between groups of people. By contrast, the life science 
disciplines (medicine, nutrition, and so on) tend to emphasise what people have in 
common. Ideally, the two perspectives can complement one another to create a 
fuller picture, but the potential for conflict between different disciplinary 
approaches and schools of thought within disciplines should also not be 
underestimated.
25 Henk van Goethem, ReachOut Project, IFRC Geneva, personal communication, 23 September 
2002.
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The problem with hiring locally is that it is not always possible to do so, either 
because the necessary professional skills may not always be available within a 
given area, or because in some situations (in particular during armed conflict) it 
may be necessary for aid workers to be (or be perceived to be) neutral outsiders. 
In addition, many aid organisations may also find it detrimental to their 
fundraising ‘back home’ if fewer experts from the donor countries will be 
involved in their emergency operations. Even in our allegedly globalised world, 
the importance of being able to provide media footage of, for example, Finnish 
aid workers arriving at a disaster zone with Finnish transport planes should not be 
under-estimated, especially for organisations relying on donations from the 
general public. Thus, both the use of local (whether they be members of the 
assisted population or not) and outside experts have their own limitations and are 
thus perhaps best seen as complementing one another, rather than as alternatives.
So far I have discussed the advantages and disadvantages associated with using 
‘cultural specialists’, whether local or foreign. Let me now turn to the issue of 
‘mainstreaming culture’ for all aid workers. On the basis of what has been said so 
far, it seems important that the training that aid workers receive, whatever their 
area of expertise, explicitly draws their attention to cultural issues. Offering aid 
workers courses specifically focusing on cultural issues, intercultural 
communication, and so on, may be useful. At the same time, it is important that 
the issues raised in such training are clearly related to principles and practices of
26 John Watt, IFRC Geneva, personal communication, 24 September 2002.
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humanitarian assistance and, in particular, possible ways of supporting cultural 
norms and practices as well as approaching potential conflicts in the course of 
their work are explicitly addressed.
Until now, I have mainly focused on situations where the culture of the recipients 
is very different from that of the aid workers and the questions that arise in such 
contexts. It should also be noted that there may be additional considerations to be 
taken into account in situations where there is a high degree of cultural closeness 
between the aid workers and the recipients of aid, as has been the case for 
example in the recent operations in the Balkans. For example, according to one 
European practitioner posted to Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, ‘[ajfter so many 
years of seeing African misery, you are confronted with people who could be 
members of your own family. It makes a big psychological difference, as it is 
easier to identify with these people. Their concepts of life are European, so there 
is a danger of becoming too emotionally involved’.27 According to this aid 
worker, becoming ‘too involved’ meant that individual aid workers focused 
excessively on the needs of certain individuals at the expense of those of many 
others. Indeed, this problem may extend well beyond the attitudes of individual 
aid workers: the Kosovo aid effort in particular -  as well as the Balkans aid 
operations more generally -  was able to attract an unprecedented amount of 
interest (and therefore resources) from donors, aid organisations, and the general 
public alike. By comparison, arguably much more severe humanitarian 
emergencies (both in terms of the number of people affected and the level of their
27 Alex Brans, field officer for Merlin, quoted in Rebecca Johnson, ‘Humanitarian Resources:
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needs), e.g. the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have become 
relatively ‘forgotten crises’. While self-interested considerations, such as the 
geographic proximity of these crises and their potential effects on regional 
stability in Europe (e.g. through large refugee outflows) undoubtedly played a role 
in spurring this interest, the significance of cultural similarities and the ability of 
the donors/helpers to identify with the victims should not be underestimated. 
Another problem that aid organisations faced in the Balkans was that the pre- 
conflict standard of living had been relatively high, and thus the population had 
needs (e.g. for diabetes or heart disease medications) that humanitarian aid 
agencies were unused to providing for and therefore failed to anticipate, having 
primarily gained their experience of large scale refugee operations in developing 
countries.28
Finally, it is also important to remember that coercive practices may not only be a 
problem within the recipient population. As the UNHCR’s ‘Refugee children: 
Guidelines on Protection and Care’ points out: ‘[t]he instability and uncertainty 
which characterizes many refugee populations makes them extremely vulnerable 
to coercion by agencies and individuals wishing to impose alien religious 
beliefs’.29 For this reason, in selecting aid workers, as well as choosing agencies 
as operational partners (in the case of organisations such as the UNHCR and 
others that carry out much of their work through their partners), it is important to
Training the Kosovo Aid Workers,’ People Management (15 July 1999), p. 36.
28 See Rebecca Johnson, ‘Humanitarian Resources: Training the Kosovo Aid Workers,’ People 
Management (15 July 1999), pp. 36-37.
29 UNHCR, op. cit., in note 6.
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ascertain how the aid workers and agencies in question intend to relate to the 
culture and religion of the recipient community. Indeed, as was already argued in 
Chapter 2, aid workers would probably benefit more generally from being 
sensitised to the cultural specificity of many of their own beliefs and practices.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to shed some light on the kinds of 
operational considerations that the norm of ‘respect for culture and customs’ 
raises in the context of humanitarian assistance. The chapter started by examining 
some overall issues that respect for culture raises for humanitarian policy and 
practice. In the second section, some of the limitations of the existing tools for 
dealing with cultural issues in humanitarian practice were examined. The third 
section addressed the kinds of considerations that humanitarian aid workers need 
to take into account when seeking to inform themselves about the cultural and 
customary practices in their areas of operation. The fourth section discussed the 
ways in which humanitarians could offer support for the cultural practices of the 
recipient population, while the fifth section addressed the question how 
humanitarians should deal with those situations where the culture of the recipients 
conflicts with the basic principles of humanitarian aid. The sixth section discussed 
the ways in which recipient participation in humanitarian assistance could help 
humanitarians to address cultural issues, while the final section addressed the role 
of cultural issues in the context of hiring and training aid workers.
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The aim of this chapter has been to offer an outline of the spectrum of operational 
considerations that ‘respect for culture’ raises for humanitarian assistance. On the 
basis of the discussion here, it is possible to identify a number of areas for further 
research: for one, concrete methods for gathering information about cultural 
issues and taking culture into account in the training and hiring of aid workers 
could be examined in much greater detail than has been possible here. In addition, 
as was already suggested above, it would be important to study the advantages 
and drawbacks of different types of participatory methods in adjudicating between 
conflicting needs and interests and deciding on how scarce resources should be 
allocated in the humanitarian context; this is something that has implications for 
humanitarian aid more generally, beyond the question of culture.
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Before discussing its substantive conclusions, let me first make a few remarks 
about the process of the writing of the thesis. Both the subject matter and the 
chosen methodology presented certain challenges for this thesis:
In terms of the subject matter, it quickly became clear as I started my research that 
the existing academic literature on the issue of culture in international 
humanitarian assistance was extremely sparse. On one hand, this presented an 
opportunity to make a genuine contribution to knowledge in an area where little 
had been said so far; on the other hand, it also meant that there was relatively little 
existing material to work with. Thus, I have largely had to try to reconstruct the 
kinds of counter-arguments that could be made against the positions taken in this 
thesis, rather than being able to position myself in relation to other authors as is 
normally the case. For this reason, some potential counter-arguments have 
undoubtedly been overlooked. This is a problem, however, that only further 
research into this topic can ultimately remedy.
Moreover, in terms of methodology, it was important to me from the outset that 
the thesis would not only make an academic contribution but that it would also 
have something concrete to say for the purposes of humanitarian practice and 
policy. Having worked for a humanitarian aid organisation myself, I know that aid 
workers often have to take positions on cultural and customary issues in their day- 
to-day work. At the same time, they rarely if ever have the time to consider the
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different dimensions of this issue -  or indeed any individual aspect of their work -  
at any length. By contrast, examining a narrow slice of something in great detail is 
precisely what a doctoral thesis is supposed to do; thus, one of my aims in writing 
this thesis was to use the tools of political theory to shed light on the implications 
of ‘respect for culture and customs* for humanitarian practice. At times, however, 
it turned out to be more difficult than expected to balance theoretical analysis and 
a practice/policy orientation within a single piece of writing and, in some ways, 
the outcome would no doubt be ‘neater’ if I had either sought to write a purely 
theoretical piece or a policy-oriented one with a specific case study/studies, rather 
than trying to do some of both.
Having made these brief remarks about the process of the writing of the thesis, let 
me now turn to its content:
The starting-point of this thesis was the observation that, since the mid-1990s, the 
international humanitarian aid community has increasingly become concerned 
with respect for the culture and customs of the recipients of humanitarian 
assistance. Evidence of this concern can be traced in aid agencies* statements of 
principle, such as the Code o f Conduct, as well as operational guidelines, such as 
the Sphere Handbook and the People-Oriented Planning approach. On one hand, 
this concern can be seen as reflecting the interest in the normative status of culture 
and community in social and political thought more generally that emerged 
around the same time; on the other, it also represents the recognition of the 
problems that have emerged in humanitarian aid operations when culture and
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customs have been inadequately taken into account. At the same time, surprisingly 
little analysis has been devoted either by practitioners or by academics to the full 
conceptual and practical consequences of respect for culture for international 
humanitarian assistance. The purpose of this thesis has therefore been to examine 
the implications of the emerging norm of respect for culture and customs for the 
principles and policies of international humanitarian assistance. This task was 
tackled in five steps:
First, I presented a sketch of the existing normative framework underpinning 
international humanitarian assistance. This normative framework is expressed in a 
range of documents, including international legal documents, interagency 
agreements on principles, as well as the statements of principle of individual 
humanitarian aid agencies. The argument was that, out of the principles standardly 
referred to in the humanitarian context, namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality 
and independence, only humanity and impartiality could be said to be both 
fundamental in a normative sense and as a matter of fact shared by the majority of 
humanitarian aid organisations. Thus, these two principles could be taken to 
constitute the core of the normative framework underpinning contemporary 
international humanitarian assistance. Briefly described, humanity can be defined 
as the call to save lives and alleviate suffering, whereas impartiality is a 
distributive principle which defines every human being as in principle entitled to 
humanitarian assistance, conditioned only by the extent of his or her needs. It was 
also pointed out that, while these principles were originally justified with 
reference to Christian beliefs, in the contemporary world, their foundations have
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become much more uncertain -  something which has also no doubt contributed to 
the emergent emphasis on ‘respect for culture and customs’, as opposed to an 
unqualified assertion of the humanitarian doctrine.
Second, I described the emergence of the norm of respect for culture and customs 
in the humanitarian context through an examination of legal documents, aid 
organisations’ statements of principle, and operational guidelines, as well as 
academic literature. While culture and customs had, prior to the 1990s, in the 
humanitarian context been understood primarily as pertaining to the freedom of 
religion and the right to a culturally appropriate education, evidence from 
operational guidelines such as the UNHCR’s People-Oriented Planning approach 
and the interagency Sphere Project clearly demonstrates that contemporary 
humanitarian aid organisations and practitioners see the significance of culture in 
the context of humanitarian aid much more broadly. In particular, in these 
contemporary documents, culture is treated as something that must be 
systematically taken account in the provision of basic survival needs (i.e. food, 
water, sanitation, shelter and medical care). Increasingly, attention is also being 
paid to implications of the interrelationship between gender roles and culture in 
the humanitarian context.
While these are clearly positive developments, there appears nonetheless to be in 
the contemporary literature by and for humanitarian practitioners an inadequate 
understanding of culturally-specific norms and practices as something that both 
the recipients of humanitarian assistance and the aid workers themselves possess.
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While the recipients’ cultural norms and practices are recognised as presenting 
both opportunities and obstacles for humanitarian assistance, humanitarian aid 
organisations and aid workers are themselves usually presented as being somehow 
‘culturally neutral’. Furthermore, the fact that the humanitarian principles may run 
into conflict with certain cultural norms and practices appears not yet to be 
adequately recognised by the humanitarian community. For example, while 
certain cultural norms or practices (e.g. ones that disadvantage women or female 
children in terms of access to humanitarian aid) are frequently identified in the 
operational guidelines examined in this thesis as problematic, this divergence with 
the principle of impartiality is never addressed in a systematic manner.
Moreover, although the above-mentioned problems are to some extent at least 
recognised in the emerging body of academic literature on culture and 
international humanitarian assistance, at the moment, this remains a very small 
and somewhat uneven body of literature, both in terms of its content as well as the 
depth in which the implications of culture for humanitarian assistance are 
considered. In this regard, it is clear that there is much scope for further research, 
both on the issue of culture in the humanitarian context on a conceptual level, as 
well as in terms of concrete case studies on how cultural issues are played out in 
the context of specific humanitarian aid operations.
Third, I proposed a typology of the different kinds of relationships that may exist 
between respect for cultural norms and practices, on one hand, and the 
humanitarian principles, on the other. For one, many cultural norms and practices
2 7 9
Conclusions
simply do not come into contact with the humanitarian principles and thus are 
either neutral or irrelevant in relation to them. In other contexts, by contrast, 
deeply embedded cultural norms or customs may become so intimately connected 
with physical survival that it is not possible to distinguish between a particular, 
culturally appropriate (or, in the case of taboos, not inappropriate) form of basic 
needs provision, on one hand, and physiological requirements, on the other. In 
addition, there are also cases where -  while not strictly necessary for physical 
survival -  cultural appropriateness can improve the effectiveness or efficiency of 
humanitarian assistance. While the first type of relationship requires no action 
from the part of humanitarian aid workers, the next two point to the benefits -  and 
at times even necessity -  of culturally appropriate humanitarian aid. What all 
these three types of relationship have in common is that, in each of them, cultural 
norms and practices are basically in harmony with the principles and practices of 
humanitarian assistance. It is, however, also possible that cultural norms and 
practices run into conflict with the humanitarian principles. In principle, such 
conflicts may occur either in relation to conceptions of needs or their relative 
order of priority, on one hand, or with regard to conceptions of just distribution, 
on the other. In other words, while humanitarians have traditionally given priority 
to saving lives and alleviating physical suffering, as well as seeing every human 
being as in principle entitled to humanitarian aid (proportionate to their needs), it 
is conceivable that, by pledging to respect culture and customs, humanitarians 
may open themselves up to claims, made on cultural and customary grounds, that 
they ought to give priority to other types of needs and/or use different distributive 
criteria.
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Fourth, I examined different ways of dealing with such potential conflicts between 
various cultural norms and practices, on one hand, and humanitarian principles 
and practice, on the other. In this context, I suggested that a set of complementary 
approaches to be adopted. In the first instance, it makes sense to approach any 
apparent cultural conflicts in the spirit of inquiry, trying to establish whether it 
may not in fact be possible to identify shared norms amidst the apparent conflict. 
Moreover, even if no pre-existing shared values can be identified, it may be 
possible to negotiate an agreement about values that both sides can accept. In 
addition to these two alternatives, however, it is also necessary to take into 
account the possibility that there may be value conflicts where no relevant shared 
values can be identified, nor does the possibility of a negotiated agreement exist.
In such situations of irresolvable value conflict, it would seem that humanitarians 
can do little but adopt a policy of non-interference, offering their services only to 
those with whom a common ground can be established. What makes a crucial 
difference in this context, however, is whether the policy of non-interference is 
adopted in relation to cultural communities, i.e. groups of people, in their entirety, 
or the individual members of such communities. The problem with the former 
approach is that it renders humanitarians vulnerable to becoming complicit in 
coercive practices that may be perpetuated in the name of ‘culture and customs’. 
This is because amongst the membership of any cultural group, there are likely to 
be various contested versions of the culture rather than just a single one. Although 
it may at first sight appear a ‘culturally neutral’ approach, by accepting the
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version of the culture represented by its leadership, or any other faction of the 
group, humanitarians will in effect be taking sides in favour of one interpretation 
of the culture in question and against others. In some situations, such side-taking 
may have negligible effects (e.g. when it comes to something like food 
preferences). Nevertheless, where cultural or customary norms fundamentally 
conflict with the humanitarian principles, i.e. in cases where the allegedly cultural 
norms or practices involve the rejection of either the importance of staying alive, 
or the equal distribution of life-saving assistance, the question of personal consent 
becomes particularly significant. After all, choosing death or physical suffering 
for oneself is something entirely different from choosing death or suffering for 
someone else.
Thus, the argument adopted in this thesis is that humanitarians ought to offer their 
services, on the basis of their traditional principles, to those persons who seek 
their assistance, even where this appears to go against cultural norms or practices 
of the cultural community of which these persons are members. Moreover, the 
assistance should be offered on an equal basis to each person, in line with the 
principle of impartiality, and irrespective of any alternative conceptions of 
distribution. For one, impartiality, and the moral equality of persons that it 
implies, is a central element in the normative framework of international 
humanitarian assistance and for that reason alone ought not to be easily 
compromised in the face of conflicting cultural norms or practices. Moreover, 
insofar as we accept the view of values as human creations (as opposed to being 
based on divine will or some such thing), the argument about moral equality of
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persons as a foundational moral principle appears to be the most plausible 
conclusion.
While reaffirming the status of the traditional humanitarian principles in the 
context of humanitarian assistance narrowly defined (i.e. involving the saving of 
lives and the alleviation of physical suffering), however, I also argued that 
humanitarians should refrain from taking on projects of more far-reaching social 
change. On one hand, humanitarians simply do not have the resources to 
undertake activities aimed at broad restructuring of the societies in which they 
intervene, at least not without material cost to their core tasks, i.e. saving lives and 
alleviating suffering; moreover, outspoken criticism of existing arrangements may 
in fact prevent humanitarians from undertaking these core tasks in the form of 
denial of access. On the other hand, it is a question of other institutions, in 
particular the state and the states system as a whole, being more suited to the task 
of instigating fundamental social change: by contrast, humanitarian aid 
organisations are a diverse collection of actors that lack the sufficient 
accountability to make decisions regarding human welfare beyond the core tasks 
of saving lives and alleviating suffering.
Fifth, I made some remarks about how respect for culture and customs could be 
put to practice in the context of humanitarian aid operations. In this context, I first 
discussed the kinds of issues that humanitarians need to take into account when 
collecting information about the cultural norms and practices in the environments 
where they operate. Ways of offering the recipients of humanitarian assistance
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‘cultural support’ were also suggested. I also discussed the practical implications 
of situations where cultural norms and practices run into conflict with the values 
of humanitarian assistance. In addition, the significance of recipient participation 
at all stages of the assistance process for the realisation of ‘respect for culture’ 
was addressed. Finally, I made some remarks about cultural considerations in the 
hiring and training of humanitarian aid workers.
In many ways, the focal point for this thesis has been the case of the ‘dead’ widow 
cited in the Introduction. For one, it was the troubling nature of this example that 
provided the major impetus for me to carry out this research. Moreover, when 
presenting my argument to an audience, it has been this example that has tended 
to have the most profound effect on people’s view on the proper place of respect 
for culture in humanitarian aid. This is perhaps because most liberal, tolerant 
people (which most humanitarians after all tend to be) instinctively see respect for 
culture in a thoroughly positive light, and it is only examples like this (and in 
general the relationship between status of women and cultural norms) that bring 
the potential negative implications of an unthinking, blanket application of the 
principle of ‘respect for culture’ into a sharp relief. For this reason, it also seemed 
important to devote an entire chapter specifically to the issue of gender, even if 
the normative issues dealt with are not entirely dissimilar to those in the previous 
chapter (although the gender chapter also serves to work out the argument in 
relation to the principle of impartiality).
As stated in the Introduction, one of the main purposes of this thesis has been to
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provide humanitarians with some tools with which to approach ‘cultural’ 
dilemmas they face in their day-to-day work. What does the argument made in 
this thesis then say about how humanitarians should relate to cases like that of the 
‘dead’ widow? Briefly recapped, the example was as follows: in a village where 
the local distribution of food customarily went through male heads of the family, a 
widow had been left completely without and was starving to death. Although there 
would have been sufficient resources to feed everyone, this was accepted by her 
fellow villagers because they considered her, as a widow, to be effectively dead 
already. The aid organisation operating in the village was using the local elders as 
the channel of distribution for food aid and had decided not to intervene, explicitly 
in order to ‘respect local culture’, thus condoning the practice. On the basis of the 
‘value contextualist* position outlined in Chapter 3 ,1 have sought to demonstrate 
that the position most consistent with the humanitarian principles would in fact 
have been that aid should have been made available for the woman. Of course, it 
is conceivable that she herself does not want to live, and she ought not to be 
forced to accept assistance against her will; at the same time, the starting 
assumption of a humanitarian aid organisation ought to be that, whatever else 
people may want, chances are that they do want to survive, and thus assistance 
ought to be made available to everyone on an equal basis. This basic commitment 
to egalitarianism (and therefore the principle of impartiality) is arguably also 
reinforced by the contemporary, non-metaphysical view of humans as equally 
valuable value creators. Moreover, I argued that humanitarians should be careful 
in interpreting the commitment to self-determination (which the commitment to 
respect culture arguably represents) in group terms, especially in a context like
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theirs that deals with decisions of life and death. Thus, to accept or decline 
assistance should be the widow’s decision, and hers alone; the views of her fellow 
villagers should not have been taken into account in deciding her access to food 
and therefore survival. Indeed, a practical lesson that can be drawn from this 
example is that humanitarians perhaps ought to think again the use of existing 
distributive structures -  such as elders -  to distribute aid, in particular in situations 
where it is known that the local distributive norms exclude certain individuals or 
groups either in part or entirely on the basis of criteria other than need. Beyond 
providing the widow with access to food (and any other life-saving assistance she 
may need), however, humanitarians ought not to involve themselves in evaluating 
what she wants to do with her life (assuming she chooses to live). This they are 
not sufficiently accountable or otherwise qualified to do, and to engage in such 
wide-reaching projects would also take away scarce resources from their primary 
task of saving lives. Thus, however unjust they may think the overall gender 
relations in the village in question, humanitarians ought not to attempt to change 
them, beyond the way in which they already may do so simply by giving the 
widow the choice to survive, if she so wishes.
In sum, the contribution that the thesis seeks to make has been two-fold: on one 
hand, it has explored the interrelationship between the traditional humanitarian 
principles and the more recently introduced principle of respect for culture in 
humanitarian discourse. The working-out of potential relationships between 
humanitarian principles and culture seeks to provide the intended reader, a 
humanitarian practitioner, with some conceptual tools to categorise, as well as to
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reflect on, different cultural phenomena that he/she encounters in the field. In 
particular, I have wanted to illustrate that, while culture in many respects is 
something positive, or at least neutral, from the point of view of humanitarianism, 
certain cultural phenomena may in practice be antithetical to the aims of 
humanitarian assistance. As was already emphasised in the introduction, however, 
my aim has not been to offer a code of conduct in respect for culture or to improve 
those codes that already exist, but rather to clarify the general guiding principles 
of humanitarian assistance within their broader context, and thus to get 
practitioners to think more clearly about the problems of applying these principles 
while giving due respect to culture. Therefore, on the other hand, in addition to 
examining specifically the problem of respect for culture in humanitarian 
assistance, the thesis also seeks to make a broader conceptual contribution to 
humanitarian thought and offer a contemporary, non-metaphysical defense of the 
traditional humanitarian principles and humanitarian action. In this sense, it also 
seeks to locate the humanitarian principles and action within a more 
comprehensive ‘world view’, in relation to other international institutions and 
activities. In particular, these include the individual states and the states system, 
which I have argued are much better placed than humanitarians to engage in more 
comprehensive projects of social change, as well as ‘global redistributive justice’, 
in relation to which I have argued humanitarian assistance should be seen as a 
necessary complement rather than as an alternative. The ‘world view’ that I have 
proposed is an admittedly liberal one, with its emphasis on individual self- 
determination, moral equality of persons, and on enabling the realisation of as 
great a variety of comprehensive conceptions of human welfare as possible.
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Humanitarians may not necessarily agree with the ‘world view’ that is proposed 
here, or the place of humanitarianism within it; I hope that they will nonetheless 
be prompted by my argument to think how their own views relate to the issues and 
questions raised here, and what alternative ‘world views’ might look like.
In conclusion, the issue of the role of culture and customs in international 
humanitarian assistance can be seen as being both important in itself, as well as 
serving as one entry-point to a broader examination of the foundations of 
humanitarian thought and practice. In the latter sense, studying the implications of 
the norm of respect for culture and customs presents one way of addressing some 
of the main questions that contemporary humanitarians grapple with. It is also 
possible to approach these issues from other angles; for instance, the well-known 
contemporary debates about what constitutes quality and accountability in the 
humanitarian context arguably at bottom deal with similar issues, i.e. what 
humanitarian assistance fundamentally is or ought to be. In this thesis, I have 
sought to offer an argument in favour of an approach to humanitarian aid that 
reaffirms the traditional humanitarian principles -  albeit on a contemporary, 
secular basis -  while at the same time being sensitive to local context.
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